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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1995).
II.
1.

STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Did the trial court err in ruling that the doctrine of

promissory estoppel can be used in Utah to enforce a contract
barred by the Statute of Frauds?

This issue was preserved at

R. 1096-154, 1388-91.
2.

Did the trial court err in finding that Stangl had

established the elements of promissory estoppel?

This issue was

preserved at R. 1906-20, 1921-37, 2213-34.
3.

Did the trial court err

damages which went beyond

in adopting

the period

a measure of

of reliance to reward

Stangl for money he expended during the two-and-a-half years
after the parties' lease negotiations terminated?

This issue

was preserved at R. 1921-37, 2017-27.
4.
to

submit

discovery?

Did the trial court err in repeatedly allowing Stangl
damages

evidence

which

he

failed

to

produce

in

This issue was preserved at R. 2039-2083, 2991-98,

3190-241, 3335, 4309-17, 4410-12, 4461-63, 4636-40, 4646-47,
4835-907.
5.

Did the trial court err in its calculation of damages?

This issue was preserved at R. 2137-45, 4955-56.
III.
1.

The

trial

STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
court's

decision

regarding

the

use

of

promissory estoppel as a defense to the Statute of Frauds was a

-1-

legal conclusion based on the interpretation of a statute.

On

review,

no

the

trial

court's

interpretation

is

accorded

deference and the court's determination of law is reviewed for
correctness.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989);

Asav v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988).
2.

The trial court's decision regarding the existence of

promissory estoppel involves issues regarding the existence of
a cause of action, and the application of existing law to the
facts of this case.

Whether a cause of action exists is a

question of law, and the trial court's decision is accorded no
deference and the court's determination of law is reviewed for
correctness.

Bailev-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet. 876 P. 2d 421,

424 (Utah App. 1994) .

The application of existing law to the

facts of this case is reviewed as a mixed question of law and
fact; the appellate court reviews

findings of fact using a

clearly erroneous standard, and reviews the trial court's legal
conclusions for correctness.

Trolley Square Assoc, v. Nielson,

886 P.2d 61 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296,
1300 (Utah App. 1991).
3.

The

trial

court's

decision

regarding

the

proper

measure of damages for promissory estoppel is a question of law
that

is

reviewed

for

correctness.

Bailey-Allen,

supra.

Alternatively, the decision is reviewed as a mixed question of
law and fact.

State v. Vigil, supra; Klinger v. Kightly, 889

P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah App.1995).
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4.

The trial court's decision regarding the admissibility

of evidence despite the violation of discovery rules is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion or "reasonability" standard.

Utah

D.O.T. v. 6200 South Associates. 872 P.2d 462, 465 (Utah App.
1994) .
5.

The trial court's calculation of damages is a question

of fact which is reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard.
Klinaer v. Kiqhtlv, supra.
IV.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1953):
Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands,
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party to whom the lease or
sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized in writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989):
The following agreements are void unless the
agreement, or some note or memorandum of the
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be
charged with the agreement:
(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to
be performed within one year from the making of the
agreement[.]
V,
A*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of Case, course of Proceedings, and Disposition in
the Court Below.
This action involves a dispute between F.C. Stangl, III

("Stangl") and Ernst Home Center, Inc. ("Ernst") over lease
negotiations between the parties from June to September 1988,
and Ernst's ultimate decision not to lease space from Stangl at
the Jordan Valley Plaza shopping center ("the Plaza").
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Stangl brought suit against Ernst on May 2, 1989, alleging
that Ernst had breached an agreement to enter into a 2 5-year
lease at the Plaza, or alternatively, that he was entitled to
recover damages under promissory estoppel because he purchased
the Plaza in reliance on Ernst. (R. 1-11).
The non-jury trial in this matter commenced February 11,
1993.

(R. 2214).

During trial, Stangl sought to use numerous

exhibits that had not been provided to Ernst in response to pretrial discovery requests, and continually changed his theory and
method of calculating damages.
Exs. 65A-C).

(R. 2991-98, 3190-241, 3335;

After Ernst's strenuous objections and motions to

exclude evidence, the trial court bifurcated
"liability" and "damages" phases.

the trial into

(R. 2000).

The "liability" phase was tried from February 11 to 19,
1993.

(R. 2214).

On April 20, 1993, the trial court issued a

Memorandum Decision which held that Ernst and Stangl had not
entered into a written or oral contract, but left open the issue
of whether Stangl could recover under the theory of promissory
estoppel for events after August 2, 1988.

The court reiterated

its pre-trial ruling that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
could be invoked to bar the application of the Statute of Frauds
under Utah law, relying on Medesco, Inc. v. LNS International,
Inc., 762 F. Supp. 920 (D. Utah 1991).
The

"damages" phase

February 22, 1994.

of the trial

(R. 2214).

(R. 2000-14).
convened

on Tuesday,

On Saturday, February 19th,

Stangl again revised his damages calculation and provided Ernst
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with additional damages documents.

(R. 2039-41).

For example,

Stangl claimed he incurred an additional cost of $48,333.43 for
interest paid on a loan for the Plaza, and produced checks from
1989

and

1990 which, he

(Exs. 88, 66C).

insisted,

substantiated

his

claim.

Despite discovery from Ernst dating back to

1989, and a request for supplementation made over a month before
the "damages" phase of trial, none of these documents had ever
been previously furnished to Ernst.
Stangl
throughout

continued
the

to

change

"damages"

phase.

(R. 2039-2083).
his

damages

Over

calculation

Ernst's

repeated

objections, the trial court admitted Stangl's damages evidence.
(R. 2039-2083, 2229, 4309-17, 4410-12, 4461-63, 4636-40, 464647, 4835-907; Exs. 88, 88A, 89, 404).
The "damages" phase was tried from February 22 to 24, 1994.
(R.

2214).

The

court

subsequently

ruled

that

Stangl

had

established promissory estoppel, and awarded Stangl $331,391 in
damages.

(R. 2229) .

To arrive at this figure, the trial court

started with the purchase price of the Plaza in August 1988,
added over $1 million in costs Stangl claimed he had incurred
during the next two-and-a-half years, and then subtracted rents
Stangl received during that time and the funds he received when
he sold the Plaza in March 1991.

(R. 2228-29/ Ex. 88A) .

The court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and a Judgment on December 27, 1994.
Addendum A ) .

(R. 2213-37) (attached as

Ernst timely filed Defendant's Notice of Appeal on

January 20, 1995.

(R. 2243-44).
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B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Stangl's Background,
Property.

and

Acquisition

of

Brockbank

Stangl is an experienced, sophisticated businessman who has
been involved in real estate development and construction for
over thirty years, and who has experience with all types of
developments,

including

shopping centers.

industrial,

apartment

complexes

and

As of 1988, Stangl owned over 1.5 million

square feet of property in Utah, and had bought and sold 500 to
1,000 pieces of property.

(R. 3274-76).

worth was approximately $24 million.

As of 1988, his net

(R. 3374-75).

From 1979 to 1981, Stangl owned the Plaza property, which
consists

of

various

(R. 2215; Ex. 339).
Plaza

to Roger

building

"pads"

and

parking

areas.

In 1981, Stangl sold the majority of the

Brockbank

("Brockbank")

and

several

of his

relatives, but remained a guarantor of the Brockbanks' loan for
the purchase.
the

Brockbanks'

(R. 2215).
that

(R. 2921-23; Ex. 81). The lender's interest in

foreclosure
Brockbank
bankruptcy.

was

subsequently

assigned

to

Aetna.

In September 1987, Aetna formally notified Stangl

Brockbank,

defaulted.

loan

the

remaining

(R. 2215, 2923).

borrower
Aetna

on the Plaza property
property"),

and

the

initiated

owned

Brockbank

on

loan,

a nonjudicial

by Brockbank

filed

had

for

("the

Chapter

11

(R. 2215-16).

The Aetna foreclosure and Brockbank bankruptcy
Stangl to consider his alternatives.

required

Stangl was aware that the

Brockbank property had been appraised at $1,800,000 in March
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1988.

(R. 3764-66; Ex. 15).

Stangl was also interested in

maximizing the values of the Plaza pads he had retained, and
understood that those pads would be affected by what happened
with the Brockbank property.

(R. 3750, 3763) .

Stangl

in his

had

been

unsuccessful

attempts

easement rights across the Plaza with Aetna.

In addition,
to

negotiate

(R. 3753, 3758-61;

Ex. 394).
On June 29, 1988, Stangl and Brockbank entered

into an

option agreement for Stangl to purchase the Brockbank property,
conditioned on Bankruptcy Court release of the property and
satisfactory title.

(Ex. 3 ) . On July 1, 1988, Stangl made an

offer to purchase Aetna's note on the property for $900,000,
conditioned on satisfactory title and, if necessary, Bankruptcy
Court approval.
July 14, 1988.

(Ex. 315).

Aetna accepted Stangl's offer on

(Ex. 11).

By letter dated July 28, 1988, Stangl exercised his option
to purchase the Brockbank property, and indicated that the sale
could close after the property could be transferred free and
clear of all liens.

(Ex. 66F) .

That same day, Stangl also

closed on a $3.6 million loan from Valley Mortgage Corporation
("Valley Mortgage")
develop the Plaza.

to purchase

the

Brockbank

property

and

(Ex. 19B). According to the July 18, 1988

Loan Submission to Valley Mortgage, a portion of the loan was to
be

used

to

pay

off

tax

liens

(Ex. 16, p. 6) .
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on

the

Brockbank

property.

As of August 1, 1988, all of the interested parties in
Brockbank's bankruptcy had agreed to the terms of a Bankruptcy
Court

Order

(Ex. 322).

Approving
The

Sale

Bankruptcy

of
Court

the

Brockbank

Order

also

remaining liens and encumbrances on the property.

property,

removed

all

(R. 3958-60).

Stangl's purchase of the property closed on August 9, 1988.
(Ex. 66A).
2.

Lease negotiations.

In late May 1988, Steve Pruitt ("Pruitt"), acting on behalf
of Stangl, called

Ernst's Vice President

in charge

of real

estate, Mack DuBose ("DuBose"), to see if Ernst was interested
in

leasing

space

at the Plaza.

(R.

2216,

4125) .

DuBose

indicated some interest, and on June 3, 1988, Pruitt sent DuBose
a letter and some materials on the Plaza.

(R. 2216).

Pruitt's

June 3rd letter explained that Stangl was repurchasing the Plaza
and "should have possession of the property by the end of this
month."

(Ex. 2) (attached as Addendum B ) .

At no time did Stangl or anyone representing him correct
the

information

conveyed

to

Ernst

in

the

June

regarding his ownership of the Plaza property.

3rd

letter

Stangl admitted

at trial that he:
•

never corrected the June 3rd letter's timeline for his
acquisition of the property (R. 3778) ;

•

never told Ernst about the acts he was taking to
reacquire title to the property (R. 3780-85);

•

never told Ernst he had
Brockbank (R. 3780-83);
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an

option

agreement

with

•

never told Ernst he agreed to purchase Aetna's note
(R. 3783-84);

•

never told Ernst he borrowed money from
Mortgage for the property (R. 3 784-85); and

•

never told
(R. 3785).

Based

on

Ernst

Pruitt's

when

letter

negotiations, Ernst reached
Stangl

owned

the Plaza

the

property.

he

closed

and

the

his

purchase

subsequent

inescapable
(R.

on

Valley

lease

conclusion

3498-500).

that

Ernst's

conclusion was further reinforced by zoning documents Stangl
submitted to the City of West Jordan in July 1988 in which he
listed himself as owner.

(R. 3789-90; Exs. 7, 19).

Stangl

never corrected Ernst's conclusion that he owned the property.
On June 23, 1988, Pruitt sent a second letter to DuBose
which set forth the general terms of a lease which would be
acceptable to Stangl.

The letter included a signature line for

Ernst to indicate its acceptance, and asked DuBose to return a
signed copy if the terms were acceptable.
Pruitt's June 23rd letter.

Ernst never signed

(R. 3505-06; Ex. 3) (Ex. 3 attached

as Addendum C ) .
DuBose responded by letter dated June 29, 1988.

DuBose's

letter identified twelve disagreements with the general terms
proposed by Pruitt, including a substantially lower percentage
rent and a substantially lower percentage of base rent increase.
(Ex. 6) (attached as Addendum D ) .
On July 8, 1988, DuBose sent Pruitt a formal Offer to
Lease.

The Offer went into considerable detail about Ernst's

requirements, and repeated the terms previously set forth in
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DuBose's June 29, 1988 letter.

The Offer also included the

following provision:
DOCUMENTATION AND APPROVAL - Finalization of the
agreement contemplated by this letter is subject to
the preparation of and execution of a Lease Agreement
in form and content acceptable to Ernst Home Center,
Inc., a Washington Corporation, and Valley Indoor
Marketplace, Inc., a Utah Corporation, and their
respective counsel.
The Offer ended by stating "If you agree with this proposal,
please

acknowledge

letter.

by

returning

a

signed

original

of

this

We will then instruct our attorneys to proceed with the

preparation of the Lease."

(Ex. 9A) (attached as Addendum E ) .

Stangl never signed the Offer.

(R. 3520).

Stangl countered DuBose's Offer to Lease by letter dated
July 14, 1988. Stangl's counteroffer proposed numerous changes.
Stangl's counteroffer also included the same "DOCUMENTATION &
APPROVAL" provision as Ernst's Offer, except that "F.C. Stangl
III" was substituted for "Valley Indoor Marketplace."

Stangl's

letter closed by stating:
If you
agree
with
this
proposal,
please
acknowledge by returning a signed original of this
letter. This letter is offered for your acceptance,
but the offer will be withdrawn if not accepted as
offered and returned to me prior to July 20, 1988, at
5:00 P.M.
(Ex.

12)

(attached as Addendum

F) .

Ernst never returned a

signed copy of Stangl's July 14, 1988 letter.

(R. 3532).

On July 15, 1995, DuBose sent Stangl a copy of Ernst's form
lease.

(Ex. 13).

Despite the fact that neither party had

signed and returned the other's Offer to Lease, negotiations
continued.

On August 2, 1988, DuBose called Pruitt and told him
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that Ernst management had approved the project and that another
offer to lease would be forthcoming.

(R. 3543-45).

On August 3, 1988, DuBose sent Stangl a second Offer to
Lease.
Stangl

(Ex. 22)
sent

changes.

(attached as Addendum G) .

DuBose

the

Ernst

form

lease

On August 5th,
with

(Ex. 24) (attached as Addendum H) .

DuBose returned a revised lease to Stangl.

substantial

On August 23rd,

(Ex. 26) (first page

attached as Addendum I ) . Although DuBose indicated that Ernst
was ready to execute the August 23rd lease as written, Stangl
responded by proposing further substantial changes by letter
dated August 29th.

(Ex. 27) (attached as Addendum J ) .

The exchange of lease drafts culminated in a letter from
DuBose to Stangl on September 12, 1988. The letter specifically
addressed each of Stangl's most recent proposed changes.
concluded

the

letter

negotiations

would

significant

remaining

September 14, 1988.

by

stating

terminate
issues,

there

absent
and

asked

was

a

risk

resolution
for

a

DuBose
that

of

the

meeting

(Ex. 31) (attached as Addendum K ) .

on

After

the September 14, 1988 meeting, at least five issues were left
unresolved between the parties.

(R. 3562-74; Ex. 30).

The parties never signed a lease agreement, a letter, a
memorandum, or any other document indicating they had reached an
agreement.

(R. 3574-77).

On September 29, 1988, Ernst formally

notified Stangl that it had elected not to continue negotiations
and would not be a tenant in the Jordan Valley Plaza.
(attached as Addendum L ) .
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(Ex. 35)

VI.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The judgment against Ernst in this case is contrary to Utah
law and must be reversed.

The judgment

is premised on the

doctrine of promissory estoppel, but promissory estoppel cannot
be utilized in this case.

The "promise" relied upon by the

trial court is an alleged agreement by Ernst to enter into a 25year

lease with

Stangl, a promise which

Statute of Frauds.

is subject

to the

Utah law does not, however, recognize a

promissory estoppel exception to the Statute of Frauds.

The

exception to the Statute of Frauds relied upon by the trial
court is contrary to Utah law regarding the Statute as well as
contracts, and has been rejected in a number of other states.
Even

if promissory

estoppel

applies

in this

case, the

judgment must be reversed because the evidence does not support
application of the doctrine.

Ernst did not have the requisite

awareness that Stangl was purchasing the Brockbank property in
reliance on its alleged "promise" to lease, nor did Ernst make
a definite and certain "promise" to enter into a lease agreement
with Stangl regardless of the circumstances.

Moreover, Stangl

did not purchase the Brockbank property in reasonable reliance
on Ernst's alleged promise, and did not suffer any detriment as
a result of his alleged reliance because the Brockbank property
he

purchased

had

a positive

value

when

Ernst

ended

lease

negotiations.
And even if promissory estoppel applies in this case, and
its requirements have been satisfied, the trial court judgment
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must still be reversed.

The court employed an incorrect measure

of damages, and erred in repeatedly allowing Stangl to submit
damages evidence he failed to produce in discovery.
Beyond legal arguments, the judgment against Ernst must
also be reversed because it is contrary to equity and common
sense.

The

judgment

allows

Stangl

to

recover

for

Ernst's

alleged "promise" to enter into a lease agreement, despite the
fact that the parties never agreed on the terms of a lease, and
the fact that Stangl repeatedly rejected the terms offered by
Ernst.
Moreover, the

judgment holds

Ernst

liable

for an oral

agreement when both Ernst and Stangl specifically conditioned
their negotiations on the requirement that any final agreement
must be in writing and signed.
these

circumstances

commercially

Employing promissory estoppel in

effectively

sophisticated

eliminates

businesses

to

the

ability

allocate

risk

of
by

setting the parameters for their negotiations.
The judgment also holds Ernst liable for Stangl's purchase
of the Brockbank property even though Stangl told Ernst prior to
negotiations that he was already in the process of repurchasing
the property, and that he would own it by the end of June 1988.
Promissory estoppel requires awareness of all material facts and
knowing inducement, neither of which existed at the time of the
"promise" relied upon by the court because Ernst thought Stangl
already owned the property, and Stangl never corrected
impression.
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that

Finally, the judgment below must be reversed because of its
affect on the ability of people to conduct orderly business
negotiations in Utah.
Stangl,

the

court

negotiations.
offers

by

By enforcing the "promise" alleged by
allowed

him

to

rewrite

the

parties'

Even though Stangl rejected two different lease

Ernst

after

August

2nd,

the

court

enforced

his

promissory estoppel claim based on an August 2nd "promise."
The trial court's use of promissory
upheld by this Court.

estoppel cannot be

Promissory estoppel cannot be utilized to

enforce an "agreement" arbitrarily located at some mid-point in
failed contract negotiations, nor can it be used as a cure-all
for unsuccessful
chance.

negotiators

who

desperately

want

a

second

Neither law nor equity supports a judgment against

Ernst based on promissory estoppel.
VII.
A.

ARGUMENT

Promissory estoppel cannot be utilized in this case.
The

trial

court

correctly

concluded

that

Ernst

never

entered into a written or oral contract with Stangl to lease
space at the Plaza.

Nevertheless, the court relied upon the

doctrine of promissory estoppel to conclude that Ernst could be
held

liable

in this

case.

The

trial

court's

reliance

on

promissory estoppel was directly contrary to Utah law.
1.

The "promise" relied upon by the trial court is an
alleged agreement by Ernst to enter into a 25-year
lease with Stangl which is subject to the Statute of
Frauds.

To establish promissory estoppel under Utah law, a party
must prove:
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(1) a promise the promisor reasonably expects will
induce reliance; (2) reasonable reliance inducing
action or forbearance by the promisee or a third
person; and (3) detriment to the promisee or third
person.
Prows v. State, 823 P.2d 764, 768-69 (Utah 1991).
The

trial

Ernst's alleged
Plaza.

court

premised

its

finding

of

"promise to lease the anchor

liability

on

space" in the

(R. 2232 - Conclusion No. 10). According to the court:

Ernst through its words and conduct represented
to Stangl that it would enter into an agreement with
Stangl to lease the anchor space at the Plaza with
remodeling to be done and possession to be taken on a
"fast track" basis.
(R. 2230 - Conclusion

No. 4) .

The

trial

court

based

its

decision on two other conclusions:
2.
Beginning with its June 29 letter, Ernst set
negotiations on a course such that any reasonable
lessor should reasonably expect Ernst to be bound by
a mutually acceptable "Offer to Lease" containing the
significant business points. . . .
3.
It was not unreasonable for Stangl to
believe that the project would proceed following
DuBose's phone calls of August 2. . . .
(R. 2230).
Whether the "promise" found by the court is characterized
as a 2 5-year lease agreement or an agreement to enter into such
a lease, it is governed by the Utah Statute of Frauds.

As the

court noted in S.C.M. Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber. 732 P.2d 105
(Utah 1986):
The contract to extend or renew the written lease for
five years, was oral. It was tantamount to an oral
contract to make a lease . . . [and] is governed by
the statute of frauds the same as if an oral lease was
made. An oral agreement to make a contract which must
itself be in writing is itself within the statute of
frauds.
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S.C.M. Land, at

107, quoting Utah Mercur

Goldmining

Co. v,

Herschel Goldmining Co. , 103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah
1943).

See also Zeese v. Estate of

Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 88

(Utah 1975) (lease agreements are subject to the section of the
Statute

of

Frauds

covering

contracts,

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 25-5-4(1), as well as Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3, the section
covering interests in real property).
Under the Utah Statute of Frauds, Ernst's alleged oral
promise to enter into a 25-year lease with Stangl cannot be
enforced.

According to the Statute, an agreement to lease an

interest in land, or an agreement which by its terms cannot be
completed
writing.
2.

in one year, cannot

be enforced

unless

it

is in

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-3, 25-5-4(1).
Utah law does not recognize a promise to execute a
contract governed by the Statute of Frauds as grounds
for promissory estoppel.

To avoid the consequences of the Statute of Frauds, the
trial court relied upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Under Utah law, however, Ernst's alleged oral promise to enter
into a 25-year

lease with Stangl cannot

promissory estoppel.

form the basis for

Utah courts have consistently refused to

employ promissory estoppel to enforce a promise to execute a
contract barred by the Statute of Frauds.
In McKinnon v. The Corporation of the President of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434 (Utah
1974), the plaintiff claimed the defendant had breached an oral
agreement to enter into a contract granting him a haulage right-

-16-

of-way over certain federal lands.

The defendant denied the

existence of a contract, and asserted the Utah Statute of Frauds
in its defense.

At summary judgment, the plaintiff argued that

the defendant was estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds.
Although the parties had conducted negotiations for the
right-of-way, and the plaintiff had withdrawn his application to
lease an adjoining piece of property, the Utah Supreme Court
determined that promissory estoppel could not be used by the
plaintiff to establish liability.

According to the court:

In Easton v. Wvcoff, this court stated that the
doctrine of promissory estoppel had been extended, in
a limited form, to those cases concerned with the
Statute of Limitations or the Statute of Frauds, where
the promise as to future conduct constituted an
intended abandonment of an existing right of the
promisor.
However, a mere promise to execute a
written contract and a subsequent refusal to do so is
insufficient to create an estoppel, although reliance
is placed on such a promise and damage is sustained as
a consequence of the refusal.
McKinnon, 529 P.2d at 436-437 (footnote omitted).
Although the plaintiff "marshalled a plethora of factual
issues which he urges must be resolved at trial," the Supreme
Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of his action
because there was no evidence of "conduct on the part of the
defendant that is tantamount to a representation that it would
not avail itself of the Statute of Frauds."

McKinnon, at 437.

McKinnon relied on two prior Utah cases, Easton v. Wycoff,
4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332 (Utah 1956), and Ravarino v. Price,
123

Utah

559, 260

P.2d

570

(Utah

1953).

In

Easton,

the

plaintiff claimed the defendant had orally agreed to the terms
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of a lease and had promised to prepare a written lease, but that
no lease was ever prepared or executed.

To overcome a Statute

of Frauds defense, the plaintiff relied on promissory estoppel.
The Utah Supreme Court in Easton upheld the dismissal of
the plaintiff's claim.

According to the court:

In most instances of negotiations for transactions
included within the Statute, a reduction of the
contract to writing is contemplated and, in all
probability, the parties will discuss who will draw
the instrument and where and when it will be signed.
The mere refusal to execute a written contract as
agreed does not constitute 'fraud' within the rule
that the Statute of Frauds will not be enforced where
the effect would be to perpetrate a fraud, and to hold
otherwise would, in effect, completely nullify the
Statute of Frauds.
Easton, 295 P.2d at 333 (citation omitted).
In

Ravarino,

the

plaintiff

sought

to

enforce

the

defendants7 oral agreement to convey two tracts of land.

The

Utah Supreme Court ruled the plaintiff could not use promissory
estoppel to enforce a contract barred by the Statute of Frauds:
[W]e conclude the general rule applies that an
estoppel will not arise simply because of a breach of
a promise as to future conduct or because of a
disappointment
of expectations
on an
executory
agreement. In Elliot v. Whitmore, supra, this court
announced the same doctrine:
'Even taking these
conversations in the most favorable view for the
appellant, there was absolutely no statement upon the
part of the defendants of an intended abandonment of
an existing right. It was merely an acquiescence in
the plaintiff's proposition.'
Ravarino, 260 P.2d at 577 (citations omitted).
Under

Utah

law,

therefore,

the

doctrine

estoppel cannot be utilized in this case.

of

promissory

Ernst began its lease

negotiations with Stangl by clearly stating that any agreement
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would have to be in writing and signed by the parties (Ex. 9A),
and there is no evidence Ernst ever abandoned that requirement
or its rights under the Statute of Frauds.

Accordingly, the

trial court erred as a matter of law in allowing Stangl to
recover based on promissory estoppel.
The trial court's reliance on Medesco
v.
LNS
International
was contrary to Utah law regarding the
Statute of Frauds.

3.

Despite the clear language in the decisions cited above,
the trial court ignored Utah precedent and relied on the U.S
District

Court's

decision

in Medesco

v.

LNS

International.

supra, to conclude that "promissory estoppel may be invoked to
bar the application of the Statute of Frauds."

(R. 2012).

The

trial court's conclusion was contrary to Utah law.
The District Court in Medesco ruled that the formulations
of promissory estoppel in McKinnon, Easton, and Ravarino were
"dated" by the Utah Supreme Court's subsequent adoption of the
formulation of promissory estoppel in § 90 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.

Medesco, 762 F. Supp. at 925

attached

together

at Addendum M,

with

all

other

(case

cases

not

reported in West's Pacific 2d Reporter).

The District Court

therefore

decisions

concluded

that

the

prior

Utah

were

of

"dubious precedential value,11 and instead adopted the exception
to the Statute of Frauds in Restatement
§ 139.

Medesco, at 925 n.8, 926.

(Second) of Contracts

Section 139 provides that a

promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee is enforceable
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notwithstanding

the

Statute

of

Frauds

if

injustice

can

be

avoided only be enforcement of the promise.
The
Although

trial
Utah

court's
courts

reliance

have

on

adopted

Medesco
§

9 0 of

was

erroneous.

the

Restatement

(Second) of Contracts, see, e.g., Rose v. Allied Development
Co., 719 P.2d 83, 87 (Utah 1986), they have never rejected the
rule in McKinnon, and have never adopted the exception to the
Statute of Frauds in Restatement § 13 9.
In fact, the exception
strict

application

of

the

in § 13 9 is contrary
Statute

of

Frauds.

to Utah's
In

Machan

Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western Real Estate & Development
Co. , 779 P.2d 230 (Utah App. 1989), the court held that even
construing various writings together did not satisfy the Statute
of Frauds because they did not show a consummated agreement was
entered into, only a willingness to enter into one.
235.

Machan, at

The court cited 2A Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 516 at

547 (1950), for the proposition that "writings must so clearly
evidence the fact that a contract was made, and what its terms
are, 'that there is no serious possibility that the assertion of
the contract is false'.11
The

Statute

of

Machan, supra.

Frauds

was

also

strictly

enforced

in

Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578
(Utah 1952).
writing

In Birdzell, the Utah Supreme Court held that a

or memorandum

sufficient

to

satisfy

the Statute of

Frauds must contain all the essential terms and provisions of
the contract.

The court held that a letter relied upon by the
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plaintiff was not sufficient to form

a contract because it

lacked "an acknowledgment or recognition that a contract has
been entered into by the parties.11

Birdzell, 242 P. 2d at 580.

By its very language, the letter purports to be
nothing more than an expression of willingness on the
part of respondent, if it is successful in obtaining
a renewal of its lease with the railroad, to sublease
the premises to the appellant upon certain terms and
conditions. The letter contains no allusion to even
any previous negotiations between the parties.
In
fact, the letter implies that no agreement has been
therefore reached since it sets forth the terms upon
which the respondent would be willing to sublease to
the appellant.
Birdzell. supra.
The application of the Statute of Frauds in Machan and
Birdzell is inconsistent with the notion that a mere "promise"
to

enter

into

a contract

covered

by

the

Statute

would

be

sufficient to establish liability.
The exception in § 139 is also contrary to the purpose and
intent of Utah's Statute of Frauds.

According to English v.

Standard Optical Co. , 814 P.2d 613 (Utah App. 1991), the purpose
of the Statute is "that in important matters such as the demise
of a ten-year leasehold in real property the parties should be
protected against frauds and perjuries."

Standard Optical, at

616; see also Guinand v. Walton. 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 467,
469

(Utah

1969).

"Statute

of

Frauds

are

intended

to

bar

enforcement of certain agreements that the law requires to be
memorialized in writing."

Colonial Leasing Co. of New England.

Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Constr. Co.. 731 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1986).
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The Statute of Frauds recognizes that certain types of
agreements are so important, or will affect the parties for such
a significant length of time, that they must be in writing in
order to be enforceable•
allow

the

enforcement

Adopting the exception in § 13 9 would
of

oral

contracts

which

the

Statute

specifically requires to be in writing, and would effectively
render the Statute meaningless.

The exception

in § 13 9 is

directly contrary to the purpose and intent of Utah's Statute of
Frauds.

The trial court's reliance on Medesco and § 139 was

therefore erroneous.
4.

The exception
contract law.

in Medesco

is also contrary to Utah

The § 139 exception adopted in Medesco is also contrary to
Utah contract law.

Utah courts recognize that when a party

specifically conditions its obligation on the execution of a
signed, written contract, that condition must be met before an
agreement will be enforced.
In

Engineering

Association.

Association, Inc., 622 P.2d 784

Inc.

v.

Irving

Place

(Utah 1980), the court held

there was no contract because of a clause in a letter which
stated:

"Upon

our

timely

receipt

of

the

foregoing

and

our

execution of both copies of this letter by the chairman of the
board

or

and

[sic] executive

binding agreement between us."

officer,

this

shall

become a

According to the court:

If the parties make it clear that they do not intend
that there should be legal consequences unless and
until a form of writing is executed, there is no
contract until that time.
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Engineering Association, at 787.
A similar conclusion was reached in Harmen v. Greenwood,
596 P.2d 636 (Utah 1979), where the court held that a letter of
intent was not an enforceable contract.
In Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 427,
428 (1961), this court stated:
A condition precedent to the enforcement
of any contract is that there be a meeting
of the minds of the parties which must be
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly,
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced.
This basic principle of contract law, when
applied to the circumstances of the negotiations
between the parties, requires the conclusion made by
the district court.
The Letter of Intent, quoted
above, is not by itself an enforceable contract.
Nowhere in its forms are any binding promises even
made; it is precisely what it purports to be, a letter
indicating the intention of the parties to enter into,
at a later time, a binding agreement. The letter is
a variation of what is often called an "agreement to
agree".
Such "agreements to agree" are generally
unenforceable because they leave open material terms
for future consideration, and the courts cannot create
these terms for the parties. Here, the parties simply
committed themselves to the intention of entering into
an agreement at a later time. . . .
As we stated in
Valcarce, " . . . where there was simply some nebulous
notion in the air that a contract might be entered in
the future, the court cannot fabricate the kind of
contract the parties ought to have made and enforce
it."
Harmen. at 638-39.
In this case,

DuBose's

July

8th

Offer

and

Stangl's

July 14th Offer both specifically stated that "[f]inalization of
the agreement contemplated by this letter is subject to the
preparation of and execution of a Lease Agreement in form and
content acceptable" to both parties.

(Exs. 9A, 12) . Neither of

these letters was ever signed and no final written agreement was
ever prepared or executed by the parties.
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Under Utah contract law, Stangl cannot enforce the alleged
oral "promise" to contract in this case.

Enforcing such an

agreement would be directly contrary to the parameters set out
by the parties in their respective Offers to Lease.

The trial

court therefore erred in using § 139 to enforce a "promise" the
parties themselves intended to be unenforceable.
5.

Other states have rejected
Statute of Frauds adopted in

the exception
Medesco.

to

the

Contrary to the reasoning in Medesco, the mere fact that
Utah courts have adopted the definition of promissory estoppel
in § 90 of the Restatement
exception

to the

adopted.

A number of states which utilize the definition of

promissory
exception

Statute

(Second) does not mean that the

estoppel

from

in § 139.

of

Frauds

§ 90

have

See, e.g..

in

§ 139

refused

must

to

also

adopt

Greaves v. Medical

be

the

Imaging

Systems, Inc., 124 Wash.2d 389, 879 P.2d 276 (1994); Stearns v.
Emery-Waterhouse Co., 596 A.2d 72 (Maine 1991); Farmland Service
COOP.,

Inc. v. Klein. 196 Neb. 538, 244 N.W.2d 86 (1976); see

generally

Comment

Note,

Promissory

Estoppel

as

Basis

for

Avoidance of Statute of Frauds, 56 A.L.R.3d 1037 §§ 4(a), 4(b);
see also Collier v. Brooks, 632 So.2d 149 (Fla. App. 1994).
The philosophy of those jurisdictions was succinctly stated
in Schwedes v. Romain, 179 Montana 466, 587 P.2d
which

also rejected

a promissory

estoppel

388

(1978),

exception

to the

Statute of Frauds:
Where a case is clearly within the statute of frauds,
promissory estoppel is inapplicable, for the net
effect would be to repeal the statute completely . . .
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[T]he breach of a promise which the law does not
regard as binding is not a fraud.
Schwedes. 587 P.2d at 392.
If this Court decides to overrule McKinnon and permit a
promissory estoppel exception to the Statute of Frauds, Ernst
submits that the limited exceptions recognized under Texas law,
or the limited exceptions recognized in other states, are more
consistent with Utah law than Restatement § 139.

As detailed

below, these exceptions would preserve the Utah Statute of
Frauds, and would apply only in circumstances where interposing
the Statute of Frauds would itself perpetuate a fraud.
Texas recognizes a limited promissory estoppel exception to
the Statute of Frauds when the promise at issue is one to
execute an agreed upon written contract. In Beta Drilling, Inc.
v. Durkee. 821 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.—Houston 1992), the court
summarized Texas law as follows:
For promissory estoppel to create an exception to
the statute of frauds, there must have been a promise
to sign a written contract which had been prepared and
which would satisfy the requirements of the statute of
frauds. A promise to prepare a written contract is
not sufficient. The defendant must have promised to
sign a particular agreement which was in writing at
the time.
Beta Drilling, 821 S.W.2d at 741 (citations omitted).
Texas law bars the use of promissory estoppel in cases
significantly similar to this one.

In H. Molsen & Co, Inc. v.

Hicks. 550 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1977), the parties
conducted negotiations and prepared a written document, but
changes still needed to be made and the sellers' attorney had to
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approve the contract before it could be executed.

The court

held that under the circumstances, "there was no meeting of the
minds as to the final terms and no acceptance by the [sellers]
of the writings.11
the

court

refused

H. Molsen, 550 S.W.2d at 356.
to

apply

promissory

application of the Statute of Frauds.

estoppel

Accordingly,
to

bar

the

Id.

In Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc. , 851 F.2d 763
(5th

Cir.

1988) , Southmark

contended

that

it

had

an

oral

agreement with Life Investors to purchase some $63 million worth
of stock.

Life Investors countered with a Statute of Frauds

defense, and Southmark replied that promissory estoppel barred
the use of that defense.
introduced
stated

affidavits

that

Life

from

To support its claim,
two

Investors

of

its

Southmark

vice-presidents,

representatives

told

them

who
an

agreement had been reached and that Life Investors would execute
final documents evidencing the agreement.

Southmark argued that

the affidavits raised fact issued regarding promissory estoppel.
Relying on Texas law, the Fifth Circuit refused to find
promissory estoppel applicable:
[A]t most the parties contemplated final documents
that were to be prepared and approved sometime in the
future. But in a transaction involving the sale of a
controlling share of the stock of an ongoing business
at a purchase price in the tens of millions of dollars
. . . there is certainly an expectation on both sides
that documents will be prepared once the parties reach
an agreement.
We cannot say that . . . justice
requires the enforcement of an oral promise to reduce
the agreement to writing or to execute final documents
at a later time, especially where, as here, it does
not appear that the parties had even worked out the
final details of the alleged transaction.
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Southmark. 851 F.2d at 769.
The Fifth Circuit found that the Statute of Frauds would be
rendered meaningless

if promissory

estoppel were applied to

situations in which parties acknowledge agreement and the need
to convert that agreement into writing, especially when the
wording of the document has yet to be agreed upon.
concluded

by finding, pursuant to Texas

The court

law, that proof of

either an existing written document, or an agreement on the
wording of that document, is required to raise a fact issue of
promissory estoppel.

Id. See also Coastal Corp. v. Atlantic

Richfield Co., 852 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993).
Other states hold that promissory estoppel may be used to
preclude the Statute of Frauds only when there has been (1) a
misrepresentation

that the Statute's

complied with, or

requirements

have

been

(2) a promise to make a memorandum of an

otherwise complete oral agreement.

See, e.g., MH Investment Co.

v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 162 Ariz.
(Ariz. App. 1989); Chapman v. Bomann.

569, 785 P.2d 89

381 A.2d

1123

(Maine

1978); Del Haves & Sons v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 283, 230
N.W.2d

588, 593-94

(1975);

see

generally

56

A.L.R.3d

1037

§§ 4(c), 5.
In adopting the foregoing exception, the Ohio Court of
Appeals in McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Haiman Co., L.P.A., v.
First Union Management, Inc., 87 Ohio App. 3d 613, 622 N.E.2d
1093 (1993), explained its decision as follows:
[T]his court adopts the approach taken by those
courts which hold that the doctrine of promissory
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estoppel may be used to preclude a defense of statute
of frauds, but only when there has been (1) a
misrepresentation that the statute's requirements have
been complied with or (2) a promise to make a
memorandum of the agreement. This approach adheres to
the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel as
adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court and stated in
Restatement
2d
of
Contracts,
Section
90.
Additionally, it promotes a balanced approach to
encouraging those in business to reduce their
agreements to writing and thereby adhering to the
policy considerations behind the statute of frauds
while at the same time providing a mitigating effect
to the harsh application of the statute of frauds and
assures
fairness
in business
relationships
by
protecting one who relies to his detriment on the
promise of another.
McCarthy, 622 N.E.2d at 1102.
Under

either

the

Texas

exception

or

the

exceptions

recognized in McCarthy, promissory estoppel could not be used to
impose liability in this case.

The trial court determined that

no written

existed.

or

oral

contract

Thus,

there

was

no

"promise to sign a written contract which had been prepared and
which would satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds,"
Beta Drilling, supra. nor was there any misrepresentation that
the Statute's requirements have been complied with, or a promise
to make a memorandum of an otherwise complete oral agreement.
B.

Even if promissory estoppel applies in this case, the
evidence does not support a finding of promissory estoppel.
Even

if

this

Court

agrees

with

Medesco

and

permits

promissory estoppel to be used to defeat the Statute of Frauds
in this case, the evidence at trial was not sufficient to meet
the requirements of promissory estoppel under Utah law or under
Restatement § 139:
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•

Ernst did not have the requisite awareness that Stangl
was purchasing the Brockbank property in alleged
reliance on a lease agreement;

•

Ernst did not make a definite and certain "promise" to
enter into a lease agreement with Stangl regardless of
the circumstances;

•

Stangl did not purchase the Brockbank property in
reasonable reliance on Ernst's alleged promise; and

•

Stangl did not suffer any detriment as a result of his
alleged reliance because the Brockbank property had a
positive value when Ernst ended lease negotiations.

Under the facts of this case, the trial court's judgment must be
reversed.
1.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts S 139.

Restatement

(Second)

of

Contracts

§

139

provides

follows:
(1) A promise which
the
promisor
should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on
the part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable
notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy for breach is limited as justice requires.
(2) In determining whether injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise, the
following circumstances are significant:
(a) the availability and adequacy of other
remedies, particularly
cancellation
and restitution;
(b) the definite and substantial character
of the action or forbearance
in
relation to the remedy sought;
(c) the extent to which the action or
forbearance corroborates evidence of
the making and terms of the promise,
or the making and terms are otherwise
established by clear and convincing
evidence;
(d) the reasonableness of the action or
forbearance;
(e) the extent to which the action or
forbearance was foreseeable by the
promisor.
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as

2.

Ernst was not aware of all material facts.

Under Utah law, the factual prerequisites for promissory
estoppel are that the defendant was "aware of all the material
facts11 and "that in such awareness

[the defendant] made the

promise when [the defendant] knew that the plaintiff was acting
in reliance on it."

Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848

P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993), quoting Union Tank Car Co. v. Wheat
Bros. . 15

Utah

2d

101,

387

P.2d

1000,

1003

(Utah

1964).

Restatement § 139(1) also mandates that the promisee's actions
be foreseeable by the promisor, and that the promisor knowingly
induced the promisee to act.
In this case, "all the material facts" must include an
awareness by Ernst that Stangl was purchasing the Brockbank
property based on his belief that Ernst had promised to enter
into

a

lease

agreement.

As

noted

above,

the

"promise"

identified by the trial court was Ernst's alleged promise to
lease space at the Plaza.
concluded
obligations

that
and

it

was

proceed

renovating the property."

Based on that "promise," the court
reasonable
with

the

for

project

Stangl
bv

to

"incur

acquiring

and

(R. 2231, Finding No. 5) (emphasis

added).
Notwithstanding the court's conclusion, there is no finding
that Ernst had any understanding that Stangl was purchasing the
Brockbank property based on a lease with Ernst, nor is there any
evidence to support such a finding.

Stangl solicited Ernst's

business, and his June 3, 1988 letter informed Ernst that he was
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already

repurchasing

the

property

possession by the end of the month.

and

expected

to

have

Stangl admitted he never

corrected the June 3rd letter, and never told Ernst about the
acts he was taking to reacquire title to the property.
The only "material facts" Ernst possessed, therefore, were
that Stangl had taken steps to reacquire the Plaza before lease
negotiations had even begun, and that Stangl owned the property
well before Ernst's July 8th Offer to Lease.

Accordingly, Ernst

lacked the awareness necessary to knowingly induce Stangl to
purchase the Brockbank property.

Promissory estoppel cannot,

therefore, be invoked in this case.
3.

No "promise11 to enter into a lease agreement
regardless of the terms was ever made by Ernst.

To support

a finding

of promissory

estoppel, Utah

law

requires the following type of promise:
[T]he promise or representation must be sufficiently
definite and certain that the plaintiff acting as a
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances
would be justified in placing reliance upon it; and in
case of uncertainty or doubt the responsibility is
upon the plaintiff to ascertain the facts before
acting upon it.
Petty v. Gindv Manuf. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30, 35-36
(Utah 1965).

Moreover, under Restatement § 139(1), the promise

must be one "which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee."
Utah law also recognizes that unaccepted offers made in
contract negotiations do not constitute promises sufficient to
support a finding of estoppel.

In R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v.

Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817 (Utah 1952), for example, the
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Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rejection of a
promissory estoppel claim based on an unaccepted offer.

Thomas

B. Child & Company ("Child") had submitted a bid to do masonry
work to R.J. Daum Construction Company ("R.J. Daum"), which R.J.
Daum used in making a successful bid for a construction job.
Prior to the award of the contract, R.J. Daum and Child had
engaged in contract negotiations and exchanged proposals, but
had not reached an agreement.

After the government contract was

awarded, R.J. Daum sent Child a proposed subcontract.

Child

objected to some of the terms of the subcontract, and refused to
do any masonry work.

R.J. Daum, 247 P.2d at 197-99.

R.J. Daum subsequently sued, alleging breach of contract
and promissory estoppel.
ruling

that

proposed

no

contract

The court rejected the contract claim,
had

been made

because

subcontract was not an unconditional

Child's bid, but a counteroffer.

R.J.

Damn's

acceptance of

R.J. Daum, at 2 02.

The court

also rejected R.J. Daum's promissory estoppel claim:
The contention that [Child is] estopped from
denying that there was a contract needs little
consideration. Here, as we have shown, [R.J. Daum]
did not accept [Child's] offer but submitted a
counter-offer.
Under such circumstances it did not
rely on the offer but was seeking to get a better one.
There is a recognized doctrine of promissory estoppel
usually involving offers to make a gift, where
although accepted, no binding contract results because
there was no consideration. We know of no case where
an offeror has been held to be bound by estoppel
without an acceptance of his offer.
R.J. Daum, at 207-08.
In the present case, a binding promise by Ernst was never
made.

Despite the trial court's conclusion
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that

Ernst had

promised to enter into a lease agreement, there is no finding of
fact which identifies a "definite and certain" promise to that
effect by Ernst, and no evidence which would support such a
finding.

Instead, the parties merely expressed optimism that

they "could" reach a mutually acceptable agreement.
Finding No. 18) .

(R. 2219 -

The court specifically found that there was

"insufficient credible evidence" to establish that the parties
had ever agreed on all significant lease points.

(R. 2220-21,

2223 - Findings Nos. 21, 22, 27).
In the context of ongoing lease negotiations which never
resulted in an agreed-upon lease, the lack of such a promise is
understandable.

See R.J. Daum, supra.

Moreover, given the

mutual requirement that there would be no binding

agreement

until "the preparation of and execution of a Lease Agreement in
form and content acceptable" to both parties, a mere promise to
enter into a lease could not possibly be binding.
The closest the trial court comes to finding a "promise" is
Finding of Fact No. 26:

"On August 2, 1988, DuBose generated

two telephone calls to Pruitt indicating that the project had
been approved by Ernst's management and that a letter of intent
would be forthcoming."

(R. 2223).

In its Memorandum Decision,

the court determined that the "promises" made on August 2nd were
the starting point for promissory analysis.

(R. 2 011-13).

The telephone calls referenced by the court fail to rise to
the level of a "definite and certain" promise to enter into a
lease agreement; at best, the messages simply indicate Ernst's

-33-

desire to continue lease negotiations by sending a letter of
intent.

Given Stangl's and Ernst's continued negotiations over

a proposed lease after August 2nd, no other conclusion makes
sense.

See R.J. Daum. supra.

In order to find a promise sufficient to bind Ernst under
the trial court's reasoning, the court would have had to find
(1) Ernst made a definite and certain promise that it would
lease

space

subsequently

at

the

Plaza

negotiated

regardless

lease

of

agreement,

the
(2)

terms
Ernst

of

a

made

a

definite and certain promise that it would no longer require the
preparation and execution of an acceptable written agreement
before

making

that

commitment,

and

(3)

Ernst

intended

its

promise to induce Stangl into purchasing the Brockbank property.
No such finding was made, nor does the evidence support such a
finding.

Even

if

therefore,

it did

Ernst

was

not make

aware

of

a promise

all

material

sufficient

to

facts,
invoke

promissory estoppel.
4.

Stangl did not purchase the Brockbank property
reasonable reliance on Ernst's alleged promise.

in

To recover under promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must show
he observed "reasonable care and prudence" in acting in reliance
on the alleged promise.

Union Tank Car, 387 P.2d at 1003; see

also Restatement § 139(2) (d).

Moreover, a plaintiff may not

claim he reasonably relied on a promise

if he attempted to

modify the terms of that promise; an attempt to modify an offer
is inconsistent with a belief that an agreement has been reached
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which would justify reasonable reliance.

Crismon v. Western Co.

of North America, 742 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Utah App. 1987).
Even

assuming

Finding

of

Fact

No.

26

constitutes

an

enforceable promise, Stangl did not purchase the property in
reasonable

reliance

on

Ernst's

alleged

August

2nd promise.

Stangl was legally obligated to purchase the property prior to
August

2nd.

Aetna's

By August

note

on

the

1st, Stangl

property,

his

Bankruptcy

purchase.

Moreover,

agreed

exercised

Brockbank to purchase the property,
finance

had

his

to purchase
option

and obtained

Aetna's

with

a loan to

agreement

to

the

Court Order approving the sale meant that as of

August 1st, all of the conditions in Stangl's agreement with
Aetna and his option with Brockbank had been satisfied.1
Although Stangl's purchase actually closed on August 9,
1988, every step necessary to purchase the Brockbank property
occurred before Ernst's alleged promise.

The mere fact Stangl

followed through on his obligation to purchase the property does
not

demonstrate

an

action

of

"definite

and

substantial

character" as required under Restatement § 139.

l

The trial court's Finding of Fact No. 3 0 implies that
Stangl agreed to pay off the tax liens on Brockbank's property
in reliance on Ernst's alleged August 2nd promise.
Although
Stangl made that claim during the "damages" phase of the trial
(R. 4358-59), his testimony was a complete fabrication.
According to the July 18th Loan Submission to Valley Mortgage
for the Plaza project, the money Stangl borrowed included
$85,000 for payment of the back tax liens on the Brockbank
property. (Ex. 16, p. 6 ) .
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In addition, given both parties 7 insistence on a written
and executed lease agreement, Stangl's purported reliance on the
August

2nd

"promise"

cannot

be

considered

reasonable.

To

justify a $1.2 million purchase, a developer as sophisticated
and experienced as Stangl would presumably require something
more than a nebulous promise that a letter of intent would be
forthcoming.

At the very least, if Stangl truly believed the

August 2nd message somehow meant Ernst would lease space at the
Plaza no matter what the terms of a subsequently

negotiated

lease, he was obligated to verify that belief and "ascertain the
facts before acting upon it."

Petty v. Gindy Manuf., supra.

In addition, Stangl sought to modify the terms of Ernst's
proposed

lease on at least two occasions

Pursuant

to

the

inconsistent
parties would

with

decision
the

enter

in

actions

Crismon,
of

Stangl's

someone

into a binding

after August 2nd.

who was

agreement.

constituted a counteroffer which began contract
anew.

actions

are

sure the

Each

draft

negotiations

See Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d

1372, 1378 (Utah 1995).
Accordingly, even if Ernst had sufficient awareness and
made a binding promise, promissory estoppel is inappropriate in
this case because Stangl did not reasonably rely on Ernst's
alleged promise when he purchased the Brockbank property.
5.

Stangl did not suffer any detriment as a result of his
alleged reliance.

The final requirement of promissory estoppel is that the
promisee suffer some detriment as a result of his reliance.
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See

Prows, supra. Restatement § 139(1) similarly permits promissory
estoppel "if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise."
Even assuming Ernst made a binding promise on August 2nd,
the evidence at trial demonstrated that Stangl did not in fact
suffer any detriment as a result of his alleged reliance on that
promise.

The period of Stangl's "reliance" ran from August 2nd

to September 29, 1988, the date Ernst informed Stangl that it
had

decided

not

to

lease

space

in

the

Plaza.

After

September 29th, Stangl can no longer claim to be acting in
reliance on Ernst's promise.
As of

September

29th, however, Stangl had

suffered no

detriment whatsoever; at the time, the value of the BrockbanJc
property itself was $1,506,000 (R. 4711-12; Ex. 339), but Stangl
had incurred costs of no more than $1,328,930 attributable to
the property.2

On September 29th, the Brockbank property had a

positive value of $177,070.
Based on the foregoing, Stangl did not meet the "detriment"
requirement

for

Restatement § 13 9.

promissory

estoppel

under

Utah

law

or

Accordingly, the trial court's judgment in

favor of Stangl must be reversed.

2

Costs attributable to Brockbank property as of September
29, 1988 were taken from Stangl's Exhibit 88A, p. 3 (Detailed
Costs Before and After 9/30/88), and calculated as follows:
Total Costs Before 9/30/88 ($1,903,728) less Item 9 (Firestone
Land, $193,829) less Item 10 (Emission Testing/Fastech Land,
$129,518) less Item 17 (Firestone hard costs ($251,451).
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C.

The trial court employed an incorrect measure of damages
for Stangl's promissory estoppel claim.
Assuming this Court determines that (1) promissory estoppel

can be used in this case to enforce an agreement barred by the
Statute

of

promissory

Frauds,
estoppel,

and

(2)

the

Stangl
trial

met

the

court's

criteria
decision

for
must

nevertheless be reversed because the court employed an improper
measure of damages.
Under Utah law, damages in a promissory estoppel case are
intended to be "remedies consistent with
reliance."1

Andreason. 848 P.2d

Perillo, Contracts. § 6-1

'the extent of the

at 175, quoting Calamari &

at 273

(3d Ed.

1987)

(discussing

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90) . The court in Andreason
approved the following jury instruction:
Damages in promissory estoppel are limited to those
which are sustained because the plaintiffs have
changed
their position
to
their
detriment
in
reasonable
reliance
upon
the
defendant's
representations. They must have done some act which
they otherwise would not have done. Only acts done in
detrimental reliance are compensable.
Andreason, at 175-76.
The scope of reliance damages was addressed

in a case

similar to this one, Trollope v. Koerner. 21 Ariz. App. 43, 515
P.2d 340 (1973).

According to the court in Trollope, reliance

damages involving purported lease agreements cover only those
expenses

incurred

for "significant

improvements

to suit the

potential lessee in anticipation of the lease," and only to the
extent

those

improvements

"are

or

were

intended

exclusively beneficial to the potential lessee."
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to

be

Trollope, 515

P.2d at 341, quoting Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 470 P.2d
91, 99 (1970).
In a lease situation, "reliance" cannot unreasonably extend
past the time a party receives notice that a lease will not be
executed.

The extent of such reliance was addressed by the

Eighth Circuit in Mahonev v. Delaware McDonald's Corp., 770 F.2d
123 (8th Cir. 1985).
McDonald's

Dr. John Mahoney ("Mahoney") and Delaware

Corporation

("McDonald's")

engaged

negotiations for a new McDonald's restaurant.

in

lease

When it became

clear that the property which Mahoney owned would not be large
enough for McDonald's, Mahoney purchased an adjoining parcel
under a contract which gave him sixty days until July 2, 1979 to
terminate the contract and receive a refund of his earnest money
deposit.

Mahoney specifically advised McDonald's of his sixty-

day option contract.

Mahoney, 770 F.2d at 124.

Shortly after Mahoney entered into the option contract, he
and McDonald's orally agreed to lease terms, and McDonald's
agreed to prepare a final lease document.

Three days before his

option was set to expire, Mahoney had yet to receive a lease
from McDonald's.

Mahoney called McDonald's, explained that the

option was about to expire, and asked if the parties still had
a deal.

Mahoney was told that the deal was still set and a

lease was on its way. Mahoney therefore exercised his option to
purchase the adjoining property.

Mahoney, 770 F.2d at 125.

Approximately three weeks later, McDonald's

forwarded a

slightly altered lease to Mahoney, who signed and returned it to
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McDonald's on July 25, 1979.
31st.

Mahoney's purchase closed on July

In late August, however, McDonald's expressed

thoughts about the
terminated
signed.

lease, and on October

negotiations

and

returned

the

second

12th,

it formally

lease

Mahoney

had

Mahoney, supra.

Mahoney obtained a judgment against McDonald's based on
promissory estoppel, and on appeal, the Eighth circuit affirmed
the finding of liability.

The court reversed the finding of

damages, however, ruling that the court had improperly allowed
Mahoney to recover damages incurred following his decision to
hold onto the property rather than sell it:
Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel,
damages may be measured by the extent of the
promisee's
reliance.
Restatement
(Second)
of
Contracts § 90 comment d (1979). In other words, our
objective in this case is to reimburse Mahoney for the
expenses he incurred in reliance on McDonald's promise
to lease the 109 building.
Mahoney borrowed the entire $300,000 used to
purchase the 109 building. From July 1979 to November
1983, he claims that he paid $404,342.83 in interest
on that loan.
During this period, he also paid
$31,828.99 for taxes, insurance, etc. on the building.
. . . McDonald's contends that the magistrate erred in
awarding 100% of the expenses.
It argues that
Mahoney's damages should be limited to exclude the
amount he could have avoided by acting prudently when
he learned that McDonald's had repudiated the lease.
We think McDonald's contention has merit. Under
section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
the remedy in promissory estoppel cases "may be
limited as justice requires." It would be unjust for
Mahoney to hold the 109 building indefinitely while
McDonald's paid interest on the purchase price.
Instead, Mahoney was entitled to a reasonable time to
sell the building or make alternative disposition of
it.
His expenses during this time, plus any loss
sustained on the disposition of the building, would
constitute his just reliance damages.
The record does not indicate that Mahoney ever
made any attempt to sell the 109 building after
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McDonald's breached the lease. There is no indication
that the building was not marketable; in fact, the
magistrate found that it had a fair market value of
$300,000. If Mahoney could have sold the building for
$300,000 in 1979, we must conclude that his failure to
do so was based on his decision that he could do
better
for
himself
by
making
an
alternative
disposition of the building. Therefore, once Mahoney
decided to keep the building, he was no longer acting
in reliance on McDonald's promise, he was acting on
the basis of his own decision.
Mahoney, 770 F.2d at 127-28 (footnote omitted).
As in Mahoney, the damages awarded by the trial court were
not based on Stangl's "reliance," i.e., they were not incurred
because Stangl changed his position in reliance on Ernst.

When

Ernst notified Stangl that it was not interested in the Plaza on
September 29, 1988, the Brockbank property had a positive value
of at least $177,070.

As of that date, Stangl had spent only

$7,380.59 in on-site improvements.
Instead,

Stangl's

"damages"

(Ex. 88A, Sub. A ) .
were

incurred

because

he

decided to hold onto the property for another two-and-a-half
years

in

the

(R. 4389-90).

hopes

that

it

would

be

more

"marketable."

Stangl testified that he made no effort to sell

the property after Ernst broke off negotiations; he made no
market inquiries, but simply concluded that because the property
had not sold in the three preceding years, "[t]here [was] no
reason to expect it would work good now."
By

the

time

Stangl

sold

the

(R. 4390).

property

in March

1991,

however, he had incurred significant additional costs but had
only marginally increased the value of the property.

As of

March 1991, Stangl claimed the property cost $2,217,817, but it
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sold for only $1,688,447.

(Ex. 88A) . Stangl's figures indicate

that by holding onto the property, he incurred additional costs
of $888,887, consisting primarily

of interest payments and

taxes, but only increased the value of the property by $182,447
over its value as of September 1988.
By gambling that the property would be worth more in the
future, Stangl incurred additional costs which produced a net
loss on the property. As in Mahoney, Stangl suffered a loss not
because he purchased the property, but because he chose to keep
the property after Ernst ended lease negotiations, and to incur
interest and other expenses in the hope of a higher sale price.
By awarding Stangl damages based on his decision to hold the
property, the court enabled Stangl to create a loss which would
not have existed otherwise. Contrary to Mahoney and Restatement
§ 139(1), the court's award does not avoid an injustice by
enforcing Ernst's alleged promise, nor does it serve as a remedy
that "justice requires."
If promissory estoppel is applied in this case, the only
appropriate damage award is one consistent with Andreason.

In

Andreason, a fire damaged the plaintiffs' kitchen and garage,
and caused smoke, electrical and water damage throughout their
home. Pursuant to the instructions of their insurance adjuster,
who assured the plaintiffs they were covered, the plaintiffs
purchased new living room carpet, a kitchen range and kitchen
cabinets, a cedar wall, and floor tile.

After their purchases

had been made, the adjuster informed the plaintiffs that their
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fire coverage had in fact been cancelled.

Andreason, 848 P.2d

at 173. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the jury
award of 90% of the expenses incurred by the plaintiffs during
the three week period the adjuster led them to believe coverage
existed.

Andreason, at 176-77.

As in Andreason, Stangl should only be allowed to recover
for the hard costs he incurred during the period he relied on
Ernst's

alleged

alleged

promise,

negotiations.

promise, from
to

August

September

29th,

2nd, the

date

the

Ernst

See also Trollope, supra.

date

of

the

ended

According to Stangl's

own records, those costs total $7,380.59.
Allowing Stangl to recover costs incurred for reasons other
than reliance, or costs

incurred

after the reliance

period

expired would be akin to allowing the plaintiffs in Andreason to
recover the cost of replacing carpet in their cars as well as
their house, or the cost of painting their kitchen cabinets twoyears after they were replaced.

Because the Brockbank property

had a positive value as of September 2 9th, any award to Stangl
based on the value of the property two-and-a-half years later
would not serve the ends of justice.
D.

The trial court erred in repeatedly allowing Stangl to
submit damages evidence which he failed to produce in
discovery.
If this Court determines that the trial court's finding of

liability for promissory estoppel was correct and its reliance
on Stangl's damages methodology was appropriate, the judgment in
this case must be reversed and the matter remanded for retrial
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on

the

issue

of

damages

because

the

trial

court

erred

in

allowing Stangl to submit damages evidence which he failed to
produce in discovery.
Prior

to the

"liability"

phase

of

trial, Ernst

served

Stangl with three different sets of discovery requests asking
for information and documents regarding the nature and amount of
his damages

claim.

(R. 2039-2048).

Notwithstanding

those

requests, and over Ernst's objections, the court allowed Stangl
to

submit

three

different

versions

of

the

exhibit

which

summarized his damages claim during the "liability" trial.
first version calculated
calculated
damages

of

damages of

$430,533.34, the

damages of $431,77 6.99, and the third
$534,342.53.

(Exs. 65A-C).

Because

The

second

calculated
the

court

continued to admit the evidence, Ernst moved in desperation for
a bifurcated trial.
Concerned

that Stangl might

again attempt

to

introduce

last-minute damages evidence, Ernst served Stangl with a fourth
set

of

discovery

requests

"damages" phase of the trial.

regarding

damages

(R. 2041-42).

prior

to

the

Stangl responded

on January 13, 1994 by claiming Ernst had already received his
damage exhibit and all underlying documentation, and that if any
additional

evidence was discovered, he would

inform" Ernst.

(R. 2039-83, Tab D ) .

wrote to Stangl to stress that the
inform" was now.

(R. 2043).
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"seasonably

so

The following day, Ernst
time to

"seasonably

so

Despite Ernst's efforts, Stangl hand-delivered to counsel
for Ernst a revised

damages

summary

and

additional

damages

documentation on the evening of Saturday, February 19, 1994,
just three days before trial.

Stangl's new damage calculation

set his damages at $494,741.10.
course

of

exhibit

the

(R. 2043, 4312-13).

"damages" trial,

three

more

times,

Stangl

revised

recalculating

During the
his

his

damages

damages

to

$491,932.99, then to $508,058.27, and finally to $407,308.60.
(EXS. 88, 88A, 404).
In all, Stangl changed his damages exhibit seven times just
prior to or during the course of trial in this case.

Stangl's

changes resulted in a series of complex damages calculations
which

varied

calculation

from
of

calculations.

version

total

to

version

damages,

but

not
in

only
their

in

their

component

Exhibit 88, for example, includes an additional

cost of $48,3 3 3.4 3 for interest payments made in 1989 and 1990
on Stangl's note to Brockbank.

The additional item inflated

Stangl's damages by offsetting corrections which would have
otherwise lowered the cost of the Plaza property.

Despite the

date of the interest payments, however, they never appeared in
any of the versions of Exhibit 65.
Stangl's tria1-by-ambush tactic prevented Ernst from ever
having the opportunity to fairly analyze the damages aspect of
this case.
evidence

Nevertheless, the court allowed Stangl's damages

over

Ernst's

objections,

and

damages award on Stangl's calculation.
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ultimately

based

its

(R. 2039-2083, 2229,

2991-98, 3190-241, 3335, 4309-17, 4410-12, 4461-63, 4636-40,
4646-47, 4835-907; Exs. 65A-C, 88A, 89, 404),
The trial court's acceptance of Stangl's damages evidence
without any sanctions was an abuse of discretion.
may

refuse

to

admit

evidence

that

opposing party in a timely manner.

is

not

A trial court

provided

to

the

Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d

917, 925 (Utah App. 1989); Varhol v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
909 F.2d 1557, 1566 (7th Cir. 1990) (trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to admit a document that a party did
not

submit

to

the

opposition

before

trial

even

where

the

document was omitted by mistake).
Moreover, Utah courts recognize that violations
discovery rules should not go unpunished.

of the

In Darrington v.

Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991), for example, the defendants
initially refused to answer interrogatories or to appear for
depositions.

The trial court entered a default judgment against

them, but subsequently withdrew the default and allowed the case
to proceed.

In commenting on discovery sanctions, the court in

Darrington observed:
It is clear from the record that Wades were
elusive and uncooperative defendants. Consequently,
imposing some sort of Rule 3 7 discovery sanction on
them was certainly justified, and under all the
circumstances, we probably would not have found entry
of a default judgment to be so harsh as to be an abuse
of discretion had the court chosen to leave that
judgment in place. Moreover, if the court had failed
to impose any kind of discovery sanction we probably
would have found an abuse of discretion. But default
judgment is an unusually harsh sanction that should be
meted out with caution, and because the court imposed
other appropriate discovery sanctions by awarding
costs and attorney fees on several occasions, this is
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not a case where inappropriate discovery conduct went
wholly unpunished.
Darrington, at 456 (citation, footnote omitted, emphasis added).
While discovery sanctions are ordinarily conditioned on the
refusal to cooperate with an order compelling discovery under
Rule 37, such orders are not prerequisites to sanctions.

In

certain circumstances, such as where the failure to participate
in discovery

takes place after the trial

court's

discovery

cutoff, sanctions are appropriate without an order to compel.
In DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353 (Utah 1994), the
court

determined

that

the

trial

court

had

not

abused

its

discretion in barring four of plaintiffs' expert witnesses from
testifying where the plaintiffs failed to designate the experts
as witnesses by the deadline set by the court, but had instead
waited to designate them until after the discovery cutoff.
Under

the

circumstances,

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion in failing to impose any sanctions on Stangl for his
failure
constant

to

comply

revisions

inappropriate
without

any

with
to

evidence

Ernst's
his

discovery

damages

requests

evidence.

into trial, and

allowing

limitations, the trial, court

By

and

his

admitting

its use it

rewarded

Stangl's

failure to comply with the discovery rules, and punished Ernst
by admitting evidence it had no opportunity to prepare for.
Regardless of whether the changes in the evidence were favorable
to Ernst or not, the trial court should have sanctioned Stangl
by excluding the evidence.
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By

allowing

Stangl

to

continually

change

his

damages

evidence, the trial court affected the trial in such a way that
the same judgment would not have been rendered had the revisions
been excluded.

Ernst had no ability to prepare for Stangl's

revised damage calculations, no way to consult or call its own
witness or prepare for cross-examination of Stangl's witnesses
regarding

the

evidence,

arguments to the court.

and

no

ability

to

make

informed

By admitting the evidence, the court

defeated the rights the discovery rules are intended to protect.
If

this

Court

finds

that

liability

was

correctly

established, this Court should nevertheless reverse the judgment
below, and remand for retrial on the issue of damages.

See Utah

D.O.T. v. 6200 South Associates, 872 P. 2d at 465 (reversal is
appropriate in cases where evidence is erroneously admitted if,
absent

the

error, there

is a reasonable

likelihood

that a

different result would have been reached).
E.

The trial court's
erroneous.

calculation

of

Stangl's

damages

was

Even if the trial court's reliance on Stangl's damages
methodology

was

appropriate,

and

all

the

damages

evidence

admitted by the trial court is accepted, the court's calculation
of damages in this case was erroneous.
The court based its calculation on Stangl's Exhibit 88A.
In that

Exhibit, however,

Stangl

received for the Brockbank property.

under-reported

the

amount

According to Subpart D of

the Exhibit, Stangl reported the total amount paid for all the
property sold to Green Isle in 1991 as $2,350,000.
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Exhibit 48,

however, indicates that the Green Isle purchase, like Stangl's
original purchase (Ex. 66A), included payment for back taxes.
According to Stangl, all $92,355.52 in taxes paid in the Green
Isle

purchase were

(R. 4506).
Brockbank

attributable

to

the

Brockbank

property.

Given that the original purchase price
property

included

taxes paid, the

for the

credit

for the

Brockbank property sale should also have included a similar
credit.

In Exhibit 88A, therefore, the credit for the Brockbank

property sale should be increased by $92,355.52, and Stangl's
"out-of-pocket" damages should be reduced by that same amount.
Similarly, Stangl's original damage exhibit, Exhibit 65,
included an adjustment to the valuation of two Plaza properties
which were deducted from the 1991 Plaza sale price to determine
the value of the Brockbank property.

The value of the two

properties,

Independent

designated

Firestone

and

Emissions

Testing ("IET"), included an allowance for a 5% vacancy rate on
the IET property.

(Ex. 65, Sub. D) .

This adjustment was

consistent with the testimony of Stangl's appraiser, who stated
that vacancy rates in the area were high, and who used a 10%
vacancy rate in his valuation of the Plaza with Ernst, and a 15%
vacancy

rate

in his valuation

(R. 4658-59, 4670; Ex. 51).

of

the

Plaza

without

Ernst.

The vacancy rate in Exhibit 65

increased the valuation of the Firestone and IET properties by
$11,700,

and

reduced

Stangl's

damages

by

the

same

amount.

Without explanation, however, Stangl's final versions of his
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damage exhibit did not include the adjustment.

(Exs. 88, 88A,

Sub. D ) .
The trial court's errors in calculating damages are not
surprising given the flurry of last-minute revisions Stangl was
allowed to inject into these proceedings.
the

court's

reliance

on

Stangl's

Accordingly, even if

damages

methodology

was

appropriate, and all the damages evidence admitted by the trial
court is accepted, the damages awarded to Stangl must be reduced
by $104,055.52; $92,355.52 for the uncredited taxes, and $11,700
for the uncredited vacancy rate adjustment.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Ernst respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the judgment below, and remand for entry
of judgment in favor of Ernst dismissing Stangl's complaint in
its entirety.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this )Z4r\ day of April, 1996.
RYAN, SWANSON & CLEVELAND

SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Rbger J. Kindley (WSBA 11875)
John P. Mele (WSBA 16381)
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
Ernst Home Center, Inc.

-50-

A;fae Swenseri (A42 52
f

ADDENDUM A

FL.JDSrT^GTGGUBT
Third Judicial District

DEC 2 7 1994

Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (0766)
Stephen T. Hard, Esq. (1359)
Steven E. McCowin, Esq. (4621)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT,
BENDINGER & PETERSON
170 S. Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383

SALT LAK^ COUNTY

By-
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANZ C. STANGL, III, an
individual, dba F.C. STANGL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
ERNST HOME CENTER, INC.,
a Washington corporation,

Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN
(Hon. Michael Murphy)

Defendant.

This suit was brought by F.C. Stangl, III ("Stangl")
who alleged that defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. ("Ernst") had
breached an agreement to enter into a five-year lease at the
Jordan Valley Plaza or alternatively that he had detrimentally
relied upon representations and conduct of Ernst and that he was
entitled to recover damages based upon a theory of promissory
estoppel.
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Liability issues were tried before the Court, without

jury from approximately February 11, 1993 to February 19, 1993.
In its Memorandum Decision, dated April 20, 1994, the Court ruled
that there was insufficient evidence to establish a contract, but
that Ernst may be liable to Stangl under the theory of promissory
estoppel.

The Memorandum Decision is attached to these Findings

of Facts and Conclusions of Law as Exhibit "A" and are
incorporated herein by reference.

The remaining issues were

tried before the Court from February 22, 1994 to February 24,
1994.
At all phases of the trials, plaintiff F.C. Stangl,
III. was represented by Stephen G. Crockett and Stephen T. Hard.
Defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. was represented by Roger J.
Kindley.

Ernst was also represented by David A, Greenwood and

Patrick J* O'Hara during the first phase and by Elizabeth Dolan
Winter during the second phase.
Having examined the admissible evidence presented at
both phases of trial and-having heard the arguments of counsel,
the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff F.C. Stangl, III ("Stangl") has been in

the business of real estate development and construction for many
years.
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2.

Defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. ("Ernst") is a

Washington corporation in the business of retail sales of homeimprovement materials, tools, plant nursery items, and other
consumer products and services.
3.

This lawsuit concerns the Jordan Valley Plaza

("Plaza") located at 9000 South Redwood Road, West Valley City,
Utah.
4.

From sometime in 1979 through the fall of 1981,

Stangl had an ownership interest in the Plaza at which time his
interest in the Plaza was transferred to the Brockbanks with the
exception of two small contiguous parcels of land which Stangl
retained to develop.
secured by the Plaza.

The Brockbanks assumed the indebtedness
Stangl remained a guarantor of Brockbanks'

obligation to the lender.

The lender's interest was subsequently

assigned to Aetna.
5.

In September 1987, Aetna formally notified Stangl

that the Brockbanks had defaulted on the loan secured by the
Plaza.

Aetna, however, never made a demand for payment on Stangl

as a guarantor of the Brockbanks' obligation.
6.

Both Aetna and Stangl believed that the value of

the Plaza would exceed the value of the amounts due on the loan,
i.e. that there would be no deficiency for which Stangl would be
liable.

28248.1

Accordingly, Aetna initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure

3

<r>—»

of the property.

The Brockbanks then filed for relief under

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
7.

In the first five months of 1987, Ernst had become

aware of the availability of space in the Plaza which had
formerly been occupied by Gibson Discount, an anchor tenant.

As

a consequence, Ernst caused a site feasibility study to be
completed in May, 1987.

At that time, Ernst interpreted this

study to indicate that an Ernst store at the site would be
economically marginal.
8.

Given the Brockbanks' default and bankruptcy, and

Aetna's anticipated foreclosure of the Plaza, Stangl saw a
business opportunity with respect to the property.

In late May,

1988, Mr. Steve Pruitt, acting on behalf of Stangl, generated a
call to Ernst to determine whether it had any interest in leasing
the anchor space at the Plaza.
9.

Pruittfs call was forwarded to Mr. Mack DuBose,

Ernst's Vice-President in charge of real estate planning and
development.

DuBose indicated that Ernst had some interest in

the property as a site for an Ernst store.
10.

On June 3, 1988, Pruitt forwarded to DuBose

documents relating to the Plaza.

In his June 3, 1988 letter,

Pruitt erroneously indicated that Aetna would be enforcing
Stangl1s guarantee and that Stangl would have possession of the
property by the end of June.
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In the same correspondence,

4

however, Pruitt also suggested that Stangl would refinance the
Plaza with Aetna.
11.

Between June 4 and June 23, 1988, DuBose and two

other Ernst employees met with Pruitt and inspected the anchor
space in particular and the Plaza generally.
the site visit, DuBose and Pruitt met.

The day following

During this meeting,

DuBose expressed a desire to proceed further with negotiations
whereby Ernst would lease the anchor tenant site at the Plaza.
12.

On June 23, 1988, Pruitt sent a letter to DuBose

outlining some very basic terms of a proposed lease including the
initial period of the lease, option periods, base rent and
percentage rent.

Pruitt1s letter specifically referenced

requests by Ernst that Stangl be able to provide a turnkey
building to Ernst which would be ready for installment of
fixtures by October 1, 1988.
13.

There were a number of matters that were not

addressed in Pruitt1s June 23, 1988 letter, including:

whether

Ernst would be obligated to continuously operate on the premises
or would it have the right to vacate and merely pay the base
rent; whether and under what conditions Ernst could sublet or
assign its interest; and whether Stangl?s failure to meet his
continuing duties would cause an abatement of rent.
14.

On June 29, 1988, Stangl took steps to obtain the

right but not the obligation to acquire the Plaza if Ernst
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expressed further interest in entering into a lease•

On that

date, Stangl executed an Option agreement with the Brockbanks and
paid the Brockbanks $1,000.00. The Option had an exercise price
of $1,150,000. The Option also required the Brockbanks to:

(1)

require the Bankruptcy Court to release the property; (2) cure
all defects in title to the property; and (3) convey the property
by warranty deed.
15.

Also on June 29, 1988, Stangl instructed his

counsel to offer to purchase Aetna's interest in the trust deed
on the Brockbank property.

Stanglfs initial offer to purchase

Aetna's interest in the trust deed was rejected.

On July 1,

1988, Stangl offered to purchase Aetna's interest in the trust
deed for $900,000.00.

The offer was subject to title to the

property satisfactory to Stangl and bankruptcy court approval.
This offer was accepted by Aetna on July 14, 1988.
16.

Stangl had no need or desire to acquire the Plaza

property unless Ernst would lease the anchor space.

If Stangl

had wanted to acquire the property for his own account or for
speculative purposes, he would have waited to acquire the Plaza
at the foreclosure of the trust deed.

The reason that Stangl

acquired an option to purchase the Plaza from the Brockbanks and
simultaneously made an offer to purchase the trust deed from
Aetna was to facilitate the speedy acquisition of the property to
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enable Stangl to meet Ernstfs intended fixturing date of October
1, 1988.
17.

In late afternoon on June 29, 1988, DuBose faxed a

response to Pruitt's June 23 letter.

With one exception, DuBose

responded to each specific item proposed by Pruitt.

DuBose

specifically agreed that Stangl should provide a turnkey
operation with the October 1, 1988 fixturing date.

DuBose also

indicated that Stangl should absorb parking lot resurfacing costs
and proposed the commencement of rent sixty days after the
premises were turned over to Ernst for fixturing.

The one item

to which DuBose did not respond was entitled "Occupancy Expenses"
which included a Pruitt proposal for a triple net lease with
Ernst paying all occupancy costs including insurance.

DuBose

made no reference to issues involving continuous use, subletting
and assignment or abatement.
18.

DuBose indicated that an agreement could be

reached with Stangl regarding the terms of the lease.

He stated

that the next step would be to complete a "binding Offer to
Lease" and the final step was to draft the actual lease which
would take three to five weeks.
19.

Although at trial DuBose testified that he

believed there were no legal consequences which would flow from a
"binding Offer to Lease" and that items in such a document would
ultimately be contained in the final lease agreement, DuBose
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never communicated to Pruitt or to Stangl his perceived
limitations on the "binding Offer to Lease."
20.

On July 12, 1988, Stangl received a letter from

DuBose dated July 8, 1988 wherein DuBose specified the "terms
acceptable to [Ernst] relative to the Leasing [sic] of space in
the Plaza."

He further stated that "[t]he lease contemplated by

this proposal shall be based on the . . . terms and conditions"
specified in the letter.

While not expressly so described, the

proposal in the July 8 letter was a proposed "binding Offer to
Lease" as DuBose had previously used that phrase.
21.

Shortly after Stangl's receipt of the July 8

letter, Stangl and DuBose had a telephone conversation.

Stangl

claims that during the conversation he and DuBose reached
agreement on all significant lease points and that he expressed
that agreement in a letter to DuBose dated July 14, 1988.

There

is insufficient credible evidence to establish the claimed oral
agreement preceding the July 14 letter.

Consequently, Stangl*s

July 14 letter at that time constituted a mere counteroffer to
DuBose1s July 8 letter.
22.

On July 15, 1988, DuBose authored a letter to

Stangl which Stangl claims constitutes a signed acceptance of the
proposal in Stanglfs letter of July 14.

There is insufficient

credible evidence to establish that the July 15 letter is an
acceptance or a verification of an acceptance of the proposal in
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Stanglfs July 14 letter.

Instead, the July 15 letter anticipated

an "Offer to Lease" which was yet to be "completed."

That letter

contained a form lease for discussion of additional items which
would have to be resolved.

DuBose, however, did not have any

strong objections to the proposal contained in Stanglfs July 14
letter.

DuBose forwarded that letter or an adaptation "thereof

for approval as an "Offer to Lease" to Ernst's President.

In the

submission to Ernst's president, DuBose indicated that
construction "must begin by 8/15/88."
23.

On or about July 16, 1988, Stangl took steps to

obtain financing from Valley Bank and Trust for the acquisition
of the Plaza, for construction of improvements requested by
Ernst, and for development of other portions of the Plaza.

Among

other things, Stangl sought approximately $1.1 million to acquire
the Plaza; $655,000 to remodel the anchor site for Ernst; and
$131,000 to remodel other shop space at the Plaza.

He also

proposed rolling into the^ new loan package two loans previously
approved by Valley Bank for development of the two properties
adjacent to the Plaza which Stangl owned.

To improve the overall

security for the loan package, Stangl's two adjacent properties,
both of which had tenants committed for leases on buildings which
Stangl would build, would also act as collateral for the other
Plaza-related indebtedness.
by Valley Bank on or about
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Stangl's loan request was approved
July 19, 1988.

9

24.
July 28, 1988.

The loan agreement with Valley Bank was closed on
No funds were disbursed at that time, and the

Loan Agreement did not provide for disbursement of funds until
Stangl acquired title to the Plaza.
25.

Although there was some indication that Ernst had

internally placed the project on hold during the latter part of
July, Ernst did not inform Stangl that the project was in
jeopardy or would be delayed.
the project would proceed.

All outward appearances were that

Throughout the month of July, 1988,

Ernst's architects (Dykeman and Associates) referred written
materials and communicated with Stangl's employees regarding
construction.

On July 8, 1988, Stangl had applied to the West

Jordan City Planning Commission for a conditional use permit, a
site plan review and permission to locate a sign.

The

application indicated that it was for an Ernst store and a
hearing date was set for July 20, 1988.

On July 12, 1988, DuBose

wrote to the City Manager of West Jordan indicating Ernst's
intent to consummate a lease at the Plaza.

On July 18, DuBose,

through his secretary, referred Ernst's financial statements to
Pruitt requesting discrete treatment of the financials.

On July

20, Ernst's Director of Construction, Rob King, attended a
meeting of the West Jordan Planning and Zoning Commission to
explain Ernst's intentions with respect to the Plaza.
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26.

On August 2, 1988, DuBose generated two telephone

calls to Pruitt indicating that the project had been approved by
Ernst's management and that a letter of intent would be
forthcoming.
27.

The evidence does not support a finding that in

the August 2 phone conversations DuBose led anyone to believe
that the July 14 letter, or for that matter the July 8 letter,
would be the operative document.

A reasonable inference is that

DuBose did not have reference to either but merely indicated that
the project would proceed.

DuBose then apparently set about

editing the July 14 letter as a means of preparing the promised
letter of intent or Offer to Lease.
28.

On August 5, 1988 Stangl sent to DuBose the Ernst

form lease with substantial changes apparently proposed by
Stangl's counsel.

As a consequence, DuBose determined not to

forward an Offer to Lease and did not further communicate with
Stangl until August 23, 1988.
29.

On August 9, 1988, Stangl closed on the purchase

of the Plaza property from the Brockbanks.

In light of the

August 2 calls from DuBose to Pruitt and all that had proceeded
before that time, this was a reasonable step in furtherance of
what DuBose had signaled and represented, i.e., that Ernst would
be the anchor tenant at the Plaza.

While DuBose could not have

anticipated this precise step, he could have and should have
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reasonably anticipated that Stangl would make legal and economic
commitments in furtherance of the project to accommodate an
October 1 possession date.

DuBose himself testified that

normally the question of risk bearing for pre-lease expenditures
is addressed during negotiations.
30.

That was not the case here.

In order to close on the purchase of the' Plaza,

Stangl waived certain conditions contained in the Option
agreement and the offer to purchase the trust deed from Aetna.
More specifically, the Brockbanks had several tax liens on the
property and thus could not deliver satisfactory title or a
warranty deed to Stangl.

Based on the assurances from Ernst that

a lease would be entered into, Stangl agreed to pay additional
amounts to pay off the tax liens.

Had Stangl known that Ernst

would not lease the anchor space at the Plaza, he could have
declined to purchase the Plaza property and the Aetna trust deed,
and he could have aborted the financing package obtained from
Valley Bank.
31.

As indicated above, since sometime in June, the

parties treated the project as an expedited one with delivery of
the premises to Ernst for fixturing on October 1, 1988.

DuBose

acknowledged that approximately sixty days were needed to
complete construction prior to delivery for fixturing.
32.

Following the August 2 phone calls, it was

approximately three weeks before DuBose next communicated with
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Stangl.

On August 23, 1988 he sent to Stangl a copy of a lease

which he indicated Ernst was prepared to sign.

In his testimony,

DuBose admitted that this commitment was not entirely correct for
Ernst was not yet convinced the project was economically
feasible.

DuBose further testified that before Ernst would

commit to the project, a feasibility analysis would have to be
completed.

Ernst did not ever explain this to Stangl.

Had

Stangl known that Ernst's leasing of the anchor space was
contingent upon an economic feasibility study, he would not have
acquired the Plaza.
33.

DuBose's hesitation between August 5 and August 23

in finalizing lease terms did not retard the speed with which
other aspects of the project proceeded.

The Ernst architects

continued to refer written construction materials to Stangl.

On

or about August 17, Stangl sought bids on the asphalt work in
accordance with specifications received from Ernst on August 12,
1988.
34.

On August 29, 1988, Stangl responded to DuBose1s

August 23 letter with proposed changes.

Stangl did not

anticipate that any of his proposed changes would be sufficiently
problematic to jeopardize the project.

Based on previous

communications and dealings with DuBose, this conclusion was
entirely and reasonably justified.

28248.1

13

35.

DuBose responded on September 12, 1988, with a

letter specifically addressing each of Stangl!s proposed changes
of August 29.

DuBose stated that several issues were unresolved

and there was a risk negotiations would terminate absent
resolution of the significant issues.

DuBose then scheduled or

confirmed a meeting with Stangl in Salt Lake City on September
14.

This was the first indication from Ernst that the project

was in jeopardy.
36.

Just before his trip to Salt Lake City, DuBose

tendered his resignation to Ernst.

Nevertheless, DuBose and

Ellis Kantor, both representing Ernst, met with Stangl in Salt
Lake City on September 14.

Contrary to the testimony of DuBose

and Kantor, they did not inform Stangl that DuBose was leaving
Ernst.
37.

At this September 14 meeting there were five

primary matters to be resolved:

abatement of rent; subletting;

responsibility of providing and paying for insurance; percentage
rent in the option period; and, whether Ernst could cease
operations or be required to continuously operate.

These open

issues had not previously risen to the level of significance that
they acquired for the September 14 meeting.
38.

At the September 14 meeting Stangl indicated his

preference on these five issues but stated that, if Ernst
insisted, each of the issues would be resolved in accordance with
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Ernst's preference.

Based on the meeting, Stangl reasonably

expected to receive from Ernst an acceptable lease by September
23.
39.

The day following the Salt Lake City meeting was

DuBose's last day with Ernst.

On or about that same day, Thomas

Stanton, Ernst's Senior Vice-President of Operations, told Kantor
the Jordan Valley Plaza project was on hold.
40.

On September 23, Stangl generated a call to Ernst

inquiring about the lease.

He was then informed that DuBose was

no longer employed by Ernst.

Both Kantor and Stanton further

informed Stangl that DuBose's projects were on hold.
also alluded to an economic study.

Stanton

This was the first indication

Stangl had of Ernst's need for such a study before leasing the
anchor space at the Plaza.
41.

In a letter dated September 29, 1988, Stanton

formally notified Stangl that Ernst would not be a tenant in the
Plaza.
42.

Upon receipt of that letter, Stangl found himself

in a position whereby he had purchased the Plaza, taken out
substantial loans to purchase that property, had pledged his
properties and leases adjacent to the Plaza, and had begun
construction consistent with Ernst's stated desires.
43.

At that point, Stangl could have chosen to stop

further activity with respect to the refurbishment of the Plaza,

28248.1
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or he could continue to improve the Plaza in the hopes that Ernst
would become a tenant, that it would be attractive to another
anchor tenant or that it would interest a potential purchaser.
Stangl, with Valley Bank's agreement, continued to renovate the
Plaza.

This was a reasonable course of action because, among

other things, the Brockbanks had been unable to sell the property
for several years given its deteriorating condition, there were
two new shopping centers established in the near vicinity with
which the Plaza had to compete for new tenants, and Stangl had
pledged his other properties and leases as security for the loan
to acquire the Plaza.
44.

Stangl spent over $2.2 million in purchasing and

renovating the Plaza.

Stangl engaged in substantial and

reasonable efforts to find a new anchor tenant or to find a
purchaser for the Plaza.
45.

On March 8, 1991, Stangl was finally able to sell

the Plaza and the two adjacent properties which he owned (upon
which a Firestone store and emissions inspection store were built
and leased) to Green Isle Development Corp.
46.

The Court determines that Stangl is entitled to

recover his out-of-pocket expenses incurred in the acquisition
and refurbishment of the Plaza less rental income he received
from other tenants and less amounts allocable to the Plaza when
it and Stanglfs two other properties (upon which a Jiffy Lube
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store and a Firestone store had been built and leased) were sold
to Green Isle.
47.

Except for certain adjustments described below,

Plaintiff's Exhibit 88A, fairly and appropriately sets forth
Stanglfs damages.
48.

Stanglfs damages, based upon his reasonable

reliance upon Ernst's representations that it would enter into a
lease to become the anchor tenant at the Plaza, are $331,391.00.
That amount is determined from plaintiff's Exhibit 88A showing
damages of $407,309, less the following deductions:
(a)

$27,851 for escrow adjustments which were counted
twice in the calculation of damages;

(b)

$433 in legal fees which were incurred prior to
reliance upon Ernst's representations;

(c)

$7,404 in loan origination fees which were
incurred prior to August 2, 1988;

(d)

$40,230 which represents selling costs for
properties other than the Plaza.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Ernst and Stangl did not enter into a contract

whether written or oral.

There was no acceptance by Ernst of the

counteroffer specified in Stangl*s July 14 letter.

While Ernst's

July 15 letter anticipated that an "Offer to Lease" would be
completed, the parties did not complete an offer to lease.
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2.

Beginning with its June 29 letter, Ernst set the

negotiations on a course such that any reasonable lessor should
reasonably expect Ernst to be bound by a mutually acceptable
"Offer to Lease" containing the significant business points.
Even though Ernst's form of an "Offer to Lease" expressly
contemplated a subsequent, written lease, Ernst's language and
conduct indicated that the subsequent lease would resolve only
the less significant matters not addressed in the "Offer to
Lease."

Furthermore, it was reasonable to conclude that any

items not raised in Ernst's June 29 or July 8 letters were not
significant.

Ernst should have reasonably anticipated that

Stangl would draw these same conclusions.

There is no reason to

believe that Stangl and Ernst would not have reached agreement on
all lease points.
3.

It was not unreasonable for Stangl to believe that

the project would proceed following DuBose's phone calls of
August 2.

Those phone calls suggest at that time DuBose

attributed no particular significance to the differences between
his letter of July 8 and Stangl•s letter of July 14.
4.

Ernst through its words and conduct represented to

Stangl that it would enter into an agreement with Stangl to lease
the anchor space at the Plaza with remodeling to be done and
possession to be taken on a "fast track" basis.

28248.1
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5.

With DuBose's promises and representations through

August 2 in hand, it was reasonable for Stangl to make
commitments, incur obligations and proceed with the project by
acquiring and renovating the property in order to deliver
possession as close to October 1 as possible.

DuBose should have

expected Stangl to undertake such actions following his oral
commitments of August 2 and before a formal lease was executed.
6.

Stangl reasonably relied upon such representations

to his detriment, and took definite and substantial actions in
reliance upon those representations.

Most significantly, he

acquired the Plaza which he had no reason to do, he incurred over
$1.1 million in debt which he otherwise would not have incurred,
and he pledged other assets to secure that note which he
otherwise would not have encumbered.
7.

Stangl had no obligation to purchase the Plaza

property from the Brockbanks, acquire the trust deed from Aetna,
or have the July 19, 1988 loan package funded by Valley Bank,
prior to date of the actual closing of the purchase of the
property on August 9, 1988.
8.

Ernst should have reasonably expected that its

representations would induce Stangl to take dramatic action or
forbearance in order to meet the "fast track" possession date.
9.

After learning that Ernst did not intend to enter

into a lease, Stangl reasonably and in good faith expended funds
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to complete renovation of the property in order to entice Ernst
to lease the property, attract a new anchor tenant, or find a new
purchaser of the property.
10.

Injustice can only be avoided in this case by

enforcing Ernst's promise to lease the anchor space under
promissory estoppel.
11.

Under the theory of promissory estoppel, this

Court has authority to do "what justice requires11 and award
damages ranging from out-of-pocket costs to full contract
damages.

This Court determines that justice does not require

that Stangl receive contract damages, i.e. the minimum amount to
which Ernst had agreed to pay as rent for the term of the lease.
This Court determines that justice requires that Ernst pay Stangl
his out-of-pocket costs of $331,391.00.
12•

Stangl is the prevailing party in this action and

is awarded his costs.
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DATED this /- 1 day of

"—-L^A /
Honorable Michael
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT,
BENDIN^ER & PETERSQN
/
BY /,.-'
-y>Q
-'

'

'£-

- +•

Attorneys for Plaintiff

VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

BY ^ ^ i ^ l ^ ^ y y r r t i ^
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the CA I

day of December, 1994, a true and correct

copy of the proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was
hand-delivered to the following:
Elizabeth D. Winter
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
and mailed, first-class, postage prepaid to the following:
Roger J. Kindley
RYAN, SWANSON & CLEVELAND
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3400
Seattle, WA 98101-3034

u~>
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Third Judicial Cisinct

Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (0766)
Stephen T. Hard, Esq. (1359)
Steven R. McCowin, Esq. (4621)
GIAUQUEf CROCKETT
BENDINGER & PETERSON
170 S. Main, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383

DEC 2 7 m

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
F. C. STANGL, III, an
individual, dba F. C. STANGL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

JUDGMENT
Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN

Plaintiff,

Honorable Michael Murphy
C

vs.

•3\ H iidb

ERNST HOME CENTER, INC., a
Washington corporation,
Defendant.

This suit was brought by F.C. Stangl, III ("Stangl")
who alleged that defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. ("Ernst")
had breached an agreement to enter into a five-year lease at
the Jordan Valley Plaza or alternatively that he had
detrimentally relied upon representations and conduct of Ernst
and that he was entitled to recover damages based upon a theory
of promissory estoppel.

Liability issues were tried before the

Court, without jury from approximately February 11, 1993 to
February 19, 1993. In its Memorandum Decision, dated April 20,
199\63320.1
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1994, the Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to
establish a contract, but that Ernst may be liable to Stangl
under the theory of promissory estoppel.

The Memorandum

Decision is attached to the Findings of Facts and Conclusions
of Law as Exhibit "A" and are incorporated therein by
reference.

The remaining issues were tried before the Court

from February 22, 1994 to February 24, 1994.
At all phases of the trials, plaintiff F.C. Stangl,
III. was represented by Stephen G. Crockett and Stephen T.
Hard.

Defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. was represented by

Roger J. Kindley.

Ernst was also represented by David A.

Greenwood and Patrick J. O'Hara during the first phase and by
Elizabeth Dolan Winter during the second phase.

Having entered

its findings of fact and conclusions of law:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
Judgment is entered in favor of Stangl j^aet—against
Ernst in the amount of $331,391.00.

l:1„J-^(
Honorable Michael
District Judge
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ADDENDUM B

SPA PROPERTIES
P.O. BOX 1922
PARK CXTY. UTAH 84060
801-649-0206

Mr- Mack DuBose
Vice President, Real Estate & Planning
Ernst Home Centers
1511 6th Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98101

June 3, 1988

Re: SVC 90th South/Redwood Road
Dear Mr. DuBose:
Pursuant to our telephone conversation earlier this week, I
am enclosing per your request the following information:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Survey of the shopping center
Site plan of new Firestone store
As-bujlts of the building
CC6R9s of the shopping center
Typical lease form

7

As I indicated to you, stangl was one of the original
partners in the venture that developed the center. The
development was involved in a trade with the Brockbanks that
included a wrap-around contract back to Stangl. In addition
to this, the mortgage that was taken out on the property for
the Brockbanks with Aetna included a guarantee from Stangl.
Aetna Is now calling on Stanglfs guarantee as the Brockbanks
have defaulted and Stangl, as a result, is-- perfecting his
position under the guarantee and contract and should have
possession of the property by the end of this month.
As this relates to a time schedule by which you could have
occupancy, depending on the level of remodeling you wish to
spec, it would appear that you could have occupancy within
sixty days after the execution of a lease agreement and 15
the lease can be completed by the end of the month, you
could conceivably be open by the first of September.
Relative to Giant's occupancy, there were no major items of
remodeling other than cosmetic that were completed for their
occupancy. As a result, the building can adequately
accomodate your needs and if additional property is required
to accomodate you* garden/outside selling area needs, the
property can be expanded to the south.
S001073

Mr. Mack OuQosc

June 3, 1988
Page Three

With regard to the lease terms, Stangl has Indicated that
the base rent factor of $2.50 per square foot would most
probably be acceptable and that the amortization of the
remodeling improvements
can be handled as well but the
timing of Stangl1s negotiations with Aetna and having an
executed lease with Ernst are important relative to the
resulting cost of remodeling as the plan would be to have
these funds included in the mortgage as it is renegotiated
with Aetna* As you can see, although not essential, the
timing could be quite cost effective. With regard to other
lease terms, the base'rent would have to be subject to some
method of increase at reasonable periods during the lease
term based either on a CPI or percentage rent basis* The
length of term can be accomodated as would be acceptable to
you but will have to be of sufficient length to amortize the
excess improvement allowance to be provided.
Th> lease form enclosed can be utilized however if you ha<re
a standard form that you prefer, Stangl would like to use
the form that will enable the most timely execution of the
lease as it relates not only to acceptability but to
execution relative to his other negotiations•
If these general terms and conditions are acceptable, please
submit a letter of intent as to these and any other terms
and conditions which you would deem necessary for this
location and I will, present them to Stangl immediately so
that we can determine if there is a deal to be made. Should-'
you have any questions regaring the enclosed information or
need other information, please call.

SOO10739
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Mr- Mack DuBose
Vice President, Real Estate
Ernst Home Centers
1511 Sixth Avenue
Seattle,. Washington 98101

June 23, 1988

Re: Jordan Valley Plaza Shopping Center
Dear Mack:
It was a pleasure to get the opportunity to meet you and to

discuss the opportunity that exists at the above refetenced
center relative to a» remodel of the existing improvements for an
Ernst Home Center. After discussions with F.C. Stangl, a lease
with Srnst can be consumated based on the following general terms
and conditions:
Location:

Jordan Valley Plaza Shopping Center
SVC 900a South Redwood Road
South Jordan, Utah

Building Size:

Existing 46,050 square feet to be
remodeled and expanded by "approximately
15,000 square feet to the south of the
existing improvements

Primary Lease Term:

25 years

Options To Renew:

Four (4) terms of Five (5) years each

Plans and
Specifications:

Lessor shall expand as well as remodel
the existing Improvements to Ernst's
specifications. Ernst shall provide
Lessor with Its plans and specifications
as Ernst desires them to be constructed
in the remodel of the improvements*
Lessor will have said plans and
specifications reviewed by the
appropriate governing agencies and

SCO10970

Mr. Hack DuBose
June 23, 1988
Page tvo

Inform Brnst of any changes that will
be required in order to obtaia a
building permit. The installation of
ell fixtures and inventory shall be
excluded front said plans and specifications except where the installation
of sane by Brnst oust be coordinated
with the work of Lessor.
Construction Costs:

Lessor will provide a turnkey
building pursuant to the above
referenced plans and specifications.
Lessor's contribution hereunder shall
be limited to Pour Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($400,000.00) including any
related site development work
exclusive of the Lessor's requirements
mm set forth; herein.

Base Rent:

$167,289.Off annually payable in equal
monthly installments of $13,940.75.

Percentage Rent:

Two Percent (2%) of all gross sales In
excess of the base rent paid in any
calendar year.

Increases in Base Rent: The base rent shall be subject to aa
Increase of Fifteen Percent (19%) in
the sixth (6th), eleventh (11th),
sixteenth (16th), and twentieth (20th)
years of the primary tera and at the
beginning of any option tera.
Cost Overruns:

In the event that the cost of
remodeling the building shall exceed
Pour Hundred Thousand Dollars
($400,000.00), as bid by Lessor, Lessor
shall so notify Lessee of the amount
of excess and Lessee shall have the * ^
option of:
•4

1) Revising the plans and specifications
to bring the costs to within the
prescribed budget; or,

S
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Mr. Mack DuBose
June 23, 198*
Page Three

2) Paying £or such excess in cash upon
Lessor's receipt of a certificate
of occupancy; or,
3) Amortizing; such/ excess construction
costs over\the primary term of the
lease, at an amortized rate of Eleven
Percent (11V)
Occupancy expenses:

The lease shall be triple net with
Brnst paying for ail taxes, Insurance,
utilities and all other costs related
to its occupancy of the premises,
Including its prorata share of all
common area maintenance of the shopping
center of which the building is a part*

Ernst's Maintenance
and repairs:

Ernst shall be responsible for the
maintenance and repair of the premises
throughout the term of the lease
including all exterior areas utilized
as sales or storage areas, the
roof and all plumbing systems.

Lessor's Maintenance:

Lessor shall be responsible for the
maintenance of all structural portions
of the premises.

Additional Lessor
Obligations!

Lessor, prior to Ernst's occupancy of
the premises, shall Install a new roof
on the premises and resurface and
otherwise rehabilitate the parking
lot including the addition of parking
to the south of the existing parking.
As soon as is practical after Ernst's
occupancy of the premises. Lessor
agrees to rehabilitate and remodel
the exterior portions of the shops
that are a part of the shopping center
of which the premises are a part.

Flxturing Date:

Subject to no unusual requirements
in the Plans and Specifications and the
timely execution of a lease agreement,
October 1, 1988.

SCO10872

Mr, Mack DuBose
June 23, 1988
Paqe Four

The lease shall contain such other terms and conditions as are
mutually acceptable to Ernst and Lessor.
If the above terms and conditions are acceptable to you, please
acknowledge so in the space provided below and return an
acknowledged copy to m& together with the standard form lease
agreement that you propose to use and we will have it reviewed by
counsel, insert the applicable terms and conditions from this
letter, and forward execution copies of the lease to you. Should
you have any questions, please call me at 801*649-4644.

rfc'Pruitt
cc: 7.C* Stangl
ACCEPTED:

By
Its
Date _

SOO10873
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(206)621*6700

June 2 9 , 1988

Mr. Steve Pruitt
Mr. F.C. Standi
P.O. Box 1922
Park City, UT 840
RE:

JORDAN

Gentlemen:
Thank you f o^yourcpjpr^spondence outlining the general terms
and conditions tK&t you propose as the basis for leasing the
building located in the above mentioned center. I will respond
in order of your June 23, 1988 correspondence*
Agreed

1.

Location

2.

Building Size - Agreed, with the provisions that CAiM and
triple net charges are calculated on the 46,050 square feet
of building only.

3.

Primary Lease Term - Agreed

4.

Options to Renew - Agreed

5.

Plans and Specifications - Agreed, with the provision that
Ernst review ail schedule of costs and bids, and reserves
the right to re-bid any element of the project that is outside normal ranges of costs for similar work/products in
other markets.

6.

Construction Costs - Agreed, provided Ernst review all
construction costs and overhead elements related to the
construction projects and review ail change orders prior to
release.
In addition, the 3400,000 does not include the
costs of roof replacement, parking lot rehabilitation and
pylon sign.

7.

Base Rent - Agreed

8.

Percentage Rent - We will pay one percent (IX) on gross
sales in excess of 38,000,000.

Mr. Steve Pruitt
Mr. F-C. Standi
June 29, 1988
Page Two
9.

Increase m
Base Rent - Vot Agreed.
We will pay an
increase in rent of 5£ in the sixth (6th), eleventh (11th)
sixteenth
(16th) and twenty-first (21st) years of the primary term and at the beginning of any option term.

10.

Cost Overruns - We are agreed, except item #3, should be
prime rate plus one-half percent (1/2%) at the time Ernst
accepts the store for fixturing.

11.

Ernst Maintenance and Repair - Agreed, with
Landlord maintains the roof covering.

12.

Lessor's Maintenance - Agreed, with the provision Landlord
maintains the roof covering.

13.

Additional Lessor Obligations - Agreed, with the provision
that Ernst remodeling costs do not include roof replacement, parking addition and rehabilitation of the adjacent
tenant space, and the parking lot. It is further stipulated that tenant space rehabilitation shall be completed
within one (1) year from execution of the Ernst Lease. The
lessor will provide at his expense
a pylon sign on 9400
South street entrance for Ernst identification.

14.

Fixturing Date - Agreed, with the provision that if the
facilities are not substantially complete
(roof replaced,
construction elements completed for Ernst building, outside
nursery complete, pylon sign installed, parking lot rehabilitated), the fixturing date will be on, but not before
January 1, 1989.

15.

Commencement of Term - Upon full execution of the Lease.

16.

Commencement of Rent - Sixty (60) days after the building
is turned over to Ernst for fixturing and stocking.

•2* *—.-/*«-»
V

the

v

provision

@g)

Mr. Steve Pruitt
Mr. F.C. Stangl
June 29. 1988
Pa*e Three
Steve, I believe we can reach substantial agreement. Our next
step is to complete a binding Offer to Lease and then draft the
Lease document.
It usually takes 3-5 weeks for this process
(the Lease draft), but we are proceeding in advance of the Lease
by having our architectural work and construction planning
completed prior to the Lease document. I will forward to you,
after I have your response, our typical Lease for your review.
I believe we can speed up the process this way.
Sincerely,

Mack OuBose
Vice President-Real Estate,
Planning and Development
MD: mb
JORDAN

ADDENDUM E

HOME&NURSEXY
Corporate Officii

EMERY EXPRESS

15H Sixth Av*.
Sftattft. WA 96101

(206)621-6700

July 8, 1988

Mr* F.C. Stangl
Mr. Steve Pruitt
P.O. Box 1922
Park City, UT 84060
RE:

OFFER TO LEASE - JORDAN VALLEY PLAZA SHOPPING .CBffFBg

Gentlemen:
The following will^serve as.our proposal of termsiacceptabl
us relative .^to.ithe Leasing of space in the rjJordai^"^^^^
Shopping ^C^nter i^ffereaf ter ureferred «[to 'as^Landl—^
Home if Center* ZnoS^hezteafterpreferredftoSSs^e
pbntempiate'd by "th'is^propqaal "shall ,be: basecT on
terms and conditions*

ng^

1.

TENANT - Ernst'Home Center, Inc., a Washington ^Corporation.

2.

LOCATION - The Premises shall be located as outlinfcdjon^the
attached plan, identified as Exhibit (A).

3.

SIZE OP PREMISES - The total building shall consistrafc frhe
existing 46,050 square feet of the former.OiTbso^OliHount
Center Building and the addition of 15,000 square £&feet ts to
the south of the existing improvement. The leasable area
for the calculation of CAM, taxes, and insurance shall be
46,050 square feet and excludes nursery, mezzanine and
loading dock.

4.

TERMS AND COMMENCEMENT - The initial term of the Lease
shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing the .later of
60 days from notic 3 by Landlord that the Premises are substantially complete and ready for fixturing. The Landlord
agrees to deliver the Premises ready for fixturing on or
before October 1, 1988, and if Landlord is unable to do so,
the Tenant will not be required to accept the Premises for
fixturing before January 1, 1989. Tenant may, at its sole
option, accept the Premises after October 1, 1988 for fixturing. merchandising and opening prior to January 1, 1989.
If tenant chooses to open the Premises for business between
November 1, 1988 and January 1, 1989, the rent shall be
abated to March 1, 1989.

0020537

Mr. F.C. Stangl
Mr. Steve Pruitt
July 8, 1988
Page Two
5.

OPTIONS TO RENEW - Provided Tenant is not in default under
the terms of the Leas* or has not terminated the Lease
pursuant to the terms of **id Lease, Tenant shall have the
right to renew the Le*»« for "P to four (4) consecutive
terms of five years each tfPon expiration of the initial
term.
In any renewal period, all terms and conditions of
the Lease shall remain in effect except as to rent, Landlords work, and fixturin* period. Any option can only be
exercised by the Tenant providing written noticei$to4 Landlord of not less than ,180ydays prior<to/the •xpi£ing^)r.>hen
immediately preceding 'terai*

6.

BASE RENT - Tenant shall pay to , 'LgpgLXdrd
S^SfS^SSS^
amounts as minimum rental for the Leased Premise!?
Lease-Tears
LejjsjyjCe&L^

&**&

#167,289 annually,..
184,0 It- i?«RBmV!J
222,662
244,928: ^asaK&K*

Lease Years 26 - 30 - option period SI: .
Lease Years 31 - 45 - option period 2,3,4

"26£{?tUgmnus&^
270,032i_annually.s

Said rental shall be paid in equal;monthly installments,1 in
advance, without prior not ic « o p demand.*
7.

PERCENTAGE
will pay
Lease Term
equal to
$8,000,000

RENT - In addition to the £minimu« rental .-Tenant
to the Landl0 rd a t the «nd of each year of the
and options, a* additional rental, an amount
one percent (J*» °* the annual gross sales over
generated in t»« Leased Premises.

8.

USE OP PREMISES - The Tenant shall use the Premises for the
conduct of a lumber, hardware and nursery business and
allied lines, as operated or the Tenant in its stores in
the State of Utah.

0020S *"i

Mr. F.C. Stangl
Mr. Steve Pruitt
July 8, 1988
Page Three
9.

REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE
A. Premises - The Landlord shall keep in good order,
condition and repair, the structural portion of the building including, but not limited to, the foundation, exterior
walla, structural portion of the roof, and all utilities to
point of connection to the building. The Tenant shall be
responsible for the maintenance of all heating and .cooling
equipment, interior lighting, plumbing and utilities,from
the point of connection to the building, floor aaxerings,
plate
glass (unless damaged as' result of
defeots), .door systems, in^rior^ painting anc
and the roof covering. ; Landlord swill repair!?*
and warrant» the existing heating and cooling e<
be in good operating condition'at the time the
turned over to the Tenant for" fixturing.

B., Parkin*"frnfl ffowinon Are
shall

'Mx&

access
outline
basii^J
in ' paragraph
designate
maintenance (CAM). Tenants Jshare*of said Si
not exceed one-half (1/2)'of?1% of its anniiarfirSM^ales
as reported to Landlord*
10.

CONSTRUCTION OP THE LEASED PREMISES
A. Landlords Work - Landlord - shall expand as well as
remodel the existing improvements to Tenants specifications. Tenant shall provide Landlord with its plan and
specifications, within 30 days or sooner from the date of
this agreement, as it desires them to be constructed.
Landlord will have said plans and specifications reviewed
by the appropriate governing agencies and secure, supervise
and complete, said plans and specifications with good materials and workmanship.
B. Construction Costs - Landlord will provide a turnkey
building pursuant to the plans and specifications referred
to in paragraph 10A.
Landlord's contribution hereunder
shall be Pour Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00),
including any related site work. Site work related to the
refurbishment and rehabilitation of the common area ahall
not be included as building costs. Ln addition, the constructioh allowance shall not include the costs of roof
replacement, parking lot rehabilitation and pylon signs.

0020333

Mr. F.C. Stangl
Mr. Steve Pruitt
July 89 1988
Page Four
C. Coat Overrun - In the event the cost of remodeling the
building
exceeda
Four
Hundred
Thousand
Dollars
($400,000.00), as the bid by Landlord, Landlord shall
notify the Tenant of the amount in excess and Tenant shall
have the option of:
1.

Revising the plans and specifications to
costs to within the prescribed budget; or

2«

Paying for such excess in cash upon Tenants opening for
business; or

3.

Amortizing suon excess construction c?*t*
primary term at an amortized rate of prime',
half percentage (1/2%) points at the time'the
is ready for fixturing.

itiMftplansJg|^^

bring

the

imaj

ousiwooi
orders i
U.

PARKING.

ADJACHNT SHOPS

AND ROOF

-

Landlord,

prlOtV^O

Tenants occupanoy of# the Premises, shall re-surface£and
rehabilitate the parkins .lot .including - the ^additl1
parking to the south of the existing parking^per^a^^
Exhibit <B). Within one year after Tenants occup^cy fvof
the Premises, Landlord agrees to rehabilitate andWibdel
the exterior portion of the shops that are a part of the
shopping center of which the Premises are a part. The
rehabilitation of the parking lot, the additional parking
to south, and the remodel of the shop space shall be at
Landlords sole expense. In addition, Landlord shall remove
and replace the existing roof and decking (if required) of
the 46,050 square foot building. The materials and construction of the new roof will be of such quality that it
is warrantable for at least ten years from the date of
application.

12.

UTILITIES - Tenant shall pay for all water, heat and
electricity, natural gas, telephone, trash removal, and
other services and utilities supplied to the Premises for
its exclusive use in the operation of its business.

Mr* F.C. Stangl
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13.

TAXES AND INSURANCE - Tenant shall pay to the Landlord its
pro-rata share based on square footage as outlined in paragraph 3 of all real estate taxes levied and assessed
against the Premisesf and its pro-rata share of the fire
and extended coverage insurance required to be maintained
by Landlord on said Premises. Tenant shall pay all taxes
on its trade fixtures, leasehold improvements! merchandise
and other personal property.

14.

PYLON SIGN - Landlordt at his expense, will ._
...
sign for Tenants identification on'.the access ^t^tkMogn^e'r^
on 9400 South.
Tenant shall %j»yP#fpr s I t j i a K S m ^ s ^
installation; and maintenance. Landlord maytf:pi
space for additional tenants, but fin no instaSoj
design allow for other tenant signage that is grea«rJ
50X o'f Xhe size of the Ernst sign*

makin-gWf/^
men tsfWa %$aiabovery^ \ is made^nat£hazardous»
used j5Ln the construction vofvthe?existing ^mpr
governmental ^authority requires*the^removal a3
such elements; the costs of removal, disposal^and
ment shall be at the Landlords expense.
16.

OTHBR TBttH A W gQHPITIQNS - Tenant and
L^^MW^iJ^
cooperate in all matters relating to and di 1 igentl^Bpursue
the preparation of documents • execution of the^LeaseT'and"
construction of the improvements and addition to allow for
the opening to the public of Tenants business no later than
March 1, 1989.

17.

DOCUMENTATION AND APPROVAL - Finalization of the agreement
contemplated by this letter is subject to the preparation
and execution of a Lea ;e Agreement in form 'and content
acceptable to Ernst Home Center9 Inc., a Washington Corporation, and Valley Indoor Marketplace, Inc., a Utah Corporation, and their respective legal counsel.
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If you agree with this proposalf please acknowledge by returning
a signed original of this letter. We will then instruct our
attorneys to proceed with the preparation of the Lease. We look
forward to a mutually successful project.
Ypurs Truly,

r/]c^2^Mack Dufloae
Vice President of Real Estate
MD:mb
JORDAN1
Enclosures-Exhibits

Agreed and Accepted this

day of

, 1988.-

VALLBY INDOOR MARKETPLACE INC.
By
Its

By
Its

\J \ * fi~ K/ J>- '-'

ADDENDUM F

F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION CO.
4455 SOUTH 700 EAST

•

SUITE 300

•

SPECIALISTS >N COMMERCIAL

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 3092
AND INDUSTRIAL

July

14,

PLANNING

•

PHONE (801) 262 0331

ANQ DPVFl np*jcyr

1988
EXHIBIT NO.

Mr . Mack DuBose
c / o ERNST HOME & NURSERY
Corporate Offices
1511 S i x t h Avenue
S e a t t l e , WA 9 8 1 0 1

Re:

Offer to Lease
Jordan Valley Plaza
West Jordan, UT

|

p

in

GROVER

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
|

]?

'•&iii:i**viz&

Dear Mr. DuBose:
The following will serve as my proposal to lease
space in the above-captioned shopping center to Ernst Home
Center Inc., hereafter referred to as Tenant. The lease
offered is based on the following terms and conditions:
1. TENANT.
Corporation.

Ernst Home Center Inc., a Washington

2. LOCATION. The premises shall be located as
outlined on the attached plan, identified as Exhibit "A".
3. SIZE OF PREMISES. The total building shall
consist of the existing 46,050 square feet "of the former
Gibson Discount Center Building, and the addition of approximately 15,000 square feet to the south of the existing
improvement. The leaseable area for the calculation of CAM
(Common Area Maintenance) shall be 46,050 square feet. The
nursery, mezzanine and loading dock shall be excluded from
this calculation. Tenant may self insure, provided Lender
approval is obtained. If Lender will not grant the approval,
Landlord will provide insurance in amounts acceptable to
Lender, and Tenant will reimburse Landlord for the cost of
this insurance. Tenant shall pay its proportionate share of
real estate taxes upon presentation of a proper tax bill,
assessment, etc.
4. T E R M S & CONDITIONS. The initial term of the
lease shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing the
later of 60 days from notice by Landlord that the Premises
are substantially complete and ready for fixturing, provided
said notice is given by October 1, 1988 or January 1, 1989.
A Certificate of Occupancy, when properly obtained, shall
fix the date of substantial completion. Landlord agrees to
deliver the Premises to Tenant for fixturing on or before
October 1, 1988, and if the Premises are not substantially

Mack DuBose
ERNST HOME & NURSERY
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complete, with Certificate of Occupancy issued, the Tenant
will not be required to accept the Premises for fixturing
before January 1, 1989. Tenant may, at its sole option,
accept the Premises after October 1, 1988 for fixturinq,
merchandising, and opening prior to January 1, 1989. fff
Tenant chooses to open the Premises for business between
November 1, 1988, and January 1, 1989, Tenant shall pay rent
in the sum of 2% of gross sales generated during this interim
period, rather than the base rent set forth in Section 6.
5. OPTION TO RENEW. Provided Tenant is not in
default under the terms of the lease, and is in occupancy of
the Premises, and has not terminated the lease pursuant to
the terms of said lease, Tenant shall have the right to
renew the lease for up to four (4) consecutive terms of five
years, each upon expiration of the initial term. During any
renewal period, all terms and conditions of the lease shall
remain in effect, except as to rent, Landlords work, and
fixturing period. Any option can only be exercised by Tenant
providing written notice to Landlord of not less than 180
days prior to the expiring of the immediately preceding
term.
6. BASE MINIMUM RENT. Tenant shall pay to Landlord
the following minimum rental for the Leased Premi?*:^:
Lease
Lease
Lease
Lease
Lease

Years
Years
Years
Years
Years

1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25

$167,289.00
$184,017.00
$202,420.00
$222,662.00
$244,928.00

Annually
Annually
Annually
Annually
Annually

Option Periods
Lease Years 26-30
Lease Years 31-35
Lease Years 36-40
Lease Years 41-45

$269,420.00
$296,362.00
$325,998.00
$358,598.00

Annually
Annually
Annually
Annually

Said rental shall be paid in equal monthly installments, in advance, without prior notice or demand or offset.
7. PERCENTAGE RENT. In addition to the minimum
rental, Tenant will pay to the Landlord, at the end of each
year of the lease term and options, as additional rental, an
amount equal to one percent (1%) o- the annual gross sales
over $8,000,000.00 generated in the Leased Premises. Landlord
reserves the right to renegotiate the percentage rent clause
if the premises are subleased to a tenant whose use is not
substantially the same as the use set forth in the lease.

Mack DeBose
ERNST HOME & NURSERY
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8. USE OF PREMISES. The Tenant shall use the Premises
for the conduct of a lumber, hardware and nursery business,
and Allied Lines, as operated by the Tenant, in its stores
in the State of Utah.
9.

REPAIRS & MAINTENANCE.

A. PREMISES. The Landlord shall keep in good order,
condition and repair, the structural portion of the building,
including, but not limited to, the foundation, exterior
walls, structural portion of the roof, and all utilities to
point of connection to the building. The Tenant shall be
responsible for the maintenance of all heating and cooling
equipment, interior lighting, plumbing and utilities from
the point of connection to the building, floor coverings,
plate glass (unless damaged as a result of structural defect),
door systems, interior and exterior painting and plaster,
and the roof covering. Landlord will repair or replace and
warrant, the existing heating and cooling equipment to be in
good operating condition at the time the building is turned
over to the Tenant for fixturing.
B. PARKING & COMMON AREAS. In general, the Landlord
shall keep in good order and repair the parking, striping,
access, lighting, landscaping, and other common areas as set
forth on Exhibit "A", and the Tenant shall pay, on a monthly
basis, its prorata share of the costs for this common area
maintenance based on square footage designated in Section 3.
10.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEASED PREMISES.

A. LANDLORDS WORK. Landlord shall expand, as well
as remodel, the existing improvement to Tenant's specifications.
Tenant shall provide Landlord with its plan and specifications
within 30 days or sooner from the date of this agreement, as
it desires them to be constructed. Landlord will have said
plans and specifications reviewed by the appropriate governing
agencies and secure, supervise and complete the work set
forth in said plans and specifications, with good materials
and workmanship.
B. CONSTRUCTION COSTS. Landlord will provide a
turnkey building pursuant to the plans and specifications
referred to in Paragraph 10A. Landlord's construction hereunder shall be Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00),
including any related site work. Site work related to the
refurbishment and rehabilitation of the common area shall
not be included as building costs. In addition, the construction allowance shall not include the costs of roof replacement or parking lot rehabilitation.

Mack DuBose
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C. COST OVERRUN. In the event the cost of remodeling
the building exceeds Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000.00^,
as bid by Landlord, Landlord shall notify the Tenant of the
amount in excess and Tenant shall have the option of:
1. Revising the plans and specifications to within
the prescribed budget; or
2. Paying for such excess in cash upon Tenant's
opening for business; or
3. Amortizing such excess construction cost :ver
the primary term. The rental for this period will be calculated by multiplying the constant .0109 x the total of the
costs in excess of $400,000.00 = Additional Monthly Rent.
Example: Total Costs $435,000
-400,000
35,000
x.0109
$381.50/mo.
NOTE: This is the same constant used in arriving at the
rent for the $400,000.00 construction allowance. Cost Overruns will be extended exactly as the original construction
allowance.
D. TENANT PARTICIPATION. Tenant will provide, at
its expense, architectural and engineering support to develop
its plans and specifications. Tenant may review all construction costs and overhead elements related to the various
construction projects, as well as review all change orders
in excess of $1,000.00 prior to release.
11. PARKING, ADJACENT SHOPS & ROOF. Landlord,
prior to Tenant's occupancy of the Premises, shall resurface
and rehabilitate the parking lot, including the addition of
parking to the south of the existing parking per attached
Exhibit "A". Within one year after Tenant's occupancy of
the Premises, Landlord agrees to rehabilitate and remodel
the extension portion of the shops that are a part of the
shopping center of which the Premises are a part. The rehabilitation of the parking lot, the additional parking to the
south, and the remodel of the shop space shall be at Landlord
sole expense.
In addition, Landlord shall remove and replace the
existing roof and decking (if required) of the 46,050 square
foot building. The materials and construction of the new
roof will be of such a quality that it is warrantable for at
least ten years from the date of application.
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12. UTILITIES. Tenant shall pay for all s^u^r,
water, heat and electricity, natural gas, telephone, trash
removal, and other services and utilities supplied to the
Premises for its exclusive use in the operation of its business.
13. TAXES & INSURANCE, Tenant shall pay to the
Landlord as additional rent, its pro rata share, based on
the space leased by Tenant, for all real estate taxes levied
and assessed against the Premises and its pro rata share of
the fire and extended coverage insurance required to b-=»
maintained by Landlord on said Premises. Tenant shall pay
all taxes on its trade fixtures, leasehold improvements,
merchandise and other personal property.
14. PYLON SIGN. Landlord, at his expense, may
erect a pylon sign for Tenant's identification beside the
access to the Center from 90th South Street. If said tenant
identification on pylon is erected, Tenant shall pay for its
sign facia, installation, utilities, and maintenance. Landlord may provide facia space for additional tenants, but in
no instance will the design allow for other tenant signage
that is greater than 50% of the size of the Ernst sign. Any
signage currently permitted and existing may remain as-is,
except the sign previously allocated for Gibsons/GGGiant
will be removed.
15.

HAZARDOUS MATERIAL/GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENTS.

If

in the making of repairs and remodeling of the existing
improvements, a discovery is made that hazardous materials
were used in the construction of the existing improvements,
and governmental authority requires the removal and disposal
of such elements, the cost of removal, disposal and replacement shall be at Landlord's expense, but only if said discovery,
removal, disposal and replacement shall be complete prior to
Tenant's occupancy, but in ho case later than March 1, 1989.
16. OTHEft TgftKS & COKPITIOKS. Tenant and Landlord
agree to cooperate in all matters relating to and diligently
pursue the preparation of documents, execution of the lease,
and construction of the improvements and addition to allow
for the opening to the public of Tenant's business no later
than March 1, 1989.
17. DOCUMENTATION & APPROVAL. Finalization of the
agreement contemplated by this lette • is subject to the
preparation and execution of a lease agreement in form and
content acceptable to Ernst Home Center, Inc., a Washington
Corporation, and F.C. Stangl III and their respective legal
counsel.
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If you agree with this proposal, please acknowledge
by returning a signed original of this letter. This letter
is offered for your acceptance, but the offer will be withdrawn if not accepted as offered and returned to me prior to
July 20, 1988, at 5:00 P.M.
Upon your acceptance, please indicate your preference
as the responsibility to initiate the drafting of the lease.
I'll await your reply

FCS:cj
enclosure: Exhibit MA'
cc: Mr• Steve Pruitt
Agreed and accepted this

day of

1988,

ERNST HOME CENTER, INC.
By.
Its
F.C. Stangl III initiate the drafting of the lease,
Ernst Home Center, Inc. initiate the drafting of
the lease.
YOUR SUGGESTED SCHEDULE

MY SUGGESTED SCHEDULE
Begin/End

Begin/End
Documentation
Approval
Signatures
Begin Const.
Fixture Install.
Rent Commence.
(Please fill in your
suggested schedule.)

Documentation
Approval
Signatures
Begin Const.
Fix. Install.
Rent Commence,

7/19
7/29
8/15
a/ij
10/1
12/1

7/29
8/15
10/1
12/1

ADDENDUM G

HOME&MJBSERY
COQQritt OfftCM
iSU Sotn Av».
S4IKH. WA 96101

(206)621-6700

^
ii inij I i ji I

i

in, 3 8 8

Mr. F. C. Stangl
F. C. Stangl construction Co.
4455 South 700 East - Suits 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-3092
Ra:

Offar to Laasa —- Jordan Valley Plaza, Wast Jordar

Daar Mr. Stangl:
Tha following will serve as our proposal of t i n s acceptable
for tha laasa of spaca in tha above-captioned shopping canter.
1 • Tanant.
Corporation.
11

Ernst

Ho»i

Washington

?•• Location, 'Tha premises shal
Ltached plan, identified aa Exhibi

3. Size of Premises. Tha total building shall consist of
the existing 46,050 squara faat of tha former Gibson Discount
Center Building, and tha addition of approximately 15,000 square
faat to tha south of tha axiatlng improvement for a nursary. The
leasable area for tha calculation of CAM (Common Area Maintenance)
shall ba 46,050 squara faat exclusive of nursary, mezzanine and
loading dock.
Landlord agrees to maintain all risk property
insuranca insuring tha building in an amount equal to tha full
replacamant coat thereof. Tanant shall have tha right, at each
annual anniversary date for any all risk proparty insurance, to
supply such all risk property insuranca with such deductible as
Tanant daass appropriate, including tha option of self insurance,
provided Lander grants its approval.
In tha event Landlord
supplias tha all risk proparty insuranca, it shall giva Tanant
vrittan notice of tha full particulars thereof and If Tenant
providas a quota from a qualified insuranca company in a lassar
amount, Landlord shall either place such insuranca with said
company or reduce the amount r»* premium attributed to Tanant to
,, ,.", j
itntSS: —
I
*> |V public
cntfY * MicOoAtW. Notify

t

(;:„Y • ,'.">
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tha amount of tha premium quoted by the insurance company supplied
by Tenant.
4. Terms and Commencement.
Tha initial term of the lease
shall ba for twenty-five (25) years commencing sixty (60) days
from notice by Landlord that tha Premises and tha common areas are
substantially complete ("Substantial Completion4').
Substantial
Completion will not occur until a Certificate of Occupancy has
baan properly obtained by Landlord, Landlord has completed all of
tha common areas so as to allow Tenant in an exercise of its reasonable judgment to begin its work, and Landlord has completed
its obligations as sat forth in Sections 10 and 11 balov.
Landlord agraas to deliver tha Premises to Tenant for fixturing on
or before Octobar 1, 1988. However, if Substantial Completion has
not occurred by Octobar 1, 1988, tha Tenant will not ba required
to accept tha Premises for fixturing bafora January 1, 1989,
Still, Tenant may, at its sola option, accept tha Premises after
Octobar 1, 1988 for fixturing, merchandising, and opaning prior to
January 1, 1989.
If Tenant chooses to opan tha Premises for
businass batwaan November 1, 1988, and January 1, 1989, Tenant
jhall pay rant in tha sum of two parcant (2%) of gross sales
generated during this interim pariod, rather
thaji tha base rent
sat forth in Section e ^ w M - ^ * ^ - * " ^ i{j0L* ^^^
^urii naJTLd ~
*
5. Option to Renew. P»e*ided Tenant ia act im delimit in-L
filll pijiiiiiiit if HI i Milium rental -r irtrlif 1 rrnal Ttan^il inrl M * »^* ^
-terminated %he ""tease. pmwiaj»* to fcha teems uf juid leaae^ Tenant 4Q
shall hava tha right to ranaw tha lease for up to four (4)
consecutive terms of five (5) yaars each.
During any renewal
pariod, all terms and conditions of tha laasa shall remain in
effect, axcapt as to rant, Landlord's work, and fixturing pariod.
Any option can only ba exercised by Tenant providing written
notice to Landlord of not lass than ona hundred eighty (180) days
prior to tha expiring of tha immediately preceding term.
6. Base Minimum Rant.
Tanant shall pay to Landlord tha
following minimum rental for tha Laased Premises:
Laasa
Laasa
Laasa
Laasa
Laasa

Yaars 1*5
Yaars 6-10
Yaars 11-15
Yaars 16-20
Yaars 21-25

$167,289.00
$184,017.00
$202,420.00
$222,662.00
$244,928.00

Annually
Annually
Annually
Annually
Annually

0
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Option Perm us
Lease
Lease
Lease
Lsass

Years
Ysars
Ysars
Ysars

26-30
31-3 5
3 6-4 0
41-45

$ 2 6 9,4 2 0.00 Annua11y
$296,362.00 Annually
$325,998.00 Annually
$358,598.00 Annually

Said rental shall be paid in equal
i nstallaents, in
adva ncs , i ri thout pri or notice or demand.
7. Percentage Rent.
In addition to the ainiaua rental,
Tenant will pay to the Landlord, at the end of each year of the
lease term, as additional rental, an amount equal to one percent
(1%) of Tenant's gross sales exceeding Eight Million Dollars
($8,000,000), and one percent (1%) of Tenant's gross sales
exceeding Fifteen Million Dollars ($15,000,000) each year of any
option period.
Landlord reserves the right to renegotiate the
percentage rent clause if the premises are subleased to a tenant
whose use is not substantially the same as the use sat forth in
the lease.
3. Ose of Premises. The Tenant shall use thm Premises for
the conduct of a general super lumbar, hardware, building
materials, sporting goods and nursery business, and Allied Lines,
as operated by Tenant, in a majority of its stores in the State of
Utah. During the term of the Lease, Landlord agrees not to permit
any other portion of the shopping center to be used for the sale
of hardware (except for normal hardware sold by food and variety
storss), building materials, plants, nursery stock and other
garden supplies (except for plants, nursery stock and garden
supplies sold, stored or displayed by retail food stores only
within the confines of the food store building or on the sidewalks
immediately adjacent to the front of the store), and no portion of
the building immediately south of the Leased Premises shall be
used for or am a restaurant unless Landlord has the prior written
approval of Tenant.
S • Rmpairs ai id Maintei lai tea.
*• P r e m i s e s .
T h e L a n d l o r d shall keep in good order,
c o n d i t i o n a n d repair, t h e s t r u c t u r a l p o r t i o n s o f the building,
including, b u t n o t limited t o , t h e foundation, exterior walls,
s t r u c t u r a l p o r t i o n s of t h e roof, a n d a l l u t i l i t i e s to point of
c o n n e c t i o n t o t h e building. T h e T e n a n t shall b e responsible for
the m a i n t e n a n c e o f all heating a n d c o o l i n g equipment, interior
lighting, p l u m b i n g and u t i l i t i e s from t h e p o i n t of connection to
the b u i l d i n g , floor coverings, p l a t e g l a s s (unless damaged as a
Cii^li' ? : -
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result of structural defect), door systems, interior and exterior
painting and plaster, and the roof covering. Landlord will repair
or replace and warrant, the existing heating and cooling equipment
to be in good operating condition at the time the building is
turned over to the Tenant for fixturing.
b. Parking and Common Areas. In general, the Landlord
shall keep in good order and repair the parking, striping, access,
lighting, landscaping, and other common areas as set forth on
Exhibit A, and the Tenant shall pay, on a monthly basis, its
pro rata share of the costs for this common area maintenance based
on the square footage designated in Section 3 compared to the
total square footage of all buildings in the shopping center.
10.

Construction of the Leased Premises.

a.
Landlord's Work. Landlord shall expand, as veil as
remodel, the existing building to Tenant's specifications. Tenant
shall provide Landlord with its plan and specifications within
thirty (30) days or sooner from the date of this agreement.
Xandlord will have said plans and specifications reviewed by the
appropriate governing agencies and secure all necessary permits,
supervise and complete the work set forth in said plans and
specifications, with good materials and workmanship.
b.
Construction
Costs.
Landlord will provide a
turnkey building pursuant to the plans and specifications referred
to in Section 10.a. Landlord's construction costs hereunder shall
be Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000), including any related
site work.
Site
work
related
to the
refurbishment
and
rehabilitation of the common
areas and the costs of roof
replacement and parking lot rehabilitation shall not be included
as construction allowance costs and shall be at the sols expense
of Landlord.
c.
Cost Overrun. In the event the cost of remodeling
the building exceeds Pour Hundred Thousand Dollars ($400,000),
Landlord shall notify the Tenant of the amount in excess and
Tenant shall have the option of:
(1) Revising
the
within the prescribed budget; or

plans

and

specifications

to

(2) Paying for such excess in cash upon Tenant's
opening for business; or

0v2Q^

^
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(3) Amortizing 3uch axcass construction cost over
ths primary tsrm. Ths rsntal for this psriod will bs calculated
by multiplying the constant .0109 x ths total -~ ths costs in
sxcsss of $400,000.00 » Additional Monthly Rant.
Exampls;

$435,000
-400,000
35,000
X .0109
$381.50/mo.

«
Tsnant Participation, Tsnant will provida, at its
sxpsnss, architsctural and snginssring support to dsvslop its
plans and spscifications. Landlord and Tsnant shall agrss on ths
cost of ths ramodsling of ths building, sxcluding changs ordars,
prior to sxscution of ths Lsasit
~*~ may rsvisw all
construction costs and ovsrhsad sl*k —.—
rslatsd to ths
construction, as wall as rsvisw and approvs all changs ordars in
sxcsss of 0ns Thousand Dollars ($1,000) prior to rslsass.
11. Parking, Adlscant Shops and Roof,
Landlord,, at its
sxpsnss, prior to Substantial Complstion, shall rssurfacs and
rshabilitats ths parking lot, including ths addition of parking to
ths south of ths sxisting parking par attachsd Exhibit A.
In
addition, prior to Substantial Complstion Landlord, at itssxpsnss, shall, in accordancs with spscifications approvsd by
Tsnant, rsaovs and rsplacs ths sxisting roof and dscking (if
rsquirsd) of ths sxisting building.
Ths matsriala and
construction of ths nsw roof shall bs warrantsd for at laast tsn
(10) yssrs from ths data of application.
Within ons (1) yaar aftsr Tsnant# s occupancy of ths Prsmisss,
Landlord agrsss, at its sxpsnss, to rshabilitats and rsmodsl ths
sxtsnslon portion of ths shops that ars a paart of ths shopping
csntsr of which ths Prsmisss ars a part. If ths rshabilitation
and rsmodsl of said shop spacs is not complstsd within ths
aforamantionsd ons (1) ysar psriod, Tsnant shall bs sntitlsd to
suspsnd ths payment of minimum and additional rsntal until such
rshabilitation and rsmodsling is complsts.
Otilltlss. Tsnant shsll pay for ax A sswsr, watsr, hsat
and slsctricity, natural gas, tslsphons, trssh rsmovsl, and othsr
ssrvicss and utilitiss supplisd to ths- Prsmisss for its sxcl i isivs
us* in ths opsration of its businsss.
13. Taxss arid m m r a n c t , Subj set tu .
abova, Tsnant
shall pay to ths Landlord as additional
, its pro rata

(;-;::,:

"1

Mr. F. C. Stangl
August 3, 1988
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share, based on the square footage designated in Section 3
compared with the total square footage of all buildings in the
shopping center, for all real estate taxes levied and assessed
against the Premises and its pro rata share of the all risk
insurance referred to in Section 3 required to be maintained by
Landlord on said Premises.
Tenant shall pay all taxes on its
trade fixtures, leasehold improvements, merchandise and other
personal property.
14. Pylon Sign. Landlord, at his expense, may erect a pylon
sign for Tenant's identification beside the access to the shopping
center from 90th South Street. If said tenant identification on
pylon is erected, Tenant shall pay for its sign facia,
installation, utilities, and maintenance.
Landlord may provide
facia space for additional tenants, but in no instance will the
design allow for other tenant signage that is greater than fifty
percent (50%) of the size of the Ernst sign.
If any of the
tenants are provided space on a pylon sign, all tenants shall pay
a pro rata share of the costs and maintenance thereof.
Any
signage currently permitted and existing shall remain as*is,
except for the addition of Tenant's sign and except for removal of
the sign previously allocated for Gibson/Giant; provided, in all
events, a pylon sign shall be available, at Landlord's expense,
for Tenant's sign by the access to the shopping center from
Redvood Road.
15. Hazardous Material/Government Requirements.
If in the
making of repairs and remodeling of the existing improvements, a
discovery is made that hazardous materials were used in the
construction of the existing improvements, and governmental
authority requires the removal and disposal of such elements, the
cost of removal, disposal and replacement shall bo at Landlord's
expense, and said removal, disposal and replacement shall be
complete prior to Tenant's occupancy, but in no case later than
March 1, 1989.
Landlord represents and warrants to Tenant that, to the best
of Landlord's knowledge, hazardous substances are not a part of or
located in the Premises or adjoining property owned by Landlord
and have not been generated, stored or disposed of on the Premises
or adjoining property owned by Landlord, nor have the same been
transported to or over the Premises. 'Hazardous substance* shall
be interpreted broadly to mean any substance or material defined
or designated as hazardous or toxic waste, hazardous or toxic
material, hazardous or toxic or radioactive substance, or other
similar term by any federal, state or local environmental law,
regulation or rule presently in effect or promulgated in the

Mr. F. C. Stangl
August 3, 1988
Paga 7

future, as such laws, r ag ulations or rules may ba amended form
time to time, and it shall ba interpreted to include, but not be
limited to, asbestos and any substance which after release into
tha environment and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or
assimilation, either directly from the environment or indirectly
by ingestion through food chains or otherwise, will or may
reasonably ba anticipated to causa sickness, death, disease,
behavior abnormalities, cancer or genetic abnormalities. Landlord
will hold Tenant harmless from and indemnify and defend Tenant
against and from any damage, loss, expanses or liability resulting
from any breach of this representation and warranty, including all
attorneys' fees and costs incurred as a result thereof.
'•• xs. Other Terms and conditions. Tenant and Landlord agree
to cooperate in all matters relating to and diligently pursue the
preparation of documents, execution of tha lease, and construction
of tha improvements and addition to allow for tha opening to the
public of Tenant's business no later than March 1, 1989.
j
Documentation and Approval.
Finalisation of :n i •
agreement contemplated by this letter is subject to the
preparation and execution of a lease agreement in form and content
acceptable to Ernst Home Center, Inc., a Washington Corporation,
and F. C. Stangl III and their respective legal counsel.
18. Automotive standards.
Landlord agrees that It shall
impose tha following standards on any occupants of the shopping
canter which either sell automotive parts and supplies or provide
automobile service:
a. The parking lots and other common areas o*. _ue
shopping center shall not be utilized by automobiles awaiting
service or repair, or the installation of parts, or pick-up by
customers.
b. Customers shall be prohibited from making repairs to
automobiles in the parking lot and other common areas of i he
shopping center.
ftiii parking lots and other common areas surrounding
e#
said occupant shall not be used for storage of automotive parts
and/or supplies, shall be kept free of petroleum products and
hazardous substances, and shall be kept in a neat and orderly
condition so as to not detract from the appearance of the shopping
center.

Mr. F. C. stangl
August 3, 1988
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d.
The premises, outside any building, shall not be
used for storage of any automotive parts and/or supplies, unless
the same are fully screened from view in a manner so as to not
detract from the appearance of the shopping center.
If you agree with this proposal, please ac)cnovledge
returning a signed original of this letter.
This letter
offered for your acceptance, but the offer will be vithdravn
not accepted as offered and returned to me prior to August
1988, at 5:00 p.m.

by
is
if
5,

If you agree with this proposal, please indicate your
acceptance by signing on the appropriate space and returning to me
a copy with an original signature.
Upon receipt of this
eement, ve vill direct our legal counsel to prepare the lease.
Sincerely,

Hack DuBoee
Vice President/Reel Estate
Planning and Development
Attachment: Exhibit A

. .....

Agreed and accepted this
day of
, 1988.

F. C. Stangl III
d216e

'.. *,V i"

ADDENDUM H

HCMZ&NUXSZZY
Coroo< ate Oftce*

tSU SutnAv«.

EMERY EXPRESS

S«attl«. WA 96101
(206)621-6700

August

i! I
F.C . Stanscl
F.C. Stansl Construction Co.
4455 South 700 East - Suite 300
S a l t Lake City, I IT 84107-3092
R*:

OFFER TO LEASE - JORDAN VALLEY PLAZA

D< !! v ^ 1! I Z '>

St I 1 " If I

Enclosed are two binding "Offers to Lease" for the above mentioned location. Please execute and return one original to mr
attention. It Is ay expectation that the final Lease document
will be approved and ready for signatures on September 1. 1988.
Ve have instructed our attorney to begin Lease preparations in
advance of your signature on the offer. At this point, it ii
difficult for me to determine the construction schedule and a
subsequent turnover date. We will await your estimate of the
schedule based on t he current;, conditions.
The determination of the store open! ng will be made
receipt of jour revised schedule.

aftex

Sincerely •

>\A a c ft. ij *J£r**'
Mack Dufiose
Vice President of Reai Estate
MD:mb
JOROAN6
Enclosures

n: * w ;:-i*

tlie

ADDENDUM I

HOME&MmSEBY
Corporate Offices
15M Sixth Ave.
Seattle, WA 98101
(206)621-6700

DM

I td'RIHli

II

I III III

Illi I M l

hiPRL i 1

August 23 „ 1 inn

ill! I
II: • C. S t a n d • III
F. C. Stangle Contatructioii Company
4455 South 700 Bast, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-3092
liii! B

i E SE

J" :::: it ::: i i

ii: i: ill i i i i Z A

Dear Mr Stangl:
Enclosed is : lii x
J e a se "
Wefc- ~ r -epared to execute as submitted. We have made every effort
address those issues I:bat
we-have discussed.
EUeascr rev lew and rtturn with jwuv ^omikents and/ or notif 7 ne
that you find the terns acceptable and I will forward execution
documents for your signature.
Aftex j oux • aignaturef
lease*

11e

1 1 il I

Co t d i a 1 1 3 ,

Mack Oufiose
Vice President of Rea 1 Bs t: 1 t • •
MB:san

thei 1 execute and record the

ADDENDUM J

F. C. STANGL CONSTRUCTION CO.
4465 SOUTH 700 EAST

•

SUITE 300

•

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107-3092

•

PHONE (801) 262-0381

SPECIAUSTS IN COMMERCIAL ANO INDUSTRIAL PLANNING ANO DEVELOPMENT

August 29, 1988

VIA TELECOPIER
Mr* Mack OuBose
c/o ERNST HOME 6 NURSERY
Corporate Offices
1511 Sixth Avenue
Seattle, WA 98101
Re: * Lease of premises in Jordan Valley Plaza,
Jordan City, Utah

Met

Dear Mr. OuBose s
I have carefully reviewed the revised lease sent by you to me
and I appreciate your making the revisions that were made in this
latest draft. Although this letter contains a number of comments,
at this point I think (and hope) that ve are very close to being
finished. Please make the changes set forth below in this letter
and then forward revised copies of the lease to ma for my
execution. Pleasa also forward with such execution copies a draft
C
°PY/ "blacklined" to show the changes made in accordance with this
letter.
I will send via Federal Express multiple copies of the legal
description to be attached as Exhibit A to the lease, and the site
plan to b» attached as Exhibit B to the lease*
If these are
acceptable to you, please attach them to the execution copies you
send to me.
I will also send via Federal Express for your
information a photocopy of our policy of title insurance for the
shopping center. The leased premises will remain subject to all
of the matters set forth on Schedule B thereof. Pursuant to your
language in Paragraph First of the lease, I will require that Ernst
approve all such matters concurrently with the execution of the
lease.

Mr. Mack DuBose
August 29, 1988
Page - 2 Please make the following changes to the lease:
1.
Delete the phrase beginning on the fifth line from the
\/ bottom of page l, which reads as follows: "Including additional
n\L^areas, if any, abutting the Shopping Center and to be used as a
\^ part of or in connection with the Shopping Center,...."
2.
Add to the second line of subparagraph 1 in Paragraph
"Second after tha word "without" the phrase "abatement (except as
expressly provided in Paragraphs Seventh and Eighth), deduction,
offset,...."

,//

3.
Add to tha paragraph ending on tha fourth line from tha
bottom of page 5 tha following: "Tenant covenants to pay said
-, amount ta Landlord without abatement (except as expressly provided
*£> in Paragraphs Seventh and Eighth) , deduction, offset, prior notice
X or demand on or before February 1, 1989."'
4.
Tha blank on tha fourth line from tha bottom of page 7
should ba competed as follows: "as shown in Landlord's policy of
•Y/title insurance for tha Shopping Center, a copy of which has been
provided to, and reviewed by, Tenant-"

P
^\

5*
Oalata tha word "initial." on tha first line on page 10,
add "(as tha same may ba extended) 9 after tha word "Lease" on said
first, line, and delete the first: full sentence on page 10, which
reads as follows: "During each of tha option terms of this Lease
the percentage rental shall be an amount equal to one percent (1*)
of all gross sales in excess of Fifteen Million Dollars
($15,000,000) for amy year in tha option term."'
6.
After tha word "without:9 on tha ninth line of page 10,
add tha phrase "abatement (except as expressly provided in
Paragraphs Seventh and Eighth), deduction, offset,...."
ttj.

After tha paragraph ending on page 11, add the following:

^&\,'
\**yjC
\lf> \%\
*
x '\
Vw

6+
Nat Lease. It is the intent of Landlord and
Tenant that .the minimum rent,. percentage rental and all
other amoqpts payable by Tenant to Landlord be absolutely
net to T&ndlord and that Tenant shall, except as
expresslyVjflhreinafter provided, pay (either directly or
by paytnen^ of Tenant's share of such amounts pursuant to
the provisions of this Lease) for all insurance, taxes,
\.v
Assessments, utilities, repairs, maintenance and all
L j^* ^ otf|L&£j services and costs relating to the Premises and to
rarayit's use thereof.

(^1
\

j

s

S0010583

Mr. Macfc DuBose
August 29, 1988
Page -38.
Replace the first sentence in Paragraph Fourth with the
following:
During the full term of the Lease and any renewals
thereof, Landlord agrees, with respect to the Premises,
to keep in good condition and repair, tha structural
portions of the roof, the structural portions of the
exterior walls, the foundation and all other structural
portions of the Premises, and plate glass (but only when
the plate glass is damaged due to structural building
defects or events included in the all risk property
insurance policy insuring the Premises, provided that any
deductible portion of such insurance is paid by Tenant),
and, provided that Tenant reimburses Landlord for its
pro rata portion of the cost thereof, all paricing areas,
common areas, sidewalks and access areas of the Shopping
Center.

^

AT
9*
Delete the sentence beginning on the fourth line of page
y % 13 which reads as follows: "If Landlord fails to promptly reimburse
Tenant for such, repairs, Tenant may deduct the expenses of the same
* &
from the rent next accruing*"
go

tf^^^

10. Delete the phrase "ordinary wear and tear," on the third
of Paragraph Fifth*

_
11. Add to the sentence ending on the fifth line from the
bottom of page 13 the following: ", except as provided below in
this Paragraph Fifth in the event that Tenant elects to provide
insurance or to self insure."
,c SS
12. Add to the sentence ending on the fourth line on page 15
^•^the following: ", and Tenant shall do any or all of the foregoing
~ ^ if requested by Landlord."
13. Add to the paragraph ending on the ninth line of page 15
the following:
^
^ ^ Tenant shall leave the^remises ("broom clean" and in good
order and condition,'exceptingvthe damages referred to
in the last paragraph of this Paragraph Fifth concerning
waiver of subrogation and other matters as to which
provision is made herein for Landlord's responsibility,
and except for damage caused by fire, however caused, or
by earthquake, tornado, the elements, act of God and
other casualty, except as provided below in this
Paragraph Fifth in the event that Tenant elects to
provide insurance or to self insure.

SCO10566

Mr. Mack DuBose
August 29, 1988
Page -4v^X. 14. Add to the eleventh line of page 15, after tha/itordl
^agrees"
the phrase "9 provided that Tenant reimburses LahdlWd
u
V ^ f o r its pro rata portion of the cost thereof,...."
O
^
\^

7N
*-**
'

•

&

15. Add to the paragraph ending on the eighth line from the
bottom of page 17 the following:
Such property insurance shall name Landlord as a loss
payee as its interests may appear, and shall be with
companies reasonably acceptable to Landlord.
Tenant
shall furnish Landlord a certificate of coverage. Such
insurance shall not be cancelable or subject to reduction
\
of coverage or other modification except after thirty
iy
(30) days' prior written notice to Landlord by the
t
\
insurer. All such policies shall be written as primary , Of*. L,
policies, not contributing with and not. in excess of they { v JT
coverage which Landlord may carry, and shall only be^\ A ^ f
subject to such deductibles as may be reasonably approvedrV^ K j/N
in writing in advance by Landlord. Tenant shall, at\J / v i ^ S l
least: ten (10) days prior to the expiration of such
-**
policies, furnish Landlord with renewals or binders
therefor. Any mortgage lender interested in amy part of
the Premises may, at Landlord's option, be afforded
coverage under any policy required to be secured by
Tenant under this Lease, by use of a mortgagee's
endorsement, to the policy concerned.

41 tf

16. Add to the paragraph ending on the eleventh line of page
18 the following: *; provided, however, that if Tenant has elected
to supply such insurance, such release shall apply to the extent,
but: only to the extent, to which such loss or damage is actually
covered by such insurance and Tenant either restores such damage
or delivers the proceeds to Landlord, as contemplated by Paragraph

^

Seventh."

17. Delete the first: two paragraphs of Paragraph Sixth and
insert in their place the following:

* •

Landlord agrees not to permit any person other than
Tenantr or its subtenants, to place or maintain any sign
on or above the Building.
Tenant may, subject to
applicable governmental regulations, utilize its standard
sign on the outside of the Building, provided that it is
not an intermittent flashing off-and-on sign, and
provided that such sign shall not extend above the roof
line of the Building. Multiple signs on the exterior of
the Building must be approved by Landlord prior to
installation, which approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld.
SOO10587

Mr. Mack DnBose
A u g u s t 2 * , 1988

CkOV^

Page - 5 -

\
Landlord shall provide a pylon sign beside the
access to the Shopping Canter on Redwood Road. Tenant
^
shall have the right to have its sign facia on said pylon
-f'jfri
signTenant shall pay for its sign facia and its / j£K^ '
installation on said pylon, as well a3 $
(^
toward Landlord's cost of the initial installation ^ ^\* ^ r
of said pylon sign. Tenant shall pay for the cost of all
utilities for, and maintenance of, said pylon sign.
<>A

18. Add to the sentence ending on the third line from the
^\>/ bottom of page 20 the following; ", but subject to the provisions
(\f /3^n relating to the renegotiation of this Lease set forth in Paragraph
* Eleventh.*
19. Add to the paragraph ending on the sixth line of page 21
ft\ the phrase ", which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.'
20. Add to the ninth line from the bottom of page 21 after
the word "damage,* the phrase "and in such event Tenant may not
terminate this Lease,...."

<P
oV

y 21* Delete the sentence beginning on the second line of page
23, which reads- "If during t h e making of such repairs Tenant
continues* to sell merchandise on the Premises, Tenant shall pay
•minimum rent, percentage rent: and a proportionate share of the
taxes, insurance and common area maintenance costs based on the
portion of the Premises actually utilized by Tenant." (This is
inconsistent with the preceding sentence.)

22. Delete the. balance of the paragraph beginning on the
sixth line from the bottom of page 25 after the first sentence
thereof, amd substitute therefor the following:
•>

Within thirty (30) days after the date the short form of
lease is filed for record, Landlord shall, at Landlord's
expense, provide Tenant with an American Land Title
Association Leasehold
Policy,
providing
standard
coverage, insuring Tenant's leasehold interest in the
Premises* Such policy shall reflect the same condition
of Landlord's title to the Premises as that shown by
Landlord's policy of title insurance, a copy of which has
been provided to, and reviewed by, Tenant.

23. Add the word "reasonably" before the word "satisfactory"
^l*^
on the tenth line and on the seventh line from the bottom of page
^ 27, and add the phrase "exercise reasonable effort to..." after the
V/^ word "shall" on the ninth line from the bottom of page 27.

1*
S0010588

Mr. Mack DuBose
August 29, 1988
Page -624. Add to the beginning of Paragraph Tenth the following:
^O-N^Provided that Tenant timely pays its pro rata share of the same-pY ^*

"•—

kj\

- -

Delete from the fifth and sixth lines in Paragraph
^e phrase "liable as surety to Landlord for the full
e minimum rent, taxes, Assessments and insurance
ording to the terms hereof;* and substitute therefor
jointly and severally primarily liable with such
or subtenant: for the timely payment: and performance of
arifc obligation of Tenant under this Lease;...."
Delete the balance of the second paragraph in Paragraph
<^/ L, Eleventh after the first sentence thereof, and substitute t^herefor
J*y
V\</
*•
%>

Landlord shall then have the r^Tv*""lrlrT r^+'r at its
optionr after its receipt of such notice, from time to
time or at any time, to terminate this Lease upon written
notice to Tenant. If Landlord has not elected to so
terminate this Leas* as provided hereinabove, Tenant may
sublet the- Premises or assign this Leas* in accordance
with the foregoing paragraph*
Notwithstanding the
foregoing portion of this paragraph, if Tenant gives
notice of such, intent prior to the end of the fifth (5th)
year of this Lease, the same will constitute a default
hereunder*
If Tenant proposes to sublet the Premises or to
assign this Lease to a Landlord approved tenant whose use
is not substantially the same as that of Tenant, Tenant
shall in good faith renegotiate with Landlord the
percentage rent provision contained in this Lease, as
well as any other provision of this Lease that in
Landlord's sole judgment requires modification to conform
this Lease and the provisions hereof to the nature of
such subtenant's or assignee's use.
The following provisions of this subparagraph shall
apply only during the first five (5) years after the
Commencement Date.
Tenant shall operate Tenant's
business in the Premises so as to maximize the gross
sales produced by such operation, and shall carry in the
Premises at all times a stock of merchandise of such
size, character and quality as is reasonably designed to
produce the greatest possible amount of percentage
rental. Tenant shall carry on its business diligently
and continuously at the Premises and shall )ceep the
Premises open for business on all business days in

y

t>v

SCO10589
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Mr. Mack DuBose
August 29, 1988
Page -7accordance with normal business practices for retail
operations, in Salt Lake County.
,
27. After the word "rent" on the second line of Paragraph
fVThirteenth add the phrase: "or any other amounts due hereunder...."
28. Delete the balance of the paragraph following the end of
'\N\ the sentence ending on the fifth line of page 30, and substitute
\^y therefor the following:
/g' \ X
X * ^ t^
/u*
*A
<rf ^T 1
\T

, and all other amounts payable hereunder, including,
without limitation, percentage rental, taxes, insurance
and common area maintenance expenses.
In addition,
Landlord may perform in Tenant's stead any obligation
that Tenant has failed to perform, and landlord shall be
reimbursed promptly for amy cost reasonably incurred by
Landlord in connection therewith with interest thereon
from the date of such expenditure until paid in full at
the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per annum, or exercise
-any other right or remedy at law or in equity. Tenant
shall pay to Landlord the cost of recovering possession
of the Premises, all costs of reletting, including
reasonable renovation, remodeling and alteration of the
Premises, the amount of any commissions paid by Landlord
in connection with such reletting, and all other costs
and damages, arising out of Tenant's default, including
attorneys' fees and costs. Landlord shall not be in
default under this Leas* unless Landlord or the holder
of any mortgage or deed of trust covering the Shopping
Center whose name- and address have been furnished to
Tenant in writing fails to perform an obligation required
of Landlord under this Lease within thirty (30) days
after written notice by Tenant to Landlord and to such
holder, specifying the respects in which Landlord has
failed to perform such obligation. If the nature of
Landlord's obligation is such that more than thirty (30)
day* ar* reasonably required for performance or cure,
Landlord shall not be in defaultSif Landlord or such
holder commences performance witn^uch thirty (30) day
period and after such commencement-^ailigently prosecutes
the seme to completion. In no event shall Tenant have
the right, to terminate this Lease or to withhold the
payment of rent or other charges provided for in this
Lease as a result of Landlord's default. Tenant may,
however, at its option, at any time during the
continuance of such default after the expiration of said
twenty (20) days' notice, pay any sum reasonably
necessary to perform any obligation of Landlord hereunder
which Landlord has not performed and of which Landlord
has been given said twenty (20) days' written notice.

SCO10590

Mr. Mack DuBose
August 29, 1988
Page - 8 Landlord shall promptly pay to Tenant any such sum upon
receipt from Tenant of an invoice therefor. If either
party shall default in the fulfillment of any of the
covenants or conditions of this Lease, other than the
covenant of Tenant to pay rent, and the same cannot be
remedied within the time herein provided by the use of
reasonable diligence, then such additional time shall be
granted, without penalty or other imposition, as may be
reasonably necessary; and provided the party in default
takes immediate steps on receipt of the notice to remedy
the default and has proceeded diligently.

^v

AVJf ,
29. The blank on the second line of Paragraph FourteenthJfr*^ \%
should be completed with the date "'October 1, 1988."
I 0**^
V*
v/
30 • After the word "and" and before the word "decking" on the
'py^intk line from the bottom of page 32, add the words "amy damaged."

m^

I

31. Delete the words "ten (10)" at the end of the eighth line
\i from the bottom of page 32, and substitute therefor the words "two
^A2).*
I

?2. Delete the text: of Paragraph Fifteenth and insert in its
^/place the following:

^

J*
v/Ji*

|i>)
Provided that Tenant is not in default in amy
H^vO
VVHC
* under this Lease, within one (1)
— year
~rx
^**'
material respect
\ i\ C
x
\^i «g5^ -* after Tenant's occupancy of the Premises, Landlord shall,
\ v^- \
at
[\^ />
J?
^ ^ sole expense, rehabilitate and remodel the f i jO^V/
vJS A } fp/C- extension portion of the retail shop space lying North
C «>V*>
*"* Y / / v of
the
Building
in
the
Shopping
Center.
Such
\/ ^
retail space equal
in
quality
to other
first
class
retail
)
v//*
rehabilitation
and
remodel
shall
be
such
as
to
make
the
<SL
space
the ecrual
same geographic
area.
*/
retail in
space
in quality to
other first class retail i T ^
33. Add to the sentence beginning on the sixth line from the
bottom of page 35 the following "Provided that Tenant timely pays
^v its pro rata share of the cost of maintenance thereof when
*'

J

y \fi^\<&T

"
\>
34#

Delate subparagraph (a) on page 36 and re*let$&H tfl^u v (JJ\
ediately following subparagraphs accordingly.
lljJ^
}±*sf'^f**\

J^
35. Add to the beginning of the first sentence of Paragraph
ffi**^Eighteenth the following: "Provided that Tenant timely pays its pro
q A ^ rata share of the cost thereof,...."
oU^T
y

X^J
r

./
36. Replace "five percent (5*)" on the first line of page 38
^ V * i t h "ten percent (10%)."
SOO10391

Mr. Mack DuBose
August 29, 1988
Page -937. Add after the sentence ending on tha seventh line of page
3> the following:
Tha Estimate for the first year of this Lease is Thirteen
Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars ($13,800.00), which shall
be paid by Tenant to Landlord with each payment: of
minimus rent on the first day of each month during such
first: year in equal installments of One Thousand one
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,150.00) each.
Such amount
shall ba prorated for any partial calendar month.
38. Delate tha parenthetical phrase on the tenth and eleventh
\/ lines of Paragraph Nineteen, which reads as follows: '(excluding
-hvthe presence of any asbestos in tha tila covering the floor of tha
Building) ..*.*
We are having the tiles in the Building tested,
and if the tests indicate that such tiles contain asbestos, we will
remove all of them. We will provide to you any written rasults of
such tests.
LU. 39. Delete the text of paragraph 4 on page 41 and substitute
^^^A'therefor the following:

J*/ l \
x

\ \ i
V~

Landlord agrees to keep and save Tenant: harmless
. ^r> I
from any obligation, liability, cost, or expense i ^ 4 ^ J k i /
(including attorneys' fees), suit or claim for damage or lAv^ jfi*
\jj
injury caused by the gross negligence or willful ^f
^
/
misconduct of Landlord or Landlord's employees or agents.

/
40* Delete two amounts of "$3,000,000* on the seventh line
rvwof page 42, and the amount of "$500,000* on the eighth line on page
^ 42, and substitute therefor the amounts of "$1,000,000,"
*$2,000,000* and *$200,000,* respectively.
41. Add to the sentence ending on the third line on page 43
\f the following: ", and Tenant is not in default in any material
"DV-respect hereunder either on the data any such notice of extension
is given or* on the data on which any such extension begins' •
42* Delate the first two sentences in
paragraph on page 46, which read as follows:

the

first

full

$?

Landlord and Tenant acknowledge that the tila covering
the floor of the Building may contain asbestos. Landlord
will hold Tenant harmless from and indemnify and defend
Tenant against and from any damage, loss, expanse or
liability resulting from as asbestos in tha Building
floor tile.
43. Add to the end of paragraph 4 on page 48 the following:
except as expressly set forth herein."
SCO1059?

Mr* Mack: DuBose
August 29, 1988
Page -10- •
\i
44. I note the following typographical errors in the Lease:
r\Jfr)
insert the word "as* after the word "Tenant* on the sixth line
vj of page 2; (b) replace the semicolon with a colon on the last line
of page 3? (c) delete the word "that* on the eighth line of page
12; (d) "flush* is misspelled on the sixth line of page 14; (e) the
word should be *charge£* on the thirteenth line of page 16; (f)
"Building* should be capitalized on the third line from the bottom
on page 16; (g) add a closed parentheses * ) * before the comma on
the fifteenth line of page 22; (h) the word should be *charges" on
the fifth line from the bottom of page 38; and (i) change the word
"renewal* on the second line from the bottom of page 42 and
substitute the word "extension* therefor.
I appreciate your cooperation in connection with this matter.
If you are unable to maJcs^any^of the changes requested above, if
either of the exhibits encISvia herewith is unacceptable, or if you
have any questions with respect to this letter, please call me so
that we can discuss and resolve your concerns prior to sending more
drafts of the lease.
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ADDENDUM K

HOME&NVRSZ3Y
Coroorait
tSlt SutnOfficii
Av#
Seiuit. WA 98101
(206)621-6700

September 12, 1988

Mr. F. C. Stangl
F. C. Stangl Construction
4455 South 700 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake Cit7» Utah 84107-3092
RE:

West Jordan
Your Letter of 8-29-88

Dear Mr. Stangl:
We have reviewed your letter concerning our lease, which outlined outstanding issues to be resolved. I am responding to
you in the order of your comments:
Item 1.

This change is acceptable

Item 2.

We do not agree to this change.

Item 3.

Again* we do not agree to the phrase "without abatement, deduction or offset." Also, since the period
during which this rent would be in effect runs
through February 28, 1989, we should revise the sentence to read:
"on or before February It 1989 and
March 1, 1989 as applicable."

Item 4.

This change is acceptable providing we find no exceptions in the title policy prior to the execution of
the lease. We should list assessments for purposes
of clarity.

item 5.

We do not agree to this point. The 38,000,000 breakpoint for percentage net during the initial term and
the 315,000,000 breakpoint for percentage rent during
each option period was previously agreed in return
for increases in the base rents during the option
periods.
-/; ij

ute

.Vitncss:
..
CHiryi MacOonald. Notary Public

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

3/
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Mr. F. C. Stansl
Page 2
Item 6.

We do not agree to this change.

Item 7.

We do not agree. This provision is not necessary.
The terms of the lease are expressly outlined in
various paragraphs.

Item 8.

We are in agreement on a change of the first sentence
of Paragraph Fourth as follows:
"During the full term of the lease and any renewals
thereof* Landlord agrees, with respect to the Building and Premises, to keep in good condition and
repair, the structural portions of the roof, exterior
walls* foundations* but not floor covering, plate
glass (if damaged as a result of structural defects
or events included in the all risk insurance policy
insuring the Premises), Plumbing to point of connection to the Building and all other portions of the
Building
except as specified in Paragraph Fifth
hereof, all parking areas, common areas, sidewalks
and access areas of the Shopping Center.

Item 9.

We do
sions.

not

agree

to

changes

in the offset provi-

Item 10.

We do not agree to this change.

Item 11.

We agree this change is acceptable.

Item 12.

We do not agree to this change.

Item 13.

The phrase "ordinary wear and tear** should
be
inserted in this paragraph after the word "excepting '
on Line 2.
With this revision, this change is
acceptable.

Item 14.

This change is not acceptable.

item 15.

We
are not in agreement.
Our Risk Management
Department is drafting alternate language.

Item 16.

This change is acceptable.

Item 17.

Beginning with the sentence ending
amend the language as follows:

with

0

"withheld,"
0 « f "* / %

-- •-* 1

Mr. F. C. atangl
Page 3
"Landlord shall provide, at Landlord's expense, a
pylon sign beside the access to Shopping Center on
Redwood Road.
Tenant shall have the right to have
its sign facia on said pylon sign. Tenant shall be
permitted a sign facia in size that is not smaller
tion on said pylon, as well as S10,000 toward Landlord's cost of the initial installation of said pylon
sign. Tenant shall pay the cost of its pro rata
share of utilities for, and maintenance of, said
pylon sign.
Item 18.

We do not agree to this change.

Item 19.

We do not agree to this change.

Item 20.

We agree to this change.

Item 21.

Rather than delete the paragraph that we
have
requested* we suggest that the sentence end on the
sixth line from the bottom of page 22 after the word
"completion.*
The remainder of the paragraph would
then be retained.

Item 22.

We agree to this change based on the assumption that
the title policy is reviewed and approved prior to
the execution of the lease.

Item 23.

The additional word "reasonably'* is acceptable.
do not agree to other changes to this language.

Item 24.

We do not agree to this change.

Item 25.

We are not in agreement.

Item 26.

We do not agree with the change. We will not accept
any language that requires continuous operation, nor
will we agree to negotiations for a new lease.

Item 27.

This change is acceptable.

Item 28.

We are not in agreement.

Item 29.

We are in agreement.

item 30.

We are in agreement.

G

*

*

* .

We

•

•

Mr. F. C. Stangl
Page 4
Item 31.

We are in agreement provided Ernst approves the specifications and ail warranties by installer and manufacturer are assigned to Ernst.

item 32.

We are not in agreement. We will agree to provisions
that provide that Ernst is in occupancy of the Premises f and is paying minimum rents per the terms of
the lease.

Item 33.

We do not agree with this change.

Item 34.

We do not agree to the elimination of provision (a)
but will agree to a "designated area" of common area
on the Site Plan that can be used to automobiles
awaiting service or repair, or pickup by customers.

Item 35.

We do not agree to this change.

Item 36.

We do not agree, but will accept a compromise of 7%
for management fees.

Item 37.

We agree to this change.

Item 38.

This change is acceptable.

Item 39.

We do not agVee with this change.

Item 40.

We agree to this change.

Item 41.

We are in agreement.

Item 42.

We agree, if the tile is replaced this language will
be deleted, including the last sentence of Paragraph
Twenty Sixth on page 46.

Item 43.

This change is not acceptable.

Item 44.

These changes are acceptable.

Since we have several issues unresolved and have the possibility of terminating the negotiations ?f the significant issues
can not be settled, we have not redrafted the Lease as you
requested. We hope that we can reach agreement on the significant issues and continue to the opening of an Ernst Store in
your Center.

0

;

'

*

'

•

;

•

"

.

'

*

Mr. F. C. Stangi
Page 5
I expect to be in Salt Lake City on the 14th of September and
look forward to meeting with you and discussing the remaining
issues.
Sincerely,

Mack Dufiose
Vice President of Real Estate
MO:san

O

ADDENDUM L

HOME&NUSSESY
Corporate Offices
1511 Sixth Ave.
Seattle. WA 96X31

(206) 621 -6700

2

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT

±2^

September 29/ 1988

Mr. P. C. Stangl
P. C. Stangl Construction
4455 South 700 Bast
Suite 300
Salt Lake City/ Utah 84107-3092
RE;

Ernst Home Center/ Inc.
Jordan Valley Plaza
West Jordan/ Utah

Dear Mr. Stangl:
This will confirm our telephone conversation of Friday/
during which we indicated that the Company has made a
decision not to open an Ernst Home Center store at the above
location at this time.
/While this decision is final as regards entering into a lease
and opening a store on the time table comtemplated by our
recent discussions/ the Company may be interested in talking
with you again on the subject in the future.'
Thank you for your courtesies extended our staff and we wish
you the best with Jordan Valley Plaza.
Very truly yours#
ERNST HOME CENTER/ INC.

>/Tfi omA«^Stanton

ilor VVice-President Operations
Senior
X. Se
TCS:ajt

PLAINTIFFS
EXHIBIT

WffiUmblZiLr
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821 S.W.2d 739 printed in FULL format.
BETA DRILLING, INC, RIO COLORADO DRILLING CQ, ALEJANDRO PEDRO BULGHERONI
and CARLOS ALBERTO BULGHERONI, AppeUants v. WILLARD EUGENE DURKEE, AppeUee
NO. B14-91-00071-CV
COURT OF APPEALS OF TEXAS, FOURTEENTH DISTRICT, HOUSTON
821 S.W.2d 739; 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 4; 17 U.CCR. Serv. 2d(CaUaghan) 208
January 2, 1992, Rendered
January 2, 1992, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: AppeUanfs Motion for
Rehearing is Denied February 6, 1992. Application
for Writ of Error Denied May 6, 1992. Motion for
Rehearing of Appucation for Writ of Error Overruled
June 10, 1992.
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] On Appeal from the 152nd
District Court. Harris County, Texas. Trial Court Cause
No. 81-25157

general denial and also affirmatively pled the statute of
frauds as barring Durkee* s claim.
In their first point of error, appellants allege that
Durkee proved no exception to the Uniform Commercial
Code statute of frauds requirement that "a [**2] contract
for the sale of securities" be in writing and signed for it
to be enforceable, and, therefore, the trial court erred in
granting judgment for Durkee.
The applicable statute of frauds states:

DISPOSITION: Reversed and Rendered
COUNSEL: Ben Taylor of Houston, Texas, Thomas R.
McDade of Houston, Texas, Lee HunneU of Houston,
Texas, for appeUant
John L. McConn, Jr. of Houston, Texas. Gregory T.
FarreU of Houston, Texas
JUDGES: Panel consists of Justices Pressler, JuneU and
Ellis.
OPINIONBY: PAUL PRESSLER
OPINION: [*739] OPINION
Durkee sued appellants (referred to coUectively as Beta
Drilling) alleging breach of an alleged oral agreement.
FoUowing a jury trial, the trial court awarded Durkee
damages of $ 1,058,116 plus prejudgment interest. The
judgment of the trial court is reversed and judgment is
rendered in favor of appellants.
Durkee filed this suit in 1981 alleging an oral agreement under which appellants would give him 25% ownership of the stock in a new company (which later became
Beta [*740] Drilling, Inc.), and he would be its chief
executive officer and president. The appellants filed a

A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by
way of action or defense unless:
(1) there is some writing signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent
or broker, sufficient to indicate that a contract has been
made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities
at a defined or stated price;
(2) delivery of a certificated security or transfer instruction has been accepted, or transfer of an uncertificated security has been registered and the transferee has
failed to send written objection to the issuer within 10
days after receipt of the initial transaction statement confirming the registration, or payment has been made, but
the contract is enforceable under this provision only to
the extent of the delivery, registration, or payment;
(3) within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation
of the sale or purchase and sufficient against the sender
under Subdivision (1) has been received by the party
against whom enforcement is sought [**3] and he has
failed to send written objection to its contents within 10
days after its receipt; or
(4) the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court
that a contract was made for sale of a stated quantity of

821 S.W.2d 739, *740; 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 4, **3;
17 U.CCR. Serv. 2d(Callaghan) 208
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described securities at a defined or stated price.

existence of an exception under Section 8.319.

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 8.319 (Tex. UCQ
(Vernon 1968). The official commentary under this section states that it is intended to conform the statute of
frauds provisions with regard to securities to the policy of the like provisions in Section 2-201 of the Texas
Uniform Commercial Code (statute of frauds for the sale
of goods).

The only exception in Section 8.319 to which partial
performance could apply is Section (2) which provides
that an oral agreement for the sale of securities is enforceable where delivery of the security or transfer instructions have been accepted, transfer of the security has
been registered without objection, or payment has been
made. Durkee never paid any money for Beta Drilling
stock, never accepted delivery of the stock or a transfer instruction, and never registered the stock. Durkee's
employment services to appellants was the only evidence
the jury could have relied upon in support of its answer.
Such does not circumvent the statute of frauds.

The threshold issue is whether the alleged agreement
constituted a "sale of securities" under the Uniform
Commercial Code statute of frauds. While neither party
expressly argues that the sale was not one of securities,
appellee implies such. The claim is that his interest in the
company was consideration for organizing the company
and accepting employment, and therefore not subject to
the statute of frauds. A plain reading of the questions
posed to the jury shows that the alleged agreement required Durkee to organize the company, act as its chief
[**4] executive officer and president, and pay $ 25,000
out of his personal funds. He would be paid $ 80,000
per year and given 25% of the Beta Drilling stock. A
"sale" consists in the passing of title of an item from the
seller to the buyer for a price. Tex. Bus. &Com. Code
Ann. § 2.106(a) (Tex. UCQ (Vernon 1968). Here, title
of the stock was to pass from appellants to Durkee for a
price of $25,000.
In Bowers Steel, Inc. v. DeBrooke, 557 S. W.2d 369
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, no writ), the appellate court held that oral employment contracts, for
which the consideration is to be corporate stock, are not
prohibited by Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 8.319
where the only consideration for the stock was acceptance of employment. Here the payment of $ 25,000
was also required. This transaction is a sale of securities and is under the statute of frauds.
It is undisputed that none of the appellants signed any
written document which would comply with the requirements of Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 8.319 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968). Thus, the statute of frauds precludes enforcement of the alleged agreement as a matter
of law unless Durkee proved an exception to the statute
[**5] of frauds.
Section 8.319 contains only four exceptions to the
statute of frauds governing the sale of securities. At appellee's request, over appellants' objections, jury questions [*741] C and D, were submitted. They asked
whether Durkee had "partially performed" the alleged
agreement, and whether Carlos Alberto Bulgheroni and
Alejandro Pedro Bulgheroni promised to sign a written
document evidencing the agreement. The jury answered
"yes" to both questions. These answers do not show the

In Wiley v. Bertelsen, 770 S.W2d 878 [**6] (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ), the plaintiff alleged
that he had an oral employment contract for which he
was to receive a monthly salary plus a percentage of certain profits. The plaintiff sued for breach of contract.
The defendants claimed the statute of frauds barred the
suit. The plaintiff argued that his employment services
were "partial performance" of the contract, and therefore the statute of frauds was inapplicable. The court
held:
Performance of an alleged oral agreement in order to remove the agreement from the operation of the statute of
frauds, must be unequivocally referable to the agreement
and corroborative of the fact that a contract actually was
made. What is done must itself supply the key to what
is promised. Rendition of services for which a person
receives a monthly salary is insufficient to take the alleged agreement out of the statute of frauds because the
services were fully explained by the salary without supposing any additional consideration. We hold that the
services performed by Wiley did not take the alleged
agreement out of the operation of the statute of frauds.
Wiley, 770 S.W.2d at 882. Durkee's claims are nearly
identical [**7] to those made by the plaintiff in Wiley.
Durkee received a regular salary. To invoke the exception of Section 8.319(2), Durkee had to perform an act
directly related to the stock, such as accepting delivery
of the stock, registering the stock, or partially paying
for it. Since Durkee did none of these, the jury's finding on partial performance was irrelevant and must be
disregarded.
Question D asked whether the Bulgheroni brothers
had promised to sign a written document evidencing the
agreement. By this Durkee appears to try to invoke the
promissory estoppel exception.
For promissory estoppel to create an exception to the

821 S.W.2d 739, *741; 1992 Tex. App. LEXIS 4, **7;
17 U.CCR. Serv. 2d(Callaghan) 208
statute of frauds, there must have been a promise to sign
a written contract which had been prepared and which
would satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds.
See Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W2d 796, 800 (Tex. 1982);
Consolidated Petroleum Indus., Inc. v. Jacobs, 648
S.W2d363, 367(Tex. App.-Eastland 1983, writrefd
n.r.e.). A promise to prepare a written contract is not
sufficient. The defendant must have promised to sign a
particular agreement which was in writing at the time.
Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763,
766 (5th Cir. 1988) [**8] (applying Texas law). The
Fifth Circuit stated in Southmark that it would follow
the rule set forth in Consolidated Petroleum and held:

Page 5
LEXSEE

never promised to sign a written document which was in
existence. Durkee admitted that there was no document
in [*742] existence at the time any alleged promise to
sign was made to him. The jury's answer to Question
D is immaterial and must be disregarded.
Since the statute of frauds applied and Durkee failed
to prove any exception, the trial court erred in entering
judgment for Durkee. Appellants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the statute of frauds.
Appellants' first point of error is sustained.
Because appellants' first point of error has been sustained, it is unnecessary to review their second point of
error. [*+9] The judgment of the trial court is reversed
and judgment is rendered for appellants.

. . . the defendant should ordinarily not be promissorily estopped from asserting a section 8.319 statute
of frauds defense unless there is proof that he at least
expressly promised to sign documents that had already
been prepared or whose working had been agreed on and
that satisfy the requirement of section 8.139.

/s/ Paul Pressler
Justice

Southmark, 851 F.2dat 769-70.

Panel consists of Justices Pressler, Junell and Ellis.

The evidence is uncontradicted that the appellants

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed January 2, 1992.

Publish - Tex. R. App. P. 90.
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381 A.2d 1123 printed in FULL format.
John W. CHAPMAN, Jr. and Margaret Chapman and Chapman-Hall Realty v. George A. BOMANN, HI
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
381 A.2d 1123

January 24, 1978
COUNSEL: Wstcott & Lynch, P. A. by John J. Lynch,
Damariscotta (orally), for John and Margaret Chapman.
Clayton N. Howard, Damariscotta (orally), for defendant.
JUDGES: Dufresne, C.J., and Pomeroy, Wemick,
Archibald, Delahanty and Godfrey, JJ. Wfemick, J. wrote
the opinion. Delahanty, J., sat at argument and conference but did not otherwise participate. Dufresne, A.
R. J., sat at oral argument as Chief Justice, but retired
prior to the preparation of the opinion. He has joined
the opinion as Active Retired Justice.
OPINIONBY: WERNICK
OPINION: [*1124] On September 13, 1974 John
W. Chapman, Jr., his wife Margaret Chapman and
Chapman-Hall Realty, as plaintiffs, brought a civil action in the Superior Court (Lincoln County) against
George A. Bomann, m as [*1125] defendant. Plaintiffs
sought specific performance, or alternatively damages
for breach, of a contract allegedly made between plaintiffs and defendant for the sale and purchase of real property in New Harbor, Maine owned by defendant and his
wife Betsy as joint tenants and used by them as a summer
residence. Defendant's answer included the affirmative
defense that the agreement plaintiffs were seeking to enforce was unenforceable for failure to meet particular requirements of the Maine Statute of Frauds, 33 M.R.S. A.
§51(4).
Ruling on a motion by defendant asking that summary
judgment be awarded in his favor, the presiding Justice
on May 27, 1975, ordered entry of summary judgment for the defendant. Plaintiffs John and Margaret
Chapman have appealed from this judgment, nl
nl Chapman-Hall Realty initially participated as a
plaintiff, but it is not a party to the appeal.

Wfe sustain the appeal. n2
n2 It should here be noted that defendant had filed
a counterclaim. This Court twice remanded the
case because the present appellants had purported
to appeal from the judgment deciding the merits of
the complaint against them before a disposition had
been made of other aspects of the case (Rule 54(b)
M.R.Civ.P.). Subsequently, by stipulation, judgments were entered dismissing the complaint as to
Chapman-Hall Realty as well as the counterclaim of
the defendant. Thereafter, defendant claimed that
plaintiffs had still failed to take a proper appeal.
Defendant's contention was that plaintiffs had failed
to comply with a provision of the order of remand
specifying the manner in which the appeal was to be
returned to this Court. This continuing controversy
as to the propriety of the appeal was not resolved until November 21, 1977 when the parties ultimately
stipulated that the instant appeal was to be heard on
the record originally before this Court, a supplemental record and the briefs originally submitted.
On June 8,1974 plaintiffs signed a document, not yet
signed by defendant, the contents of which set forth an
agreement that, through Chapman-Hall Realty, defendant Bomann would sell, the plaintiffs would purchase
the Bomann summer residence at New Harbor.
The presiding Justice ordered summary judgment for
defendant on the rationale that since defendant had never
signed the above-described document, the agreement
contained in it was unenforceable for failure to comply with the writing requirement of the Maine Statute of
Frauds. 33 M.R.S.A. § 51(4).
The presiding Justice had before him for consideration facts stated in sworn answers to interrogatories and
in various affidavits submitted in connection with the
motion for summary judgment.

381 A.2d 1123, *1125
The affidavit of Joan E. Simonds, a Chapman-Hall
Realty broker, disclosed that plaintiffs rejected an initial offer made by defendant and defendant then submitted a counter-proposal for a sale and purchase agreement. Plaintiffs accepted it and signed the document
setting forth the agreement. Thereafter, on June 14,
1974, Chapman-Hall Realty received from plaintiff John
Chapman a check for $4,000.00 which, as added to an
earlier down payment of $500.00, completed a 10%
down payment to be deposited in an escrow account
for the benefit of defendant. On the same day that the
plaintiffs signed the document containing defendant's
proposal for a purchase sale contract the document was
returned to the office of Chapman-Hall Realty. It was
then forwarded to the defendant to be signed on his part.
On July 2, 1974 another person associated with
Chapman-Hall Realty arranged for Joan Simonds to
communicate with defendant regarding the document already signed by plaintiffs and forwarded to defendant
for signature. This was done because plaintiffs had arranged, and were scheduled that same day to complete,
a refinancing of their home in Massachusetts in anticipation of their purchase of defendant's summer residence in
New Harbor. Joan Simonds reached defendant's wife by
telephone and explained these circumstances to her and
the consequent need for confirmation that the Bomanns
would sign the document which had been forwarded
for signature. Defendant's wife told Joan Simonds that
she and her husband would sign the contract and return
it to the office of Chapman-Hall Realty the following
Saturday. Joan Simonds then called plaintiff Margaret
[*1126] Chapman and told her exactly what defendant's
wife had said. The Chapmans then refinanced their
Massachusetts house that same day. n3

n3 Although Joan Simonds did not have personal
knowledge that the refinancing had occurred, her
lack of such knowledge would not bear upon the decision made by the presiding Justice. Defendant's
brief seems to admit that such was the fact, at least
for the purposes of the disposition of the present appeal.
Defendant filed an affidavit stating that he had not
signed the purchase-sale document and had not signed
either a note or memorandum as to it, and he had never
received any portion of the purchase price and, further,
plaintiffs never took possession of the premises or made
any repairs to them. Defendant's affidavit also said that
defendant lacked authority to bind his wife to a contract
for the sale of their summer residence and that defendant
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had no knowledge that plaintiffs were refinancing their
home on the basis of any oral negotiations.
A separate affidavit of defendant's wife stated that she
had not authorized defendant to make an agreement to
sell the Bomann residence in New Harbor.
To avoid applicability of the Statute of Frauds to the
document signed by them and which they seek to enforce against defendant plaintiffs invoke the equitable
principles of estoppel in pais and part performance.
While we conclude that plaintiffs' appeal must be sustained, we reach this decision on grounds other than
those asserted by plaintiffs. We find it unnecessary to
reach the question whether in the instant circumstances
the document signed by plaintiffs, but not signed by defendant, should as such be directly enforceable as a contract binding on defendant, despite applicability of the
Statute of Frauds. Rather, as more fully explained hereinafter, we decide this case by holding that the doctrine
of promissory estoppel (as distinguished from estoppel
in pais) applies, here, to raise genuine issues of material fact concerning (1) whether the separate ancillary
promise made by defendant's wife, as attributable also
to defendant, that she and her husband would sign, and
return, the document signed by plaintiffs became a contract binding on defendant, and (2) whether, further,
with the promise of defendant's wife being deemed a
promise binding on defendant's wife and also defendant,
defendant should be barred from asserting the Statute of
Frauds to deny its enforceability.
The doctrine currently formulated and identified by
the label "promissory estoppel" has substantive roots in
the law which long antecede the use of the label. It has
often been said that promissory estoppel is the principle
by which contract law avoids injustice through recognition of a substitute for traditional consideration. See
Williston on Contracts §§ 116, 139; Allegheny College
v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown,
246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927) (Cardozo, C J.).
Another approach views promissory estoppel as a particularized formulation of estoppel functioning generally
as an instrument utilized by equity to prevent injustice.
Professor Ames observed that even before 1500, equity
gave relief to a plaintiff who had incurred detriment
on the faith of a defendant's promise. Ames, Lectures
on Legal History at 143 (1913). See also Pomeroy's,
Equity Jurisprudence § 808b (5th Ed. 1941).
Several Maine cases mention that reasonable and detrimental reliance on the promise of another may act as a
substitute for consideration. Although charitable subscriptions have been upheld on a variety of theories, in
Central Maine General Hospital v. Carter, 125 Me.

381 A.2d 1123, *1126

191,195, 132 A. 417, 418 (1926) this Court noted:
"It may also be true that in strict theory the sustaining
of such promises to give cannot be upheld as a contract
based on a valid consideration. . . However, the courts
have sustained them as contracts in numerous instances .
. . where the performance in part at least of the purpose
for which the funds were subscribed or promised were
shown, or where liabilities were incurred on the [*1127]
strength of such promise . . . " (emphasis supplied)
See also Can v. Bartlett, 72 Me. 120 (1881).
In Colbath v. H. B. Stebbins Lumber Company, 127
Me. 406, 415, 144 A. 1 (1929) this Court referred to
promissory estoppel as distinguishable from the more
traditionally recognized equitable doctrine of estoppel
in pais on the ground that estoppel in pais involves the
misrepresentation of an existing fact. Simultaneously,
however, in Colbath the Court suggested that, absent
traditional consideration to make a promise binding as a
contract, promissory estoppel can serve to excuse future
performance of a condition or obligation.
In LaGrange v. Datsis, 142 Me. 48, 46 A. 2d 408
(1946) this Court mentioned promissory estoppel as a
particularized form of estoppel conceived broadly as a
doctrine to do equity. Moreover, further language in
LaGrange purporting to limit promissory estoppel to circumstances in which the promise involves a representation concerning the intent to abandon existing rights n4
is only dictum. The actual decision of the case is that
defendant in fact made no promise; hence, there was
nothing to generate at all the applicability of promissory
estoppel, however broadly or narrowly conceived.
n4 Courts in other jurisdictions initially limited application of promissory estoppel to cases involving
promises as to the abandonment of existing rights.
Now, however, the doctrine has become generally
recognized as having applicability, comprehensively,
to promises relating to the future, provided the other
requirements of the doctrine are satisfied. See, e. g.,
Peoples National Bank v. Linebarger Construction
Company, 219Ark. 11, 240S.W2d 12 (1951), and
appropriate cases collected in Annots., 48A.L.R.2d
1069 and 56A.L.R.3d 1037.
Wfe are satisfied that the formulation of the principle
of promissory estoppel in the Restatement of Contracts,
§ 90, as refined in Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §
90 (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973) to authorize limitation of the remedy and thus acknowledge the possibility of partial enforcement, is fundamentally in harmony
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with the principles already acknowledged in the law of
Maine. Moreover, we find compelling the reasoning in
support of the Restatement's formulation of promissory
estoppel and are impressed by the widespread acceptance of that formulation in the case law of this country. See generally, 1A Corbin, Contracts §§ 193-209
(1963); 1 WiUiston, Contracts §§ 138-140 (3rd Ed.
1957); Annots., 48 A.L.R.2d 1069; 115 A.LR 152;
Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents,
50 MiduLRev. 639, 873 (1952).
Accordingly, we now adopt as the law of Maine the
comprehensive formulation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel set forth in § 90 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7,
1973), reading as follows:
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of
the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires."
With the law of Maine thus declared, it is apparent that the circumstances set forth in the record raise
several genuine issues of fact material to the question
whether the promise made by Betsy Bomann should
be attributable to her husband, and if so, whether that
promise should be held binding by virtue of promissory
estoppel.
The affidavit of Joan Simonds discloses sufficient
information warranting factual conclusions that when
Betsy Bomann made her promise that she and defendant
would sign and return the document forwarded to them,
she should reasonably have expected that her promise
would induce plaintiffs to act in reliance on it Betsy
Bomann gave the promise in direct response to what
she had been told was an inquiry being specially made
because plaintiffs were about to undertake a substantial
financial commitment to refinance their Massachusetts
home in connection with their undertaking to purchase
the Bomann's summer residence. The "substantial financial commitment" language appearing in the affidavit
also indicates a factual issue concerning [*1128] whether
plaintiffs had suffered harm or detriment by relying on
the promise.
Despite the conclusory statement in defendant's affidavit concerning his wife's lack of authority to act on his
behalf, the record reveals a genuine issue of fact on this
question. The document containing the sale-purchase
agreement identifies not only defendant but also his wife
as a "seller." In his sworn answer to interrogatories John
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C Chapman, President of Chapman-Hall Realty, stated
that Defendant had suggested various changes to be made
in the drafting of the document setting forth defendant's
counter-proposal for a sale-purchase agreement with the
plaintiffs. These circumstances would warrant a finding that by participating in the drafting of the document
defendant knew its contents, and the designation of defendant's wife as well as defendant as a "seller" was
holding out by defendant that defendant and his wife
were acting together in selling their summer residence
and, therefore, defendant's wife was authorized to act
for defendant in relation to the sale. n5
n5 It may also be noted that there is likewise a genuine issue of fact as to whether there was actual, or
apparent, authority for defendant to act on behalf of
his wife Betsy. By her making the promise described
in the affidavits, defendant's wife could be taken to
have known the contents of the document she was
promising to sign. This being so, her promise to sign
a document designating her, as well as her husband,
as a "seller" could be a ratification by her of her husband's prior undertaking to act for her in arranging
a contract of sale. Moreover, defendant's wife could
be taken as acknowledging a continuing authority in
her husband to act on her behalf in relation to selling
their summer residence in light of one of the sworn
answers to interrogatories in which it was asserted
that when defendant's wife made the promise that
she and her husband would sign the document containing the sale-purchase agreement, she also stated
that she was ". . . waiting to have Mr. Bomann
bring the contract up to Damariscotta [the location
of the Chapman-Hall Realty office]."
The question remaining to be discussed, then, is
whether, in addition to making Betsy Bomann's separate ancillary promise binding as a contract capable of
being attributed to defendant, promissory estoppel will
bar defendant from asserting the Statute of Frauds to
deny enforceability of that otherwise binding promise.
In Lawrence v. Chase, 54 Me. 196, 200 (1866) this
Court acknowledged, as generally accepted, the principle that a separate oral
". . . agreement on the part of the defendant to execute
and deliver . . . his writing obligatory to convey . . .
certain real estate, upon certain terms and conditions . .
. named [in said writing]",
though not itself within the textual language of the
Statute of Frauds, is deemed to be within the penum-
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bra of the Statute'8 policy and thus becomes unenforceable like the underlying agreement to which it relates
and to which the Statute of Frauds applies in terms.
Simultaneously, however, this Court noted in Lawrence
v. Chase that even if such would be the rule in a "suit at
law", a court of equity could provide "remedy against
the fraud thus attempted." (at 201) Although some authorities hold to the contrary, many others agree with the
Lawrence v. Chase statement that on principles of equity
(among which estoppel would be included) a defendant
may be barred from asserting the policy of the Statute
of Frauds to deny enforceability to a separate, ancillary
oral promise, otherwise binding, to sign as a writing an
agreement which, lacking such signature, the Statute of
Frauds in terms renders unenforceable.
This limitation upon the penumbral policy applicability of the Statute of Frauds is conceived to be a particularized application of the general equitable principle that
since it is the purpose of the Statute of Frauds to prevent
fraud, that Statute cannot be permitted to be itself an
instrument of fraud. Cf. Dehahn v. Innes, Me., 356
A.2d 711 (1976); Gosselin VL Better Homes, Inc., Me*,
256 A.2d 629 (1969).
Comment f. to § 178 of the Restatement of Contracts
states this principle in particular relation to the doctrine
of estoppel, including both estoppel in pais and promissory estoppel, as follows:
[*1129] "Though there has been no satisfaction of the
Statute, an estoppel may preclude objection on that
ground in the same way that objection to the nonexistence of other facts essential for the establishment of
arightor a defence may be precluded. A misrepresentation that there has been such satisfaction if substantial
action is taken in reliance on the representation, precludes proof by the party who made the representation
that it was false; and a promise to make a memorandum, if similarly relied on, may giveriseto an effective
promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise operate to defraud."
See also Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Col. 782,106 P. 88
(1909); Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson, 15 Alaska 272,
217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954); 21 Turtle Creek Square,
Ltd. v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System,
432 E2d 64 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 955,
91 S. O. 975, 28L.Ea\ 2d 239 (1971).
This principle, perceived many years ago in the generalized discussion in Lawrence v. Chase, supra, we
now reaffirm as the law of Maine. We adopt it as it is
formulated in Comment f. to § 178 of the Restatement
of Contracts, above quoted.
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In further clarification of this exposition of Maine law
we address specifically the phrase in Comment f., "if the
Statute would otherwise operate to defraud." This does
not contemplate that the person who makes a separate
ancillary promise to sign, or make a sufficient memorandum of, an already existing agreement to which the
Statute of Frauds applies in terms must have made the
promise with an actual subjective intention to relinquish
the right to assert the Statute of Frauds or with an actual intention otherwise to deceive. While the existence
of such subjective intention would be sufficient to preclude assertion of the Statute of Frauds, other circumstances can also be sufficient. The criterion signified
by the words "if the Statute would otherwise operate
to defraud" is whether all the particular circumstances
in which the separate ancillary promise to sign or execute a sufficient memorandum is made show, objectively,
that a fraud, or a substantial injustice tantamount to a
fraud, would be perpetrated upon the promisee were the
promisor allowed to assert the Statute of Frauds as a bar.
In the present situation the affidavits sufficiently indicate that the defendant's wife, as a joint tenant with
defendant of the realty at issue, was told (1) plaintiffs
were about to make a substantial change in their financial position in connection with the already existing oral
agreement for the sale and purchase of the land, (2) before plaintiffs did this, they wanted to know whether
defendant would sign the document which plaintiffs had
already signed. Fully aware of what plaintiffs were seeking, defendant's wife gave exactly the confirmation being sought, promising that she and her husband would
sign the purchase and sale agreement as a writing and
return it to the real estate broker involved in the transaction.
These circumstances give rise to genuine issues of material fact concerning whether defendant's wife, by conduct attributable also to defendant, actually intended or
reasonably should have expected that the promise made
would induce plaintiffs to make a substantial change in
their financial position, a change which plaintiffs in fact
made in reliance upon their justifiable belief that the
absence of a writing was not to be a matter of concern. In sum, the totality of the circumstances depicted
in the record precipitate general factual issues material to
whether it would be grossly unjust and, therefore, tantamount to a fraud on the plaintiffs to allow defendant to
assert the Statute of Frauds, by invoking the penumbral
policy (rather than the actual terms) of the Statute, to
bar enforceability of the separate ancillary promise for
the making of a sufficient writing.
If, after the requisite evidentiary hearing, it is found
that on promissory estoppel grounds defendant is barred
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from asserting the Statute of Frauds to deny specific enforcement of the binding separate ancillary promise of
defendant'8 wife, as attributable to defendant, the Court,
as an incident of the present proceeding, [*1130] could
order defendant to sign the document which plaintiffs
had already signed. By defendant's compliance with that
order, the Statute of Frauds would be rendered inapplicable to the principal sale-purchase agreement between
defendant and plaintiffs, and plaintiffs would be in position to continue seeking enforcement of it as alleged
in their complaint. See 21 Turtle Creek Square, Ltd.
u New Ytfrk State Teachers' Retirement System, supra;
see also enlightening discussion in Annot. 56A.LR.3d
1037,1058-1064. n6
no* WB previously emphasized in delineating the
precise scope of our decision herein that we do not
reach, or intimate opinion on, the question whether
promissory estoppel would enable plaintiffs directly
to enforce the oral sale-purchase agreement as such,
notwithstanding that the Statute of Frauds applies in
terms to that agreement. The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 197 (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7,1973)
has taken the position that:
"A contract for the transfer of an interest in land may
be specifically enforced notwithstanding failure to
comply with the Statute of Frauds if it is established
that the party seeking enforcement, in reasonable reliance on the contract and on the continuing assent of
the party against whom enforcement is sought, has
so changed his position that injustice can be avoided
only by specific enforcement."
The Comment to § 197 indicates that the section restates the "part performance doctrine." The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Tentative Drafts
Nos. 1-7, 1973) further provides in § 217A:
"(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable
notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice
requires.
"(2) In determining whether injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise, the following
circumstances are significant:
"(a) the availability and adequacy of other remedies,
particularly cancellation and restitution;
"(b) the definite and substantial character of the ac-
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tion or forbearance in relation to the remedy sought;
"(c) the extent to which the action or forbearance
corroborates evidence of the making and terms of
the promise, or the making and terms are otherwise
established by clear and convincing evidence;
"(d) the reasonableness of the action or forbearance;
"(e) the extent to which the action or forbearance
was foreseeable by the promisor."
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Me. 2S9,86A.2d 873 (1952). Yet, at this time
we refrain from deciding whether we should adopt
the broad formulation of principle, as including also
promissory estoppel, contained in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts §§ 197 and 217A (Tentative
Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973). Indeed, before we could
so decide, we should be obliged to analyze the policy considerations seeming to underlie LaFlamme v.
Hoffman, 148 Me. 444, 95 A. 2d 802 (1953).

See also Comment to said § 217A.
Estoppel in pais and part performance have been
invoked in many cases to allow enforceability of a
contract, despite textual applicability of the Statute
of Frauds, where there was a misrepresentation of an
existing fact or a part performance constituted by acts
specifically referable to such contract. See Green v.
Jones, 76 Me. 563 (1885); Woodbury v. Gardner,
77 Me. 68 (1885); McGuire v. Murray, 107 Me.
108, 77 A. 692 (1910); Berman v. Griggs, 145 Me.
258, 75 A. 2d 365 (1950); Busque v. Marcou, 147

The entry is:
Appeal sustained; judgment for defendant set aside;
remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion herein.
DELAHANTY, J., sat at argument and conference but
did not otherwise participate.
DUFRESNE, A. R. J., sat at oral argument as Chief
Justice, but retired prior to the preparation of the opinion. He hasjoined the opinion as Active Retired Justice.
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OPINION: [*715] OPINION
Coastal Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary,
ANR Pipe Line Company, appeal from take-nothing
summary judgments in a suit for breach of an oral contract to buy securities, tortious interference with business
relations, and fraud. The essential issue is the existence
of a valid contract. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Tecumseh Pipe Line Company owns and operates an
interstate crude oil pipeline lying between Indiana and
Ohio. Arco, [*716] Ashland, and Unocal, appellees

here, own 100 percent of Tecumseh's capital stock: Arco
and Unocal [**2] own 40 percent each, while Ashland
owns the remaining 20 percent. The owners decided
to sell Tecumseh's capital stock in 1987, soliciting bids
from various companies, including Coastal. Coastal offered the highest bid and presented a draft stock purchase agreement to the owners. The parties began negotiations. After a negotiating session on August 13,
1987, the parties had agreed upon several substantive
changes and reached what they believed to be a "handshake" agreement on the essential and material terms of
the transaction. The owners agreed to reduce this to
writing. Coastal contends that the resulting document,
sent shortly after the August 13th negotiations, "memorialized" the parties' agreement. Coastal presumed to
have a contract with the owners to purchase 100% of
their Tecumseh stock.
This agreement included Coastal's pledge to acquire
Tecumseh's pipeline as an operating crude oil pipeline,
and its assumption of responsibility for converting the
line to natural gas service. Shortly thereafter, Coastal
began discussing the potential affects of this transaction
with Laketon Refining Corporation. Laketon's refinery
was located along the Tecumseh pipeline and was dependent [**3] upon Tecumseh for crude oil. Laketon
told Coastal that it had a substantial claim against Arco,
as the current operator of that line, for continued crude
oil service. Laketon threatened to do everything in its
power to halt a conversion of the pipeline from a carrier
of crude oil to natural gas.
As a result, Coastal informed Arco and the other sellers that it would only proceed with the Tecumseh stock
sale agreement if the sellers would indemnify Coastal
for Laketon's claims. Coastal contended that under the
parties' agreement, it was liable only for the expenses of
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dealing with the regulatory authorities and participating
in the necessary litigation to receive permits and permission to convert the line to, and operate it as, a natural gas
line. Arco disagreed, stating that under the post-August
13th agreement, Coastal had agreed to assume all risks
and liabilities with regard to conversion of the pipeline.
Arco refused to assume any potential liability incurred
as a result of Laketon's actions. The pipeline was not
sold to Coastal.
Coastal sued Arco, Ashland, and Unocal for breach of
contract, sued Arco for tortious interference with business relations, and sued both Arco [**4] and Tecumseh
for fraud. Coastal's theory of the case was that a valid
contract for the sale of the pipeline had been entered into.
Unocal moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that it did not breach the purported contract, fully intending at all times to consummate the agreement. The
trial court granted Unocal's motion. The court then
broadly entered summary judgment on behalf of Arco,
Ashland, and Tecumseh.
By its first point of error, Coastal contends that the
August 13th agreement between the parties constituted
a valid, enforceable contract for the sale of Tecumseh's
stock. Coastal asserts that on August 13th "we came to
absolute agreement on the essential terms. Vlfe got up
and shook hands and hugged each other. . . . " The
parties agreed, among other things, that Coastal would
pay $ 17.1 million for 100% of lecumseh's stock. The
parties also negotiated environmental liability, agreeing
that the owners would maintain possession of a terminal
that was particularly problematic, that Coastal, rather
than the owners, would be responsible for converting
the pipeline from crude oil to natural gas, that Coastal
would be responsible for finding a solution for the potential [**5] conflicts with Laketon, and that specified oil
inventory and working capital adjustments would apply.
The primary issue is whether an enforceable contract
exists. Appellees contend that one does not, relying
upon section 8.319 of the Business and Commerce Code,
entitled "Statute of Frauds," which provides, in pertinent
part,
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable
by way of action or defense unless:
[•717] (1) there is some writing signed 'by the party
against whom enforcement is sought . . . sufficient
to indicate that a contract has been made for sale of a
stated quantity of described securities at a defined or
stated price; * * *
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.319 (Vernon
1991).
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It is uncontroverted that the subject of this alleged contract is the sale of securities, as that term is defined by
section 8.102(a) of the Business and Commerce Code.
The transaction is therefore governed by section 8.319,
which requires a writing indicating that a contract has
been made and signed by the party against whom it is
sought to be enforced. Coastal, although alleging an
oral contract, relies upon a post-August 13th writing
that "memorializes" the agreement. That writing [**6]
contains a provision expressly stating that execution of
the agreement is required in order for it to be binding
on the parties. That section provides,
19. Entire Agreement; Execution Required
This Agreement and the documents to be delivered
pursuant hereto supersedes all prior negotiations, constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and can
be amended only by written agreement signed by the parties. Nothing in this Agreement shall be binding upon
any of the parties until this Agreement is executed by all
of the parties by their duly authorized officers.
Coastal contends that this provision was arbitrarily
added to the agreement by the owners and was not agreed
to by Coastal itself; therefore, the provision should not
be binding on Coastal and should not operate to place
the agreement outside the statute of frauds.
Coastal itself, in its May 15th, 1987 letter to the president of Tecumseh Pipe Line Co., stated that it offered to
buy all of the issued and outstanding shares of the capital
stock of Tecumseh "subject to the negotiation, preparation and execution of a definitive purchase agreement
in form and substance satisfactory to the Owners and
Coastal setting [**7] forth the terms provided herein
and such further terms and conditions as are reasonable
and customary in a transaction of the type contemplated
hereby." Coastal refers repeatedly to the "execution of
the Purchase Agreement" in its purchase offer.
Moreover, Coastal asserted below and on appeal that
the post-August 13th draft at issue memorializes the parties' agreement. When a party relies upon a memorandum of a contract, it cannot disregard unfavorable provisions. See Hall v. Hall, 158 Tex. 95, 308 S. W.2d 12,
17 (Tex. 1957). Coastal cannot therefore assert reliance
upon, and the validity of, the document in all respects
save for the execution requirement.
Coastal contends in the alternative that TEX. BUS. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 8.319(4) (Vernon 1991) applies
to establish this agreement within the statute of frauds.
Section 8.319(4) provides,
(4) The party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court
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that a contract was made for sale of a stated quantity of
described securities at a defined or stated price.
This section requires an admission that a contract was
made. While all of the parties do concede that [**8]
they reached agreement on particular issues, it is clear
that the owners did not consider themselves to have a
contract. The document memorializing the agreement
expressly required that it be executed. The owners were
aware of this; in fact, it is Coastal's contention that the
owners inserted the execution provision of their own
accord. Coastal mistakes agreements during the negotiation process with a binding contract. No owner has
admitted executing a contract with Coastal.
Coastal failed to raise any evidence to preclude the
granting of summary judgment in favor of Arco and
Ashland on the basis of the statute of frauds. Coastal
was unable to direct this court's attention to any document or series of documents, or to any admissions by
the owners, that showed a final agreement between the
parties. All documents and admissions referred back to
[*718] the post-August 13th writing as either a draft or
a tentative agreement. Necessary exhibits had yet to be
attached. Moreover, that document contained an execution provision that was never complied with. Point one
is overruled.
By points of error two and three, Coastal contends that
the doctrine of promissory estoppel precludes appellees
[**9] from asserting the statute of frauds. In order to
avoid summary judgment, the burden lay on Coastal to
present summary judgment proof raising a fact issue on
its promissory estoppel defense to the statute of frauds.
"Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492
S.W2d 934, 936-37 (Tex. 1972); Cobb v. Vkst Texas
Microwave Co., 700 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. App.Austin 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.). The promissory estoppel
doctrine provides that when a party makes a promise and
reasonably expects the promisee to rely on that promise
by acting or refraining from acting in some manner, in
order to avoid injustice, the promise is binding against
thepromissor. "Moore" Burger, 492S.W2dat 938; see
also Fretz Constr. Co. v. Southern Nat'I Bank, 626
S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tkx. 1981).
Coastal contends that it satisfied its burden to raise
a fact issue with regard to promissory estoppel via the
affidavit of Mike Morris, Director and Executive Vice
President of ANR at the time of the August, 1987 negotiations. Morris stated that,
When we reached agreement on the essential terms
[*+10] and conditions of the transaction, the representatives of the Owners and I shook hands. The Owners
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agreed and promised to sign a written agreement fully
reflecting our handshake deal.
Promissory estoppel is allowed as an exception to
the statute of frauds only when the enforcement of the
statute would plainly amount to fraud. Nagle v. Nagle,
633 S.W2d 796, 799 (Tex. 1982) (quoting Hooks v.
Bridgewater, lllTex. 122, 229 S.W 1114 (Hex. 1921)).
Moreover, in contract cases, the determinative promise
is limited to the promise to sign a prepared written agreement that complies with the statute of frauds. Nagle, 633
S.W.24 at 800; "Moore" Burger, 492 S.W.2d at 940;
Cooper Petroleum Co. v. La Gloria Oil <& Gas Co.,
436 S.W.24 889, 896 (Tkx. 1969). The Texas Supreme
Court in "Moore" Burger emphasized the limited application of promissory estoppel to statute of frauds claims
in its opinion on rehearing in the case. It then reiterated
this instruction in Nagle. A complete agreement on the
terms and wording of the written contract is required
to permit [**11] the application of promissory estoppel
to a statute of frauds defense. "Moore" Burger, 492
S.W.2d at 436; H. Molsen &Co. v. Hicks, 550 S.W2d
354, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref d
n.r.e.); Baddy v. Gray, 497S. W.2d 600, 605 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref d n.r.e.).
Promissory estoppel is applied when a party promises
to sign an existing written contract that would satisfy
the statute of frauds (but for the lack of a signature).
When a document remains to be prepared, as in this
case, all of the terms must ultimately be agreed to in
writing. H. Molsen, 550 S. W.2d at 356. In H. Molsen,
the record showed that the parties negotiated and a written document was prepared, but changes were yet to be
made in the document and the sellers' attorney had to
approve the contract before it could be executed. The
Court held that although the written document memorializing the agreement was not in evidence, "whatever its
terms were, there was no meeting of the minds as to the
final terms and no acceptance by the [sellers] of the writings. " [**12] Id. at 356 (emphasis added). Promissory
estoppel was not established to bar the application of the
statute of frauds in that case. Id. at 356.
In Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., nl the
Fifth Circuit applied Texas law to a case strikingly similar to the (meat bar. In that case, a prospective stock purchaser brought suit against the seller of the stock as well
as the party who ultimately purchased that stock, alleging, among other things, breach of contract. Southmark,
the [*719] buyer, contended that it had an oral agreement with Life Investors to purchase some $ 63 million
worth of stock. Life Investors countered with a statute of
frauds defense, and Southmark replied that promissory
estoppel would bar the use of that defense. Southmark
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introduced the affidavits of two of its vice-presidents,
who stated that Life representatives told them an agreement had been reached and that Life would execute final
documents evidencing the agreement. Southmark contended that these affidavits raised a fact issue regarding
promissory estoppel.
nl 851 E2d 763 (5th Cir. 1988).
[**13]
The Fifth Circuit relied upon Texas decisions such as
"Moore" Burger, Nagle, and Consolidated Petroleum to
limit the applicability of promissory estoppel to cases
in which a party promised to sign a written agreement
that had already been prepared and that would satisfy the
statute of frauds. The Court's rationale is particularly
instructive in this case. The Court found,
at most the parties contemplated final documents that
were to be prepared and approved sometime in the future. But in a transaction involving the sale of a controlling share of the stock of an ongoing business at a
purchase price in the tens of millions of dollars . .
. there is certainly an expectation on both sides that
documents will be prepared once the parties reach an
agreement. We cannot say that . . . justice requires
the enforcement of an oral promise to reduce the agreement to writing or to execute final documents at a later
time, especially where, as here, it does not appear that
the parties had even worked out the final details of the
alleged transaction.
Southmark, 851 F.2d at 769. The Court found that the
statute of frauds would be rendered [**14] meaningless if promissory estoppel were applied to situations
in which parties acknowledge agreement and the need
to convert that agreement into writing, especially when
the wording of the document has yet to be agreed upon.
The Court concluded by finding, pursuant to Texas law,
that proof of either an existing written document, or an
agreement on the wording of that document, is required
to raise a fact issue of promissory estoppel. Id.
As explained by Coastal in its appellate brief, on
August 13, the parties agreed to such complex matters as: 1) environmental liability, particularly the owners' retention of an environmentally risky terminal, 2)
Coastal's responsibility for conversion of the pipeline
from crude oil to natural gas, 3) Coastal's responsibility
for dealing with Laketon's reaction to the conversion of
the crude lines to gas lines, and 4) specified oil inventory adjustments and working capital adjustments. In a
complex securities purchase agreement, the wording of
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terms such as these is not generally established by mere
verbal agreement. The written memorial of that August
13 negotiation was only tentative and the writing was
a draft. Promissory estoppel cannot [**15] be used to
avoid the statute of frauds in a case in which the parties
were clearly still negotiating the final wording of their
binding contract. Accordingly, because the agreement
made between Coastal and the owners on August 13,
1987, was not an agreement regarding either an existing, already-prepared document, or an agreement on the
precise wording of that document, Texas jurisprudence
expressly prohibits the application of promissory estoppel to this case. Points two and three are overruled.
By point of error four, Coastal contends that the trial
court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of
Arco on Coastal's tortious interference claim. Coastal
maintained that Arco's refusal to close the security purchase agreement interfered with Coastal's business relationships and agreements with Unocal and Ashland.
Arco alleged in its motion for summary judgment that
because it was a party to the transaction, it could not
interfere with its own relationship or contract. In the
alternative, Arco averred that it was privileged to refuse
Coastal's terms for sale.
Interference with a prospective contract or business relationship consists of several elements. These include:
1) a [**16]reasonableprobability that the parties would
have entered into a contractual relationship, 2) an intentional and malicious act [*720] by the defendant that
prevented the relationship from occurring 3) with the
purpose of harming the plaintiff, 4) the defendant lacked
the privilege or justification to do the act, and 5) actual harm or damage resulted from the defendant's interference. Exxon Corp. v. Allsup, 808 S.W.2d 648,
659 (Tex. App. -Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied);
GiUum v. Republic Health Corp., 778 S. W.2d 558, 565
(Ifex. App. -Dallas 1989, no writ). However, Texas
Courts have held that one cannot tortiously interfere with
his own contract. Schoellkopf v. Pledger, 778 S.W.2d
897, 902 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Frost
Nat'l Bank u Matthews, 713 S.W.ld 365, 369 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.). "Liability for
tortious interference is founded only on the acts of an
interfering third party." Schoellkopf, 778S.W2dat902
(citing J. Edgar & J. Sales, Texas Torts and Remedies
§ 46.02[4][e] (1988)). In Matthews, [**17] an oil and
gas case, the court held that because Matthews and the
other litigants were all parties to the oil and gas lease
at issue, Matthews could not have tortiously interfered
with his own lease contract as alleged. Id. at 369. This
Court, too, has held that intentional interference with a
contract requires the act of a third party, not a party to
the contract Rural De*, Inc. v. Stone, 700 S.W2d
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661, 667 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref d
n.r.e.). We reasoned that when one of the parties to the
contract interferes with it, the action is one for breach of
contract. Stone, 700 S. W2d at 667. Arco, as a party to
the agreement, could not have tortiously interfered with
its own agreement. Point of error four is overruled.
By point of error five, Coastal alleges that Tecumseh
and Arco committed fraud when inducing Coastal to enter into this contract.
Coastal bases its entire fraud argument on the presumption that a contract was created between the parties. However, no binding contract existed. A finding
of fraud requires proof that a party believed a deceitful
representation and, relying on it, contracted [**18] or
acted to its detriment. Thrower v. Brownlee, 12 S.W.2d
184, 186 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
Where false representations or promises' are made to
induce another to act, and, before such other does act, he
learns of the falsity of such representations or promises,
it cannot of course be said that he relied upon them believing them to be true, for, knowing their falsity, he has
not been deceived.
Thrower, 12 S.W.2d 184 at 186 at 186-87. The Court
qualified this rule, limiting its application only to cases
in which the complaining party had not changed its position for the worse. Ia\ at 187. The rule will not
be applied when the contract is more than merely executory, that is, when the contract has been partly or
wholly performed to such an extent that the complaining party could not have fully protected itself. Id. at
187. Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court has held that
reliance on a representation that results in entry into
an obligation is actionable. Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646
S.W.2d927f 931 (Tex. 1983).
Coastal contends that at the [**19] time of the August
13 agreement, they believed they were obligated to perform under the agreement. This subjective feeling of
obligation is not the type recognized by Texas Courts. At
the time Coastal learned of Arco's alleged misrepresenta-
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tions, no binding agreement existed between the parties
at that time or at any other; they were still in the process
of negotiating the final stock purchase agreement That
agreement had to be executed by the parties in order
that it have a legally obligatory affect on Coastal. That
execution never occurred. Therefore, Coastal met with
Laketon agents of its own accord—it was not required to
do so under any established contract. Having learned
of the fraud during those meetings in September; 1987,
any further actions taken by Coastal in furtherance of
the agreement were taken with full knowledge of Arco's
representations. Equally important, those actions, too,
were not required under any binding contract between
the parties. Coastal is unable to show that it assumed an
obligation or entered into more than a mere executory
contract with Arco in reliance upon Arco's representations. Moreover, [*721] any refusal to pursue alternative
acquisitions [**20] cannot be deemed forbearance as a
result of fraudulent representations. In September; upon
learning of Laketon's claims, Coastal could well have
terminated all negotiations with the owners and pursued
other options. Rather, Coastal chose to continue negotiating with a party it later accused of committing fraud.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in
favor of Arco on Coastal's fraud claim against i t
Coastal also alleged that Tecumseh committed fraud
because Arco was Tecumseh's agent, and thefefore if
the agent committed fraud, then Tecumseh, as its principal, was liable for the acts of its agent. Because Arco
committed no fraudulent acts, any similar claim against
Tecumseh must fail as well. Point of error five is overruled.
All issues necessary to the disposition of this appeal
haven been addressed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 90(a).
The trial court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
J. BONNER DORSEY
Justice
Opinion ordered delivered and filed
this the 15th day of April, 1993.
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[*150] BARFIELD, J.
Roger Collier appeals from a summary judgment
against him as plaintiff in a suit for breach of contract
and unpaid wages, the trial court having determined that
his claim for money damages is barred by the statute
of frauds. With regard to the breach of contract claim,
the record before us demonstrates a factual dispute as to
whether the agreement at issue is one "that is not to be
performed within the space of one yearfromthe making
thereof," so as to make applicable the provision of section 72S.01, Florida Statutes, nl that "no action shall be
brought" unless the agreement is in writing and signed
by the party to be charged. We therefore reverse the
summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and
[**2] remand for further proceedings.
nl 725.01 Promise to pay another's debt, etc.-

No action shaU be brought whereby to charge any
executor or administrator upon any special promise
to answer or pay any debt or damages out of his own
estate, or whereby to charge the defendant upon any
special promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another person or to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of
marriage, or upon any contract for the sale of lands,
tenements or hereditaments, or of any uncertain interest in or concerning them, or for any lease thereof
for a period longer than 1 year, or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of 1
year from the making thereof, or whereby to charge
any health care provider upon any guarantee, warranty, or assurance as to the results of any medical,
surgical, or diagnostic procedure performed by any
physician licensed under chapter 458, osteopath licensed under chapter 459, chiropractor licensed under chapter 460, podiatrist licensed under chapter
461, or dentist licensed under chapter 466, unless the
agreement or promise upon which such action shaU
be brought, or some note or memorandum thereof
shall be in writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith or by some other person by him
thereunto lawfuUy authorized.
[**3]
In November 1989, Collier filed an amended complaint against BoUing Brooks, aUeging that the two of
them had entered into an agreement in January 1986
for Collier to be general manager of Brooks' business,
Jones Motor Company, in Graceville. According to the
allegations of the complaint, the parties agreed that if
Collier were successful in "reversing the decline" in the
company's business, he would receive twenty-five per
cent ownership in the company, and that under his management business did improve. The complaint further
alleged that after Collier "had fully performed and successfully accomplished the goals specified in the afore-
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mentioned contract," Brooks "refused to transfer any
ownership whatsoever" to him, and sought damages for
breach of contract and unpaid wages.
Brooks filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Collier was suing the [*151] wrong defendant because his verbal agreement was with Jones
Motor Company, not with Brooks, and asserting that
any claims were barred by the Statute of Frauds, section 725.01, Florida Statutes. Attached to the motion
for summary judgment was an affidavit in which Brooks
swore that Jones Motor Company is a corporation with
several [**4] stockholders, that Collier was paid $ 450
per week plus ten per cent of the net profit, and that
the parties had agreed that after January 1987, if the
company had profited under Collier's management, he
would be given the opportunity to purchase capital stock
from the stockholders, the amount and the price to be
negotiated at that time. Brooks further swore that at
no time during Collier's management did the company
make a profit, and that by the express terms of the agreement, Collier's purchase of stock could not have been
accomplished within one year.
Collier filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion,
stating that in January 1986, "Boiling Brooks personally
obligated himself to provide delivery of a portion of my
payment for services rendered, to wit, 25% ownership
of Jones Motor Company, contingent upon a reversal of
a decline in business." Collier swore that at the time they
entered into the agreement, Brooks represented that he
owned fifty-one per cent of the stock in the company, and
that the obligations under the contract "could have been,
and were to have been, performed within one year."
The depositions of the parties indicated that Brooks
was president of Jones Motor [**5] Company until the
assets were sold in May 1989. Brooks testified that in
January 1986, he and Collier agreed that Collier would
come to work for the company as general manager, making $ 425 per week and ten per cent commission on the
departments which were making money, and that "after
a years (sic) employment if he had turned the business
around and was making money then he would be offered to buy stock in Jones Motor Company, the amount
and the price to be decided at that time." Brooks testified
that, at the time of the agreement, he held twenty-five per
cent of the company stock, A.D. Williams held twentyfive per cent, and the remainder was owned by several
relatives. He also testified that the company had been
losing money for the five years prior to the agreement,
and that it lost money in each of the ensuing three years.
Collier testified in his deposition that he was employed
by Brooks "representing Jones Motor Company," that he
was paid in cash every week "by Jones Motor Company
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and Boiling Brooks," and that he had a verbal agreement
with Brooks representing Jones Motor Company. When
asked about Brooks' affidavit, Collier stated:
A. Mr. Brooks and I made a deal him representing [**6]
Jones Motor Company of $ 450 per week plus 10 percent, plus several other things that aren't mentioned in
this paragraph. I have a disagreement with that paragraph.

Q. With what do you disagree in that paragraph?

A. He offered me 25 percent of the business to come in
there, he told me I could buy up the other 25 percent
from Mr. A.D. Williams that he had 25 percent of the
stock. He also said I could have two demos, and pay
all my health insurance which I've already beat him in
court on that.
Collier testified that he was supposed to get the twentyfive per cent of the business "within the first year"
without payment of anything, even if the company lost
money, and that Brooks told him he ownedfifty-oneper
cent of the stock.
The trial judge issued an order granting the motion for
summary judgment as to the wage claim, and denying it
as to the breach of contract claim. Brooks filed an answer denying all the allegations of the complaint except
that Collier was employed as general manager of Jones
Motor Company, and raising as affirmative defenses that
Brooks was not personally liable because the agreement
was between Collier and Jones Motor Company and that
the suit [**7] was barred by the statute of frauds. He
counter-claimed against Collier on behalf of the stockholders of the company, alleging that if Collier were
determined to be entitled to twenty-five per cent of
the stock, then Collier would be legally obligated for
twenty-five per cent of the [*152] losses the company
had sustained since January 1986.
Collier denied the affirmative defenses and counterclaim, and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
of the counter-claim. He also filed the affidavit of Bill
Bell, an employee of Jones Motor Company from July
1987 to October 1988, who swore that Collier had said
that he would be part owner of the dealership, and that
Brooks had confirmed the fact.
Brooks filed a renewed motion for summary judgment,
asserting that the only way to transfer an ownership
interest in a corporation is by the exchange of securities or capital stock in the corporation, and that section
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678.319, Florida Statutes, n2 provides that a contract
for sale of securities is not enforceable unless in writing. At the hearing on the motion, Collier argued that
even if the statute of frauds applied, the doctrine of part
performance took the agreement out of the operation of
the statute, [**8] citing a decision of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, Leavitt v. Garson. n3 Brooks cited
a federal decision from the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeal, Dwight v. Tobin, n4 for the proposition [*153]
that under Florida law, the doctrine of part performance
does not remove a contract from the statute of frauds for
the purpose of seeking money damages, but would remove it in an equitable action for specific performance.
The trial court's order stated:

against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker, sufficient to indicate that a
contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity
of described securities at a defined or stated price;

. . . it would appear that the Defendant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law in that Plaintiffs claim is
barred by the Statute of Frauds.

(3) Within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the sale or purchase and sufficient against
the sender under subsection (1) has been received by
the party against whom enforcement is sought and
he has failed to send written objection to its contents
within 10 days after its receipt; or

Plaintiffs counsel, while not conceding the applicability of Florida Statutes § 678.319, contended that if
applicable, part or full performance by Plaintiff removed
the parties' agreement from the Statute of Frauds.
Assuming for the purpose of the Defendant's motion
that Plaintiff had fully performed his part of the bargain,
under Florida law, the doctrine of part performance is not
available in an action solely for damages at law. Since
by Plaintiffs Amended Complaint no equitable .relief is
sought, a judgment for damages is the only relief sought
and the position of the [*+9] Plaintiff is not well taken.
See Dwight v. Tobin, 5 FLW Fed. C1818 and the cases
cited therein.
We reject the reasoning of the trial court and the arguments of the parties on appeal nS to the extent they
are predicated on the application of section 678.319 to
this case, which involves an employment agreement, not
a contract for the sale of investment securities under
the Florida version of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Having extensively reviewed the history of the Statute of
Frauds from its enactment in England in the seventeenth
century, including the various forms adopted by the individual states and the interpretations placed upon them
by their respective jurisdictions, we find that we must
reject Collier's arguments to the extent they rely on the
doctrines of "part performance'' and "full performance"
as removing the agreement from the operation of section
725.01, Florida Statutes. n6
n2 678.319 Statute of frauds.-A contract for the
sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action
or defense unless:
(1) There is some writing signed by the party

(2) Delivery of a certificated security or transfer
instruction has been accepted, or transfer of an uncertificated security has been registered and the transferee has failed to send a written objection to the
issuer within 10 days after
receipt of the initial transaction statement confirming
the registration, or payment has been made, but the
contract is enforceable under this provision only to
the extent of the delivery, registration, or payment;

(4) The party against whom enforcement is sought
admits in his pleading, testimony, or otherwise in
court that a contract was made for the sale of a stated
quantity of described securities at a defined or stated
price.
[••10]
n3 525 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In
that case, the court reversed a summary judgment
for the appellee because it found that there was a
factual dispute regarding whether the appellee had
paid the appellant's decedent $ 7000 for 100,000
shares of stock in AGA of America. The appellee
had sought specific performance and damages for
breach of contract and fraud, alleging that the transaction was memorialized in a letter attached to the
complaint. The appellant had denied that there was
a contract between the parties. The court also reversed the denial of the appellant's motion to amend
its answer to include the affirmative defense of the
statute of frauds, noting the appellee's contention
"that since he paid $ 7,000 as consideration for the
stock, section 678.319 would not have been a valid
defense to his claim," but observing that "if a trier
of fact were to determine that appellee did not pay
the $ 7,000, then section 678.319 would be a valid
defense." Id. as 111.
n4 947F.2d 455 (11th Cir. 1991). That case involved in part a suit by one partner against the other
for breach of a partnership agreement. The district
court had agreed with the defendant partner that the
Florida statute of frauds applied to the alleged part-
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nership agreement, but held that the doctrine of part
performance removed the statute of frauds barrier.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the statute of frauds did apply to the agreement, but
reversed the district court's ruling that the doctrine
of part performance removed the contract from the
operation of the statute of frauds, citing Elsberry v.
Sexton, 61 Fla. 162, 54 So. 592 (1911), in which
the Florida Supreme Court unequivocally held that
part performance is an equitable doctrine and is not
available in actions for damages at law.
The court noted that the plaintiff partner had cited
"a handful of cases in which Florida District Courts
of Appeal have failed to apply this rule," but stated,
"we do not believe that these cases signal a change
in the otherwise settled law of the state." 947E2d
at 459. It noted that in three of the four cases cited,
the court "seemed unaware of the equity limitation."
Id. It pointed out that the fourth case was an action
brought under the Florida version of the Uniform
Commercial Code, in which the court specifically
relied on special provisions for the applicability of
partial payment in the Florida Uniform Commercial
Code statute of frauds, and found that the case "in no
way stands for the more general proposition that partial performance is available in all actions for damages. "Id. at 60.
The court observed that other decisions of the
Florida district courts of appeal "indicate that the
venerable rule established in Elsberry v. Sexton over
eighty years ago remains alive and well" and concluded that "until the Florida Supreme Court shows
some definitive indication that it intends to change
the rule limiting partial performance to actions in
equity, we must follow this rule." Id.
[**H]
n5 Collier argues that summary judgment was improper because the "well established exception to the
statute of frauds for contracts in which one party has
performed" applies to section 678.319, and that the
trial court's application of an "exception to this exception" for actions at law as opposed to equity was
error. He relies on Evans v. Parker, 440 So. 2d
640 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), an action for damages in
which this court held that "it is axiomatic that partial performance of an oral contract removes such
contract from the statute of frauds." This case was
discussed in Dwight v. Tobin, where the federal
court observed:
While one Florida district court of appeals may have
neglected to apply the equity rule at the time the
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court decided Evans, see Bertram Yacht Sales, Inc.
v. West, 209 So. 2d 677 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1968),
one could hardly say that it was "axiomatic" that partial performance would remove the statute of frauds
bar to an action at law. It simply appears that this
point was neither raised nor argued before the court.
947 E2d at 459-60. Collier contends that the trial
court erred in ruling that the doctrine of part performance is not available in an action solely for damages, noting the "modern trend to abolish the artificial distinctions between equity and law to focus on
the substance of the issue."
Alternatively, Collier asserts that he fully performed his part of the contract, so that "part performance" is not involved here. He argues that section
678.319 "requires a writing to enforce a contract for
sale of securities unless there is a written confirmation which is not objected to or payment has been
made," notes that the statute makes no distinction
between law and equity, and asserts that he made
payment for his stock by commencing and maintaining his employment with Jones Motor Company.
Brooks asserts that Collier's action has always
been for breach of contract and money damages, and
that Collier consciously decided not to pursue an equitable remedy of specific performance. He argues
that it is clear from Collier's affidavit that delivery
of part ownership in the business was "contingent
upon a reversal of a decline in the business," that the
parties never defined the period of time for which
this "reversal" was to take place, and that Bell's affidavit makes it clear that the contingencies of the
verbal agreement had not been fulfilled over a year
and a half after Collier went to work for the company.
n6 See footnote 5.
The English statute enacted in 1676, entitled "An Act
for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries," declared
that certain types of oral promises or agreements would
not be enforceable. n7 Included was "any agreement
that is not to be performed within one year [*154] of the
making thereof." n8 Most American statutes of frauds
follow the English statute in enumerating the classes of
contracts required to be evidenced in writing in order
to be enforceable, with some variations of wording. n9
Some jurisdictions tend toward restricting the operation
of the statute by rigid construction, freely admitting and
extending exceptions and distinctions supporting the enforceability of oral contracts, while other jurisdictions,
commenting on the beneficial effects of the statute, tend
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to restrict rather than enlarge the exceptions. nlO In
Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132, 181 So. 341, 344 (Fla.
1937), the Florida Supreme Court observed:
The statute of frauds grew out of a purpose to intercept
the frequency and success of actions based on nothing
more than [**13] loose verbal statements or mere innuendos. To accomplish this, the statute requires that all
actions based on agreements for longer than one year
must depend on a written statement or memorandum,
signed by the party to be charged. The statute should be
strictly construed to prevent the fraud it was designed to
correct, and so long as it can be made to effectuate this
purpose, courts should be reluctant to take cases from
its protection. 25 R.CL. 442.
In determining whether a contract is within this provision of the statute of frauds, the supreme court held:
When no time is agreed on for the complete performance
of the contract, if from the object to be accomplished
by it and the surrounding circumstances, it clearly appears that the parties intended that it should extend for
a longer period than a year, it is within the statute of
frauds, though it cannot be said that there is any impossibility preventing its performance within a year. 25
R.CL. 458.
Id. n i l The supreme court found that the agreement at
issue in that case was by its terms "susceptible of performance within a year, and the evidence shows that it
was expected to have been performed within that time,"
[**14] so that it was not within the statute of frauds. Id.
It added:
Another fact lending support to this view is that the
contract was fully performed on the part of the plaintiff before action was brought. The rule is generally
approved in this country that the statute of frauds applies only to contracts not to be performed on either
side within the year, and has no application to contracts
which by intent were fully performed within the year on
one side. If that rule is applied in this case, the plaintiff having performed the contract on his part within the
year, the defendant cannot avail himself of the statute of
frauds.
Id. at 345 (cites omitted, emphasis added). nl2 This
doctrine, which is sometimes labeled "full performance"
or "complete performance" nl3 was articulated in an
English case in which the court held enforceable a tenant's promise to pay five pounds for fifteen years, where
the landlord had promised to spend fifty pounds in improvements and did so within a year.
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n7 See 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 1, and
the cases cited therein.
n8 29 Charles H (1676) Ch 3, § 4.
[••IS]
n9 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 3. See
also 3 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of
Contracts § 450 (3d ed. 1960).
nlO Williston, supra, at § 448. See also 2 Arthur
Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 275 (1950).
n i l In Markowitz Bros., Inc. v. John A. \blpe
Const. Co.,209F.Supp. 339,340(S.D. Fla. 1962),
the court referred to this statement as a dictum citing
with approval the "minority rule," which it found to
be applicable, "in light of the past rulings in Florida
— and the more persuasive rationale of the minority
position, especially in this day of negotiations looking to the formation of informal contracts not under
seal."
nl2 See also 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds §
19.
nl3 "It must be borne in mind that cases involving complete performance by one party, as well as
cases of part performance by one or both parties,
are, strictly speaking, cases of part performance and
the courts in considering cases of complete performance by one party often use the terminology 'part
performance.'" Annotation, Performance as taking
contract not to be performed within a year out of the
statute of frauds, 6A.L.R. 2d 1053,1063 (1949).
[**16]
As the contract was entirely executed on one side within
a year, and as it was the intention of the parties, founded
on a reasonable expectation, that it should be so, [*155]
the statute of frauds does not extend to such a case.
DoneUan v. Read, 3 Barn & Ad 899, 110 Eng Reprint
330 (1832).
The doctrine of "part performance" also arose early on
in Florida, in actions for specific performance of contracts for the conveyance of land or an interest in land,
based on the conviction that "the statute of frauds should
not be used as ail instrument of fraud." Chabotv. Winter
Park Co., 34 Fla. 258,15 So. 756, 759 (Fla. 1894). In
Malay u Boyett,53Fla. 956, 43 So. 243,24&47 (Fla.
1907), the Florida Supreme Court adopted the following
language of the Utah court:
Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine invoked by
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plaintiff, have not by any means intended to annul the
statute of frauds, but only to prevent its being made the
means of perpetrating a fraud. In order that a plaintiff
may be permitted to give evidence of a contract not in
writing, [**17] and which is in the very teeth of the
statute and a nullity at law, it is essential that he establish, by clear and positive proof, acts, and things done
in pursuance and on account thereof, exclusively referable thereto, and which take it out of the operation of
the statute.
In Demps v. Hogan, 57 Fla. 60, 48 So. 998 (Fla.
1909), the supreme court held:
Where the owner of land, by himself or through his
agent, makes a verbal contract of sale of such land to
another for an agreed price, and puts the vendee in possession, upon compliance with the terms of his contract
of purchase a court of equity will, in favor of such
purchaser, enforce specific performance of such contract, notwithstanding the statute of frauds, requiring
all contracts for the sale of lands, or some memorandum
thereof, to be in writing and signed by the vendor.
And in Miller v. Murray, 68 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla.
1953), the supreme court stated:
The governing principles by which part performance
may remove an oral contract for the sale of land from the
effect of the Statute of Frauds are also well established.
In addition to [**18] establishing the fact that an oral
contract for sale was made, proof must be submitted as
to the following: payment of all or part of the consideration, whether it be in money or in services; possession
by the alleged vendee; and the making by the vendee
of valuable and permanent improvements upon the land
with the consent of the vendor—or, in the absence of
improvements, the proof of such facts as would make
the transaction a fraud upon the purchaser if it were not
enforced. Battle v. Butler, 138 Fla. 392, 189 So. 846.
Accord Todd v. Hyzer, 154 Fla. 702, 18 So. 2d 888;
Purvis v. Malloy, 129 Fla. 191,176 So. 71, 72.
Unlike the district courts of appeal, some of which have
attempted to extend this doctrine beyond the circumstances under which it arose, the Florida Supreme Court
has implied the doctrine of part performance only in suits
involving specific performance of oral contracts for the
conveyance of land or an interest in land. nl4 Where a
landowner sought damages for breach of an oral agreement in which the defendant had contracted to buy 500
standing [**19] trees for $ 1000, then cut 150 of the best
ones and paid the owner $ 300, but refused to complete
the agreement, the court held that a sale of standing tim-
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ber is a contract concerning an interest in land, within
the meaning of the statute of frauds, and that
nl4 Condrey v. Condrey, 92 So. 2d 423 (Fla.
1957); Cottages, Miami Beach v. VJkgman, 57 So.
2d 439 (Fla. 1951), reh. denied, 59 So. 2d 528
(Fla. 1952); Demps v. Hogan, 57 Fla. 60, 48 So.
998 (Fla. 1909); Malay v. Boyett, 53 Fla. 956,
43 So. 243 (Fla. 1907). See also Gable v. Miller,
104 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1958); Miller v. Murray, 68
So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1953); Green v. Price, 63 So. 2d
337 (Fla. 1953); Burton v. Keaton, 60 So. 2d 770
(Fla. 1952); Dixon v. Clayton, 44 So. 2d 76 (Fla.
1949);Tbddv. Hyzer, 154Fla. 702, 18So. 2d888
(Fla. 1944); Battle v. Butler, 138 Fla. 392, 189
So. 846 (Fla. 1939); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain,
150 Fla. 21, 155 So. 136 (Fla. 1934); Williams v.
Bailey, 69 Fla. 225, 67 So. 877 (Fla. 1915).
[**20]
Where a contract is for the sale of lands, or any interest therein, and is not in writing, no action at law can
ever be maintained upon it. Part performance of such a
contract is a ground for relief in equity only, and there
on the principle of relieving from fraud.
[*156] The suit here is nothing more than an action
at law for the recovery of damages for alleged breach
of an oral contract for the purchase of an interest in realty, which action is expressly forbidden by our statute
of frauds.
Elsberry v. Sexton, 61 Fla. 162, 54 So. 592, 593
(Fla. 1911) (cites omitted). And in Canell v. Areola
Housing Corp. ,65 So. 2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1953), which
involved an oral promise to create an easement that the
court found "is clearly within the terms of the statute of
frauds and thus cannot be enforced directly or indirectly"
and "would amount to an unauthorized reformation of
the description in the deed," it concluded:
Since the provision in the statute prohibiting any action to be brought on an oral contract within the statute
includes actions based indirectly on the contract, "an
action for damages cannot [**21] be maintained on the
ground of fraud in refusing to perform the contract, even
though the defendant at the time of the making of the
oral contract may have had no intention of performing
it." 25 R.CL. 691. See also Dung v. Parker, 52 N.Y.
494. Although some courts have reached an opposite
conclusion, 49 AmJur. p. 841; 23 AmJur. p. 889;
Anno. 104A.L.& 1420, we think that on the facts of the
case under consideration the rule quoted above is best
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calculated to uphold the theory upon which the statute
of frauds is founded, in accord with the principle that
so long as the statute can be made to effectuate its purposes, courts should be reluctant to take cases from its
protection. Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132,181 So. 341.
We have discovered only two cases in which the Florida
Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether
the statute of frauds applied to employment agreements.
In Grossman u Levy's, 81 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. 1955),
the court held that an oral renewal of an oral one-year
employment agreement, which commenced on the day
the renewal [**22] was made, was not within the statute
of frauds regardless of whether the original contract was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds, noting:
Our statute of frauds, unlike the statutes of some states,
49 AmJur., Statute of Frauds, Sec. 23, does not declare an offending contract to be "void" or "invalid".
Nor does it merit this construction, in spite of some casual language in Yates v. Ball, 132 Fla. 132, 181 So.
341. It merely states, so far as is relevant here, that
"No action shall be brought whereby * * * to charge
any person * * * upon any agreement that is not to be
performed within the space of one year from the making thereof." (Italics added.) The statute thus pertains
exclusively to the remedy. . . . If a contract which
offends the statute were absolutely void and a nullity,
it could not be held, as it has long been held by this
court, that the statute applies only to executory and not
to executed contracts. McDowell v. Ritter, 153 Fla.
50, 13 So. 2d 612; Summerall v. Thorns, 3 Fla. 298.
And the rule of the cases just cited is directly applicable
here, [**23] because the original contract alleged had
concededly been executed on both sides.
In Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital, Inc.,
190 So. 2d 777, 779 (Fla. 1966), the supreme court
approved the district court's rejection of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, nl5 "as a sort of counteraction to
the legislatively created Statute of Frauds." The supreme
court cited with approval its holding in Yates v. Ball that
the statute of frauds should be strictly construed, and the
district court's observation that great caution should be
exercised "in the consideration of the advisability of ingrafting onto the law of this State a provision [*157]
which may have the effect of nullifying the legislative
will of the State as expressed by the inactment [sic] of
the Statute of Frauds * * * ."
190So.

2dat778.
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nl5 Estoppel theory has been found to be related
to the doctrine of part performance. Annotation,
Action by employee in reliance on employment contract which violates statute of frauds as rendering the
contract unenforceable, 54 A.L.R. 715, § 3 (1992
pocket part).
And in Winters ML Alanco, Inc., 435 So. 2d326,
331 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), involving an easement in
land, the court noted:
The doctrine of part performance is based not on the
theory that part performance is a substitute for the
written evidence required by the Statute of Frauds,
but on the theory that the defendant should be
estopped, in view of the part performance in reliance
on the defendant's inducement or acquiescence, to
assert the statute as a defense.

[**24]
To the extent our sister courts, relying on the law
of other jurisdictions or the opinions of commentators
regarding the "modern trend" towards eviscerating the
statute of frauds, have digressed from the principles
which were laid down by the Florida Supreme Court in
the aforementioned cases, we do not find their opinions
to be persuasive authority. nl6 To the extent opinions
from this court have digressed from those principles, we
do not find them to be binding on our decision in this
case. nl7 As noted in Dwight v. Tobin, recent decisions
from the Florida district courts of appeal nl8 "indicate
that the venerable rule established in Elsberry v. Sexton
over eighty years ago remains alive and well." 947F.2d
at 460. It was Corbin who explained in his treatise on
contracts that the course of decisions leading away from
denying [**25] enforcement of promises that are not to
be performed within one year is based upon public welfare and policy, not upon reason and logic. If Florida is
to move toward enforcing oral promises intended to be
performed beyond one year, or towards compensating
those who enter into such agreements, it is the proper
function of the Florida Legislature to announce that public policy change, not the function of a district court of
appeal. While the Florida Supreme Court has occasionally chosen to depart from its own precedent on public
policy grounds, we note that it frowns on such departures by lower courts. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d
431 (Fla. 1973).
nl6 See, for example, Goslin v. Racal Data
Communications, Inc., 468 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 3d
DCA), rev. denied, 479 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1985);
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AV-MED, Inc. v. French, 458 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1984); Hiatt v. \hughn, 430 So. 2d 597 (Fla.
4th DCA 1983); Dionne v. Columbus Mills, Inc.,
311 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Miami Beach
First National Bank v. Shalleck, 182 So. 2d 649
(Fla. 3d DCA 1966).
[**26]
nl7 See, for example, Moneyhun v. Vital
Industries, Inc., 611 So. 2d 1316 (Fla. 1st DCA
1993); Elliot v. Timmons, 519 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1st
DCA), rev. denied, 525 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1988);
Futch v. Head, 511 So. 2d 314 (Ha. 1st DCA),
rev. denied, Head v. Futch, 518 So. 2d 1275 (Fla.
1987); Evans v. Parker, 440 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983); W. & a, Inc. v. Howard Johnson
Co. ,382 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied,
Howard Johnson Co. v. W. B. D., Inc., 388 So. 2d
1114 (Fla. 1980).
nl8 The Eleventh Circuit cited Winters v. Alanco,
Inc., Tanenbaum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hospital,
Inc., and Williams v. Faile, 118 So. 2d 599 (Fla.
1st DCA 1960). We also note the cases previously
cited in this opinion, and the following cases holding that part performance of a contract for personal
services is not an exception to the provisions of the
Statute of Frauds: Miller Construction Co. v. First
Industrial Technology Corp., 576 So. 2d 748 (Fla.
3d DCA 1991); Johnson v. Edwards, 569 So. 2d
928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Tobin & Tobin Insurance
Agency, Inc. v. Zeskind, 315 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1975); and Rowland v. Ewell, 174 So. 2d 78
(Fla. 2d DCA 1965). Most recently, in Hospital
Corporation v. Associates in Adolescent Psychiatry,
S.C.,605So. 2d556(Fla. 4thDCA 1992), rev. dismissed, Associates in Adolescent Psychiatry, S.C. v.
Hospital Corporation, 626 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1993),
the court held that the doctrine of part performance
does not remove the bar of the statute of frauds from
actions for damages based upon breach of oral contracts, relying in part on Dwight v. Tobin and distinguishing Elliot v. Timmons, Futch v. Head, Evans
v. Parker, and W.B.D., Inc. v. Howard Johnson
Co..
[**27]
The parties in this case do not dispute the existence
of the oral employment agreement, but disagree with regard to some of its terms. They do not dispute that in
January 1986 they entered into an oral agreement, which
was not reduced to writing, that Collier would manage
Jones Motor Company, in which Brooks had an ownership interest, and that Collier would be paid $ 450 per
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week plus ten per cent of the net profit. The evidence
indicates that the parties also agreed that upon some contingency involving the success of the business (the exact
nature of which is in dispute), Collier would be entitled
to some ownership interest in the business (the manner
of transfer and exact terms of which are also in dispute).
The parties have taken opposing positions regarding the
time in which the agreement was to have been performed
nl9 and summary judgment [*158] is precluded by this
factual dispute, the resolution of which will determine
whether section 725.01 bars Collier's damages claim for
breach of contract.
nl9 Brooks swore in his affidavit that by the express terms of the agreement, Collier's purchase of
stock could not have been accomplished within one
year. He testified in his deposition that "after a
years (sic) employment if he had turned the business around and was making money then he would
be offered to buy stock in Jones Motor Company,
the amount and the price to be decided at that time."
Collier swore in his affidavit that the obligations under the contract "could have been, and were to have
been, performed within one year" and testified in his
deposition that he was supposed to get twenty-five
per cent of the business "within the first year" from
Brooks, without payment of anything, even if the
company lost money.
[**28]
On remand, the trial court must determine, "from the
object to be accomplished" by the agreement and the surrounding circumstances, whether "it clearly appears that
the parties intended that it should extend for a longer period than a year." See Yates v. Ball, 181 So. 2d at 344.
If the court so finds, it must then determine whether it
was the intention of the parties that Collier would fully
perform his part of the agreement within one year; and
whether Collier did in fact fully perform his part of the
agreement within one year. If the court does not find
that the parties intended that Collier would, and also
that Collier actually did, fully perform his part of the
agreement within one year, section 725.01 bars any action to enforce the agreement. Id. at 345. In light of
the supreme court's decision in Tanenbaum, we do not
believe that it would approve extending the application
of the narrow doctrine of "part performance" to an action which does not in any way involve an agreement to
convey land, and which seeks, not the equitable remedy
of specific performance of the contract, but the common
law remedy of damages [**29] for breach of contract.
n20
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n20 We note that Collier may alternatively seek
compensation in quantum meruit for the reasonable
value of the services he rendered, to the extent he
has not already been compensated by the salary and
commissions he received.
The summary judgment is REVERSED and the cause
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
SMITH, J., CONCURS. ERVIN, J., CONCURS AND
DISSENTS, WITH A WRITTEN OPINION.
CONCURBY: ERVIN
DISSENTBY: ERVIN
DISSENT: ERVIN, J., concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority's decision to reverse and
remand the summary judgment, but dissent from its interpretation of the full-performance doctrine. The majority considers the doctrine applies only if the parties
intended that one party perform the agreement within
one year, and the party fully performs within such time.
Its conclusion is contrary to prior authority from this and
other courts in Florida, which hold that full performance
by one party removes the contract from the operation of
the statute of frauds, [**30] without consideration of
the parties' intent and the length of time before completion. See, e.g., Moneyhun v. Vital Indus., Inc., 611
So. 2d 1316, 1319 (Fla. IstDCA 1993); AV-MED, Inc.
v. French, 458 So. 2d 67, 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984);
Hiatt v. \bughn, 430 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 4th DCA
1983); \knditti-Siravo v. City of Hollywood, 418 So.
2d 1251,1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Gerry v. Antonio,
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409 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Dionne
v. Columbus Mills, Inc., 311 So. 2d 681, 683 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1975); Miami Beach First Nat'I Bank v. Shalleck,
182 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). nl See also
2 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 457 (1950 &
Supp. 1993) (adhering to the general rule from numerous jurisdictions that full performance beyond one year
renders the statute of frauds inapplicable).
nl If the evidence shows that Collier fully performed within one year, the following cases provide
additional authority for his position: Futch v. Head,
511 So. 2d 314, 319 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 518 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1987); W.RD , Inc. v.
Howard Johnson Co., 382 So. 2d 1323,1327 (Fla.
1st DCA), review denied, 388 So. 2d 1114 (Fla.
1980); Goslin v. Raced Data Communications, Inc.,
468 So. 2d 390,392 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied,
479 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1985).
[**311
Because the issue of whether Collier fully performed
his part of the parties' agreement is a disputed issue of
material fact, I would simply reverse the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings without any
directions to the lower court regarding the parties' intent or the length of time required [*159] for Collier to
perform. In other words, if the evidence discloses that
Collier fully performed his part of the agreement, the
existence of evidence showing that the parties did not
intend that Collier would fully perform the agreement
within one year, or that the contract was not fully performed within such time is immaterial to his right to
enforce the terms of the agreement.
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PRIOR HISTORY:
Action in the Sherburne County District Court to recover
for soybeans allegedly sold and delivered to defendants,
Bruce Mitchell and Mitchell Feed & Seed Company,
wherein defendant corporation counterclaimed. The
court, Carroll £. Larson, Judge, ordered summary judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appealed from the
judgment entered.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
HEADNOTES: Judgments — summary judgment —
power of trial court to grant sua sponte.
1. Trial court has power to grant summary judgment,
sua sponte, without meeting formal notice requirement
of Rule 56.03, Rules of Civil Procedure, under certain
circumstances.
Statute of frauds — oral agreement for future purchase
- defenses not available.
2. Neither promissory nor equitable estoppel is available under the facts of this case to take the oral agreement
out of the statute of frauds, Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(1).
Statute of frauds — oral agreement for future purchase
— defenses not available.
3. Both acceptance and receipt of all of the goods
in question are required under Minn. St. 336.2 —
201(3)(c) before avoidance of the statute of frauds is
recognized.
Appeal and error — failure to make proper record on
issue - effect.
4. Where individual defendant failed to make a proper
record on the question of whether he acted in his individual capacity or as corporate agent, he was precluded
from raising the issue on appeal.
COUNSEL: Wklsh & Nelson and Jerold Q Nelson, for
appellants.

Smith & Pringle and Gary L. Pringle, for respondent.
JUDGES: Otis, Kelly, and Chanak, JJ., * and considered
and decided by the court en banc.
* Acting as Justice of the Supreme Court by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. 6, § 2,
and Minn. St. 2.724, subd. 2.
OPINIONBY: CHANAK
OPINION: [*276] [**590] Appeal by defendants from
summary judgment of the District Court, Sherburne
County, in favor of plaintiff for goods sold and delivered
and denying recovery on the counterclaim. Ws affirm.
On November 24, 1972, the parties entered into
an oral agreement whereby plaintiff contracted to sell,
and defendants agreed to purchase for future delivery, certain soybeans for a price of $ 3.50 per bushel.
Approximately 4,020 bushels were delivered to defendant on May 16 and 17, 1973. The market value of the
beans had increased to $ 8 or $ 9 per bushel at time of
delivery, and after delivery continued to rise, reaching
$ 10 per bushel.
The parties' disagreement as to the quantity of beans,
the subject [*277] of the oral contract, culminated in this
action. Plaintiff claimed that the contract was for 4,000
bushels of beans, and defendants insisted that plaintiff
promised to sell a "bin of beans." Under defendants'
view, plaintiff had failed to deliver approximately 1,000
to 1,500 bushels of the total beans contracted for and
remaining in plaintiffs bin. At no stage of the negotiations or agreement was any writing in any form, relating
to the agreement, executed by either of the parties.
Plaintiff was never paid for the beans delivered. As
a consequence, plaintiff sought recovery of the agreed
price for the number of bushels actually delivered (which
the parties later stipulated was $ 13,151.73), and defendants counterclaimed for damages resulting from plaintiffs failure to deliver the beans remaining in plaintiffs
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bin after delivery of 4,020 bushels.
At the pretrial conference on December 27, 1973, the
trial court raised the issue of the statute of frauds, Minn.
St. 336.2 — 201, which provides that an agreement for
the sale of goods of a value of more than $ 500, to
be enforceable, must be in writing, and so noted in its
pretrial order of January 2, 1974, but without a final
determination.
At the conference in chambers between court and
counsel, preliminary to the selection of a jury, on the day
set for trial, January 22, 1974, plaintiff moved to amend
its reply to defendants' counterclaim by raising the affirmative defense of the statute of frauds. At the same time,
defendants moved to amend their counterclaim to plead
affirmatively estoppel. Both motions were granted.
After the court indicated at the latter conference that
the defendants could not prove their alleged counterclaim, defendants were then permitted to make an offer of proof as to (1) facts relied upon to prove defendants' version of the verbal agreement and (2) conduct
or representations of plaintiff which would constitute an
estoppel. The court then determined that defendants'
counterclaim was within the statute of frauds and that
the conduct and representations of the plaintiff, even
if true, did not constitute an estoppel. Rejected also
was defendants' contention [*278] that a jury issue arose
as to whether a "bin of beans" was a commercial unit.
Defendants had argued that acceptance of part was acceptance of the entire unit within the meaning of Minn.
St. 336.2 — 606(2), so as to take the oral agreement out
of the statute of frauds under § 336.2 - 201(3)(c).
Having further advised counsel that under Minn. St.
336.2 - 201(3)(c) the payment for the 4,020 bushels
was enforceable because [**591] it was in "respect to
goods * * * which have been received and accepted"
and therefore not within the statute of frauds, the trial
court ordered judgment, which is the subject of this appeal, nl
nl Prior thereto, the parties stipulated that the
amount of plaintiffs claim was $ 13,151.73.
Defendants' appeal raises the following issues: (1)
Whether the trial court exceeded its authority in granting
what was in effect a summary judgment on its own motion on the basis of the information disclosed by the interrogatories, depositions, files, pleadings, pretrial conference, and offer of proof preliminary to trial. (2) Did
the question of whether plaintiff was estopped to raise
the statute of frauds constitute a genuine issue of material fact? (3) Did the question of whether a "bin of
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beans" is a commercial unit within the meaning of the
Uniform Commercial Code (hereafter UCQ constitute
a genuine issue of material fact? (4) Did the trial court
err in entering judgment against Bruce Mitchell individually?
Summary Judgment Sua Sponte
Defendants contend that the trial court exceeded its
authority because it granted a summary judgment on its
own motion on the day of trial without notice to the parties. In support of that contention, defendants rely on
McAllister v. Independent School Dist. No. 306, 276
Minn. 549,149N.W2d81
(1967).
WB did hold in McAllister, as defendants contend,
that under Rule 56.03, Rules of Civil Procedure, n2 the
stated time of 10 days' [*279] formal notice is mandatory, absent a clear waiver by the adversary. The aggrieved party there vigorously opposed the motion for
summary judgment by defendants on two grounds: (1)
Notice was 5 days short, and (2) plaintiffs had other
evidence to submit.
n2 Rule 56.03, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
in part: "The motion shall be served at least 10 days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that either party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law."
The circumstances which are presented here distinguish McAllister v. Independent School Dist. No. 306,
supra. Significant are the following facts: (1) The pretrial conference was held on December 27, 1973, at
which time the trial court raised the issue of the statute
of frauds relative to defendants' counterclaim and incorporated the issue in its pretrial order of January 2,
1974, in effect affording written notice of the issue to
both parties; (2) by the same order, trial by jury was set
for January 22, 1974, in effect affording defendants a
20-day opportunity to prepare to meet the issue raised;
(3) on the day set for trial, at a conference in chambers
between court and counsel preliminary to selection of a
jury, the court reviewed its pretrial order, reiterated its
opinion that the defendants could not pursue their counterclaim because of the statute of frauds, secured agreement of counsel as to the amount of plaintiff s claim, and
then afforded defendants an opportunity to make their
offer of proof; (4) defendants availed themselves of that
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opportunity by attempting to show genuine fact issues as
to the provisions of the oral agreement and facts relating
to estoppel and were fully heard as to all the questions involved; (5) the trial judge thereupon ruled that the statute
of frauds precluded defendants' counterclaim and denied
estoppel; (6) at the time defendants voiced no objection
on the record to the procedure employed by the court;
and (7) no prejudice was shown by defendants by reason
[*280] of the absence of a formal motion.

"'Unless the objecting party can show prejudice arising from the lack of notice * * *, exercising [summary
judgment] power at pre-trial is sound. Seldom should
lack of notice prejudice a party, as each party should be
fully prepared on the facts applicable to the case in order
to participate in the pre-trial. To compel a 10 day delay
solely to comply with the notice requirements of Rule
56.03 would seem ill-advised.' [Citations omitted.]"
265Minn. 227, 121 N.W2d353.

Neither the summary judgment rule nor any other procedural rule gives the trial court express authority to
enter a summary judgment on its own motion. The authority is derived from the inherent power [**592] of
the trial court to dispose summarily of litigation when
there remains no genuine issue as to any material fact
and judgment must be ordered for one of the parties as a
matter of law. The same conditions must exist as would
justify a summary judgment on motion of a party. Green
v. Kaesler-Allen Lumber Co. 197 Kan. 788, 420 P. 2d
1019;Sheildv. Vklch, 4N.J. 563, 73A. 2d536;Roberts
v. Braynon, 90 So. 2d 623 (Flo. 1956); Buffington
v. Continental Cos. Co. 69 KM. 365, 367 P. 2d 539
(1961). See, also, Rule 16(6), Rules of Civil Procedure.
Concededly, there were genuine fact issues involved in
the instant case. But as their resolution would in no way
affect the application of the rules of law which we adopt
herein, the trial court properly denied defendants a jury
trial on those issues.

Ws hold that under the circumstances of this case the
trial court properly exercised its power in granting summary judgment sua sponte.

In Niazi v. St. Paid Mercury Ins. Co. 265 Minn.
222,121 N.W.2d 349 (1963), we considered facts analogous to those in this case. There, plaintiffs had brought
an action under the medical pay and uninsured motorist
provisions of an automobile insurance policy. The policy provisions required that such disputes be arbitrated
in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration
Association. At the pretrial conference, the trial court,
either on its own motion or upon oral motion of the attorney for the insurer, ordered the proceedings stayed until
plaintiffs submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to
the policy. No formal application for stay and order for
arbitration had been made by defense counsel. Plaintiffs
sought a writ of mandamus from this court alleging that
the trial court had in effect granted a summary judgment
on its own motion in a manner not in compliance with
the rules.
In denying the application for the writ, we reasoned
as follows:
"* * * [T]he trial judge does have power under Rule
56.04 [*281] to grant summary judgment with respect
to all or some of the issues raised by the pleadings.
[Citations omitted.]

Estoppel
Defendants' offer of proof was that after the oral agreement of November 24, 1972, was negotiated and relying
on plaintiffs promise to sell defendants all of the beans
in its bin, defendants entered into a contract with Bunge
Corporation on the same day to resell 4,000 bushels of
the beans to Bunge. The resale to Bunge was at a slightly
higher price and was limited to 4,000 bushels because,
defendants claim, neither plaintiff nor defendants knew
exactly how many bushels there were in plaintiffs bin.
Defendants claim that the general understanding was that
the bin was about half full and that the full bin would
hold approximately 12,000 bushels.
Later that week, defendants claim, plaintiff assured
defendants that there were from 5,000 to 5,500 bushels
in the bin, and acting in reliance thereon and upon
later commitments from several other farmers, defendants on December 6, 1972, again resold another lot
of 4,000 bushels to Bunge for June delivery. Of that
total 4,000-bushel lot, defendants relied upon the additional 1,000 bushels from plaintiff. Defendants'reliance
upon plaintiffs promise was such that the former made
no additional hedges against the two future deliveries.
Defendants argue that [*282] in order to fulfill their two
contracts with Bunge, it became necessary [*+593] for
them to deliver 1,000 bushels of expensive beans rather
than plaintiffs less costly beans and thus defendants incurred a loss. Based upon this offer of proof, defendants
contend that a fact issue of estoppel was for the jury.
The offer of proof on that issue was clearly one creating a fact issue. However, the court's denial of estoppel
would constitute reversible error only if the doctrine of
estoppel is available to defendants under the statute of
frauds in the UCC The trial court held that no estoppel would follow even if defendants established the facts
that they offered to prove.
The statute of frauds provided by the UCC with respect to contracts for the sale of goods in excess of $
500 n3 does not expressly state that estoppel will take
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a contract out of the statute of frauds. Nevertheless,
the general savings clause of the UCC provides that the
principles of estoppel, as well as other commonlaw principles, will continue to apply unless expressly displaced
by provisions of the UCC n4

Promissory estoppel is the name applied to a contract
implied in law where no contract exists in fact. n6 The
effect of promissory estoppel is to imply a contract from
a unilateral or otherwise unenforceable promise coupled
by detrimental reliance on the part of the promisee. n7

n3 Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(1) provides in relevant
part: "(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of
$ 500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between
the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or
broker."

n6 Its elements are set forth in Restatement,
Contracts, § 90, as follows:

n4 Minn. St. 336.1 - 103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this chapter,
the principles of law and equity, including the law
merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its
provisions." (Italics supplied.)
In arguing that plaintiff should be estopped from asserting the statute of frauds, defendants fail to draw a distinction between equitable estoppel, also referred to as
estoppel in pais, and promissory estoppel, also referred
to as quasi contract. Language used by the trial court at
the time he considered defendants' offer of proof would
seem to indicate that equitable estoppel was [*283] the
basis for his holding that the offer of proof did not make
out the elements of an estoppel. n5 On appeal, however, defendants have urged us, without specifying either
promissory or equitable estoppel, to apply the reasoning of certain promissory estoppel cases cited by them.
Thus, it is necessary for us to consider the applicability
of each of the types of estoppel to the facts of this case.
n5 The trial court stated: "[A]nd with respect to
estoppel, I do not think this is a proper case for estoppel. Stretch it how you will, I can't bring in the
elements of fraud, and estoppel is always predicated
upon some ramification of fraud. I don't believe we
have it here."
We note that defendants' offer of proof tended to show
the elements of promissory — although perhaps not intended — rather than equitable estoppel. The doctrine of
promissory estoppel is wholly inapplicable here for the
simple reason that an actual contract existed.

"A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite
and substantial character on the part of the promisee
and which does induce such action or forbearance is
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
nJ Jn Constructors Supply v. Bostrom Sheet Metal
Vbrks, 291 Minn. 113, 116, 190 N.W 2d 71, 74
(1971), we quoted Restatement, Contracts, § 90, to
establish the elements of promissory estoppel and
characterized the doctrine as "a species of or substitute for consideration" or a "reliance doctrine."
The Restatement rule is that promissory estoppel will
defeat the statute of frauds only when the promise relied upon is a [**594] promise to reduce the contract to
writing. n8 Many of the courts which have considered
the problem have either expressly adopted [+284] the
Restatement rule or have simply rejected the view that
promissory estoppel can remove an oral contract from
the statute of frauds. n9 The jurisdictions which adopt
this restrictive view do so because a promissory estoppel
exception would likely render the statute of frauds nugatory. nlO There is always some degree of reliance on
an oral contract. Some jurisdictions adopt the slightly
less restrictive view advocated by Williston and permit
promissory estoppel where the detrimental reliance is of
such a character and magnitude thatrefusalto enforce the
contract would permit one party to perpetrate a fraud,
n i l A mere refusal to perform an oral agreement, unaccompanied by unconscionable conduct, however, is not
such a fraud as will justify disregarding the statute. 3
Williston, Contracts (3 ed.) § 533A.
n8 Restatement, Contracts, § 178, comment f.
n9 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson, 217
F. 2d 295 (9 Cir. 1954) (adopts Restatement); Cox
v. Cox, 292 Ala. 289, 289 So. 2d 609 (1974) (denies estoppel); Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co.
45 IlL App. 2d 10, 195 N.E. 2d 250 (1964) (denies
estoppel); Polka v. May, 383 Pa. 80,118 A. 2d 154
(1955) (denies estoppel); cf. Fairway Machine Sales
Co. u Continental Motors Corp. 40 Mich. App.

304 Minn. 275, *284; 230 N.W.2d 588, **594;
17 U.CC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 16
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270, 198N.W 2d 757 (1972).

Jurisprudence (5 ed.), § 805, as follows:

nlO See, e.g., Ozter v. Haines, 411 11L 160,
103 N.E. 2d 485 (1952); Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K.
Transit Mix, Inc. 16 Ariz, App. 415, 493 P. 2d
1220 (1972).

"* * * 1. There must be conduct — acts, language, or
i lence -- amounting to a representation or a concealment
of material facts. 2. These facts must be known to the
party estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at least
the circumstances must be such that knowledge of diem
is necessarily imputed to him. 3. The truth concerning
these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming
the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when such conduct was done, and at the time when it was acted upon
by him. 4. The conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it [**595] will
be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will
be so acted upon. There are several familiar species in
which it is simply impossible to ascribe any intention or
even expectation to the party estopped that his conduct
will be acted upon by the one who afterwards claims the
benefit of the [*286] estoppel. 5. The conduct must be
relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must
be led to act upon it. 6. He must in fact act upon it in
such a manner as to change his position for the worse; in
other words, he must so act that he would suifer a loss if
he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what
he has done by reason of the first party being permitted
to repudiate his conduct and to assert rights inconsistent
yvith it "

nil "The fraud most commonly treated as taking
an agreement out of the Statute of Frauds is that
which consists in setting up the Statute against its
enforcement after the other party has been induced
to make expenditures or a change of situation * * *,
so that the refusal to complete the execution of the
agreement is not merely a denial of rights which it
was intended to confer, but the infliction of an unjust
and unconscionable injury and loss." 3 Williston,
Contracts (3 ed.) § 533A, p. 798.
See, e.g., Gem Corrugated Box Corp. v. National
Kraft Container Corp. 427F. 2d 499 (2 Cir. 1970);
Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co. 349 F. 2d 328 (6 Cir.
1965); Irving Tier Co. v. Griffin, 244 Cat App. 2d
852, 53 Col Rptr. 469 (1966); MoseHan v. Davis
Canning Co. 229 Col. App. 2d 118, 40 Col, Rptr,
157(1964).
We have given careful consideration to the various
views of the application of promissory estoppel to cases
involving oral contracts and hold that, under the facts
of this particular case, [*285] promissory estoppel was
not available to defendants so as to take the instant oral
contract out of the statute of frauds set forth in the UCC,
Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(1). nl2
nllAlbachtenv. Bradley, 212 Minn. 359,3N.W.
2d 783 (1942), relied on by defendants, does not
compel a contrary result. In that case, defendant by
making false promises intentionally induced plaintiff
to let the statute of limitations run. Despite a statute
which provided that a writing was necessary to make
a novation or a continuing contract that would extend the statute of limitations, we held that defendant
was estopped from raising the statute of limitations,
reasoning that he should not profit from his obvious
deceit. The case is obviously distinguishable on its
facts and is of only limited assistance here.
We next turn to the question of whether the trial court
was correct in holding that equitable estoppel did not
take the contract out of the statute of frauds. Equitable
estoppel is a type of equitable doctrine applicable not
only to the statute of frauds but also to any of a number of different claims and defenses. Elements of an
equitable estoppel are set forth in 3 Pomeroy, Equity

From Pomeroy's recitation of the elements, we recognize that equitable estoppel is akin to fraud. It does require a representation or concealment of material facts.
WB have previously held that the latter requirement is an
indispensible element of equitable estoppel. In Bremer
v. Commissioner of Taxation, 246 Minn. 446, 454, 75
N.W.2d 470, 475 (1956), we said:
"4 i i [{is fundamental that estoppel is based upon a
representation of fact and cannot exist as to an expression of opinion as distinguished from a representation of
fm "
WD agree with the trial court that defendants' offer of
proof contained no showing or representation or concealment of material facts. Thus, Roberts v. Friedell,
218 Minn. 88, 15 N.W. 2d 496 (1944), cited by defendants, is of no assistance despite the fact that we there
held that equitable estoppel would take an oral contract
out of the statute of frauds. That case, unlike the case
at bar, involved concealment of material facts. Thus,
we hold that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was not
proved by defendants so as to take the oral contract out
of the UCC statute of frauds, Minn. St. 336.2-201(1).
Commercial Unit

304 Minn. 275, *286; 230 N.W.2d 588, **595;
17 U.CC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 16
Defendants maintain that the trial court erred in not
permitting the question of whether a "bin of beans" is a
commercial unit to go to the jury. At the conference preliminary to trial, defendants offered to prove that within
the relevant market area farmers and grain-elevator operators frequently bought and sold beans by the bin.
[*287] From that offer of proof, defendants contend
(1) that a jury issue arose as to whether a bin of beans is a
commercial unit within the meaning of Minn. St. 336.2
— 105(6), nl3 and (2) that acceptance of any part of the
bin by the buyer constitutes acceptance of the entire bin
within the meaning of Minn. St. 336.2-606(2). nl4
The question then arises whether defendants' position
that the oral contract is taken out of the statute of frauds
by Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(3)(c) nl5 is tenable.
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payment has been made and accepted or which have
been received and accepted (section 336.2 — 606)."
We need not reach that issue since under our reading
of Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(3)(c) it is necessary that the
goods "have been received and accepted" before [**596]
avoidance of the statute of frauds is recognized. See,
Johnston Jewels, Ltd. v. Leonard, 156 Conn. 75, 239
A. 2d 500 (1968). The evidence is conclusive that defendants actually received only 4,020 bushels of beans.
As the partperformance exception to the statute of frauds
requires that one have received all of the goods for which
recovery is sought, defendants could not prevail even if
they could prove that by accepting a part of the bin of
beans, they accepted the whole.
Individual Liability

nl3 Minn.
St.
336.2 - 105(6) provides:
"'Commercial unit' means such a unit of goods as
by commercial usage is a single whole for purposes
of sale and division of which materially impairs its
character or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single article (as a machine)
or a set of articles (as a suite of furniture or an assortment of sizes) or a quantity (as a bale, gross, or
carload) or any other unit treated in use or in the
relevant market as a single whole."
nl4 Minn. St.
336.2 - 606(2) provides:
"Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire unit."
nl5Minn. St. 336.2 - 201(3)(c) provides: "A
contract which does not satisfy the requirements of
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable * * * (c) with respect to goods for which

Wfe reach the issue of whether the trial court erred in
entering judgment against Bruce Mitchell individually.
Although the joint answer and counterclaim of the defendants denied that he was [*288] a party to the contract
and alleged that he was at all relevant times acting as
agent for the corporate defendant, the agency issue apparently dropped out of the case at the time of die pretrial
conference.
Because die issue was not reserved in the pretrial order or at any subsequent time and because there was no
offer of proof nor any argument regarding that point,
the record is inadequate to determine on appeal whether
the agency issue was properly decided or whether there
was a genuine issue of material fact. Defendant's failure
to make a proper record precludes him from raising this
issue on appeal.
Affirmed.
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OPINION: [*539] [**88] Plaintiff seeks damages for
the breach of an oral agreement to sell 90,000 bushels
of corn. The District Court sustained a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's action
was barred by the statute of frauds. Plaintiff premises
this appeal on its theory that fact issues are present which
are not determinable at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment. Wfe affirm
Plaintiff-appellant, Farmland Service Coop, Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as Coop, alleges that Ross Klein,
acting on behalf of the defendants collectively, agreed
to sell it 90,000 bushels of corn. The corn was to be
No. 2 yellow corn and the sale price was $ 1.39 per
bushel, with delivery during June, July, and August.
Coop further alleges defendants knew it would rely on
defendants' agreement and immediately enter into resale
agreements with others.
The alleged sale agreement was entirely an oral telephone transaction. No written memorandum of any
[*540] nature was prepared or signed by the parties.
Nor was any letter confirming the transaction sent to the
defendants. The evidence does refer to a letter sent to the
defendants after the repudiation of the alleged contract.
That letter, however, while referred to in a deposition,
was never offered or received in evidence. Defendants
denied the existence of a contract. In their motion for
summary judgment defendants contend that became the
agreement alleged by Coop was an oral agreement for
the sale of goods for the price of $ 500 or more, the

196 Neb. 538, *540; 244 N.W.2d 86, **88;
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contract, if one existed, was not enforceable due to the
statute of frauds.
Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-201, provides
as follows: "(1) Except as otherwise provided in this
section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of
five hundred dollars or more is not enforceable by way
of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is
not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity
of goods shown in such writing.
"(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time
a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient
against the sender is received and the party receiving it
has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written
notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days
after it is received.
"(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements
of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable
"(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for
the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the
ordinary course of the seller's business and the [*541]
seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods
are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning
of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement; or
"(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court
that a contract [**89] for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the
quantity of goods admitted; or
"(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been
made and accepted or which have been received and accepted (section 2-606)."
In support of their motion, defendants offered the depositions of Louis, Ross, and Raymond Klein, all of
whom denied committing any grain to the Coop or the
existence of any contract with it. Defendants also offered the deposition of Howard Houser, Coop's grain
division manager, who testified that he was "relatively
sure" that defendants, after obtaining an offer from the
Coop, had phoned and accepted an offer of $ 1.39 per
bushel for 90,000 bushels of corn. To show reliance
on the sale agreement, Houser also identified exhibit
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1, a confirmation of purchase by Far-Mar-Co., Inc.,
from Farmland Service Coop, Inc., of 102,000 bushels
of com, dated March 31, 1973. This carries a notation "Klein Corn, 90000 Bu." He concedes, however,
that this notation was made by Coop sometime after the
confirmation form was received by it from Far-Mar-Co.
Coop produced no evidence in opposition to the motion for a summary judgment. The District Court sustained the motion " for the reason that the action is barred
by the Statute of frauds and for that reason no issue
remains." Coop, which made no showing by affidavit
or otherwise in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, now urges that its cause of action is based on
promissory estoppel and under that claim defendants'
defense of the statute of frauds raises many issues of
[*542] fact, which preclude the sustaining of a summary
judgment motion. There is no merit to these contentions.
The burden is upon the party moving for a summary
judgment to show that no issue of fact exists, and unless
he can conclusively do so, the motion must be overruled.
Upon a motion for summary judgment, the court examines the evidence, not to decide any issue of fact, but to
discover if any real issue of fact exists. In considering
a motion for summary judgment, the court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against
whom it is directed, giving to that party the benefit of
all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn
therefrom. SeePfeiferv. Pfeifer (1976), 195 Neb. 369,
238N. W.2d451.
Applying these rules, we are at a loss to see what factual issues Coop believes exist in the record before us.
The sale was for much more than $ 500. It was not
in writing. There was no written confirmation of the
contract. It was not within any of the exceptions enumerated in section 2-201(3), U.CC On the record, the
trial court properly sustained the motion for summary
judgment.
Coop urges that equity will not allow the statute of
frauds to be used as a shield for wrongdoing. In support of this point, it quotes the following from Hecht
v. Marsh (1920), 105 Neb. 502, 181 N W 135,17 A.
L. R. 1: "In Simonton, Jones & Hatcher v. Liverpool,
London & Globe Ins. Co., 51 Go. 76, the following
rule is announced: 'Equity will not allow the statute of
frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud, and will decree specific performance or hold the maker of a parol
contract estopped from denying it when the other party,
by virtue of it, and under and in pursuance of it, has so
far acted as that it would be aiding in a fraud to permit
the contract to be repudiated. And what equity would
do, our courts of law, under proper allegations, will also
do.'"

196 Neb. 538, *542; 244 N.W.2d 86, **89;
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Hecht v. Marsh, supra, involved a sale and exchange
[*543] of lands. The seller refused to sign the contract
unless the buyer put up forfeit money as evidence of
good faith. To induce the seller to waive this requirement, the broker orally agreed to waive his commission
if the transaction was not completed. When the contract
was not performed, the broker sued for his commission.
This court held that equity will not allow the statute of
frauds to be used as an instrument of fraud. Where a
party to a written contract within the statute of frauds
induces another to waive some provision [**90] upon
which he is entitled to insist and thereby change his position to his disadvantage because of that party's inducement, the inducing party will be estopped to claim that
such oral modification is invalid because not in writing.
This, however, is not the situation in the instant case.
Coop is laboring under a misapprehension. It is clear
to us that the mere breach or violation of an oral agreement which is specifically covered by the statute of
frauds by one of the parties thereto or the mere denial
of an agreement or refusal to perform it is not of itself a
fraud either in equity or in law for which the court should
give relief. The mere pleading of reliance on the contract to his detriment should not be sufficient to permit
a party to assert rights and defenses based on a contract
barred by the statute of frauds. If he were permitted to
do so, the statute of frauds would be rendered meaningless and nugatory. The mere failure to perform an oral
contract within the statute where no relation of trust and
confidence exists does not constitute fraud authorizing
the right to relief. In Hecht v. Marsh, supra, the broker
induced the seller to waive specific provisions of a written contract on his oral agreement to waive his fee. To
have permitted the broker to have used the statute on his
oral inducing agreement would have constituted a fraud
on the seller.
The plaintiffs petition is framed on the theory of
promissory estoppel, which generally is a promise by
one party upon which another relies to his detriment,
and [*544] which the promisor should reasonably have
foreseen would cause the promisee to so rely. It operates
not in regard to a part or presently existing state of facts
but rather to a situation which one party promises will
be true in the future. Unlike equitable estoppel, it gives
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rise to a cause of action for damages. In determining
whether promissory estoppel establishes a defense to the
statute of frauds, as contended by Coop, it is necessary
to analyze the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Section 90 of Restatement, Contracts 2d, TenL Di.
No. 2 (1965), states the doctrine of promissory estoppel
in the following terms: "A promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and
which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise. The remedy for breach may be limited as
justice requires."
Traditionally, the promissory estoppel claim has been
used to supply the element of consideration where to
refuse enforcement of a promise unsupported by a consideration would work an injustice to the party who relied to his detriment on the promise. Calamari&Perillo,
The Law of Contracts, §§ 99 to 105 (1970). W* do not
have such situation here.
Wfe note that section 2-201, U.CC, contains no
promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds.
The statute of frauds is still operative in this jurisdiction.
It applies to the enforcement of oral contracts except as
otherwise provided by section 2-201, U.CC The position we take is that promissory estoppel usually applies
only in cases where there is a promise or representation
as to an intended abandonment by the promisor of a legal
right which he holds or will hold against the promisee.
This was the situation present in the Hecht case. This
also is the interpretation which gives full effect to the
statute of frauds rather than rendering it nugatory as
the interpretation urged by Coop would [*545] do. In
reference to this position, we determine section 90 of
Restatement, Contracts 2d, Tent. Dr. No. 2 (1965), is
limited in scope to informal contracts of a unilateral nature and its purpose in such instances is to dispense with
the requirements of consideration to support the promise
where it applies.
The motion for summary judgment was properly sustained. The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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OPINIONBY: PRES1 « »
OPINION: [*355] A Buyer of cotton brought this action against the Sellers to recover damages arising out
of the failure of the Sellers to deliver cotton to the Buyer
as promised orally, and for their failure to keep an oral
promise to sign and deliver a written contract that would
comply with the Statute of Frauds providing for the sale
of the cotton. The trial Court granted the summary judgment of the Defendant-Sellers on the basis of Section
2.201 of the Texas Business & Commerce Code, Statute
of Frauds. WB affirm.
Kenneth Newcomb, as agent for Royce Cooley, who in
turn was the agent of H. Molsen & Co., Inc., negotiated
with two farmers, Ernest B. Hicks and Norman Hicks,
for the sale of their 1973 cotton production on some
5,000 acres to Molsen. Molsen contends that a written agreement was arrived at between Newcomb and the
Hicks brothers; that the Hicks brothers agreed to sign it
but never did; and that in reliance on such agreement to
sign the contract, Molsen hedged its purchase by selling
an equivalent number of bales for delivery at harvest
time and suffered monetary damages when the Hicks
brothers did not sign the contract and subsequently sold
their cotton to another buyer after the price of cotton had
gone up.
The Appellant, Molsen, asserts that the trial Court
erred in granting the summary judgment as to each of

the Defendants because there is evidence to raise a fact
issue as to whether such Defendant is estopped to assert the Statute of Frauds. In upholding the defense of
the Statute of Frauds, the trial Court specifically states
in its judgment that it is done on the basis of Section
2.201, Tex.Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. That Section
provides that a contract for the sale of goods for the
price of $500.00 or more is not enforceable unless there
is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and signed by
the party against whom enforcement is sought There
is no contract of writing here, but Appellant [*356] alleges that the Appellees are precluded from asserting the
Statute of Frauds by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. That doctrine, in summary, may be said to be that
if a party promises to sign a writing in a situation within
the Statute of Frauds, and the other party relies on the
promise to his detriment, the promise may be enforced
as if the writing had been signed. See "Moore" Burger,
Inc. u Phillips Petroleum Company, 492 S.W.2d 934
(Tex. 1972); Cooper Petroleum Company v. LaGloria
Oil and Gas Company, 436 SM2d 889 (The 1969);
Comment: Wright, Promissory Estoppel Marches On —
Mooreburger, 28 Baylor L.Re* 703(1976).
WB are of the opinion that the application of the doctrine to this case must fail for the reason that there was no
complete agreement ever reached by the parties as to the
terms of the written contract. The written contract is not
before us, and there is some indication that it may be lost.
The finality of such agreement and the terms that were
agreed upon must be gleaned from the deposition of the
two Appellees and the agent Newcomb, who negotiated
with them. In deciding whether or not there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment,
evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as
true, and every reasonable inference must be indulged
in favor of the non-movants and any doubts resolved in
their favor. Wilcox v. St. Mary's University of San
Antonio, Inc, 531 S.W.2d589 (Tex. 1975). Reviewing
the evidence in that light, we conclude that no binding

550 S.W.2d 354, *356; 22 U.CC Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 294

agreement was reached as to a written contract. The
negotiations were carried on by Newcomb with the two
Hicks brothers, and, at that time, he filled in blanks on
a printed form contract. The best of the evidence is that
there were farms listed, the number of bales or acres
agreed upon, the price was agreed upon, and these items
were inserted on the written form; and that neither he
nor either of the Hicks brothers signed the writing. Mr.
Newcomb testified several times that the acceptance of
the contract or their signing of it was dependent on its
being approved by their attorney, Mr. John Shepherd.
He said at one point: "I typed up the statement and they
were to take it to Mr. Shepherd for his approval and for
him to look over and if it satisfied them, if it satisfied
Mr. Shepherd, they would accept the contract and sign
it." And at another point, the question to Mr. Newcomb
was: "All right. Now, was the agreement made from —
on that day?" Answer: "Well, it was my understanding
that it would — if it was approved by their attorney that it
would be acceptable." When asked what report he made
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to his principal, Mr. Cooley, he said: "That they had
agreed to accept his offer and that they would sign the
contract as soon as it was acceptable — as soon — if it was
a satisfactory contract with their attorney." Additionally,
there was testimony by Mr. Newcomb that there were
certain changes to be made in the printed form of the
contract, and that he never knew whether those changes
were ever made or not after the contract was taken to
the attorney. He gave the contract to the Appellees to
take to their attorney; and in response to a question as to
whether when they left his office, the Appellees still had
some question about the contract, he responded: "Yes.
They were going to satisfy themselves." As indicated,
the writing prepared by Mr. Newcomb is not in evidence, but we are of the opinion that whatever its terms
were, there was no meeting of the minds as to the final
terms and no acceptance by the Appellees of the writings.
The trial Court properly applied the Statute of Frauds,
as there was no contract in writing. The judgment of the
trial Court is affirmed.
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suant to 28 US.C. § 656Xc)(l).
I. BACKGROUND.

PRIOR HISTORY:
Appeal from the United Stat
Eastern District of Missouri.
COUNSEL: Bernard L. Ballon, Kansas
for Appellant.
Samuel C Ebling, St. Louis, Missouri, for Appellee.
JUDGES: Ross, Circuit Judge, Bright, Senior C'i " ., It
Judge, and Nichol, * Senior District Judge.
* The HONORABLE FRED J. NICHOL, Senior
United States District Judge for District of South
Dakota, sitting by designation.

OPINION: [*124] BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge.
Delaware McDonald's Corp. (McDonald's) appeals
from a judgment of the United States Magistrate nl finding McDonald's liable to Dr. John A. Mahoney under
the doctrine of promissory estoppel for failing to execute a lease upon a newly purchased building. For
reversal, McDonald's argues that the magistrate erred
as follows: (1) in concluding that one Jack Baringer had
apparent authority to act on behalf of McDonald's, (2)
in concluding that liability existed under the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, and (3) in calculating the amount
of damages. We affirm the determination of liability on
the basis of promissory estoppel but remand for further
consideration of the damages.
nl The Hon. David D. Noce, United States
Magistrate, presiding by consent of the parties pur-

Mahoney owned two buildings located at 105 and
107 North Eighth Street in St. Louis, Missouri. In
the late fall of 1978, Mahoney had conversations with
Jack Baringer, a real estate representative in McDonald's
St. Louis Regional Office, exploring the possibility of
locating a McDonald's restaurant in Mahoney's buildings. In early 1979, Baringer visited the building at
107 North Eighth Street and indicated McDonald's interest in acquiring a larger store. Mahoney observed that
the adjoining building at 109 North Eighth, although
the same size as the 107 building, could be enlarged
by the construction of an addition. Mahoney suggested
that he could purchase the 109 building and lease it to
McDonald's.
On March 10, 1979, Mahoney and his attorney,
William Bowles, met Baringer at McDonald's Regional
Office to discuss a lease on the 109 building. Baringer
advised Mahoney and Bowles at this meeting that any
lease would be approved by the St. Louis Regional
Office and then had to be formally reviewed and approved at McDonald's Oak Brook, Illinois office. At
or before this meeting, Mahoney received a specimen copy of McDonald's store lease form which gives
McDonald's a conditional right of cancellation. n2
n2 If it is determined from the Lessee's inspection
that the premises cannot be altered or remodeled in
order for the Lessee to utilize the demised premises
for a McDonald's Restaurant, or that the premises
contain frontage, depth, or square footage leas than
the amount in the building plan, or that the utility
lines are not adequate, then the Lessee shall have the
right to notify the Lessor of its intention to cancel
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this Lease, in which event this Lease shall terminate
without further liability to either party.
On May 2, 1979, Mahoney executed an earnest money
contract to purchase the 109 building and land for
$300,000. The contract permitted Mahoney to terminate the purchase agreement for any reason within sixty
days and receive a refund of his $1,000 earnest money
deposit. On May 7, Mahoney and his attorney again met
with Baringer at McDonald's Regional Office to negotiate several modifications Mahoney wished to make in
McDonald's form lease. At this meeting, the parties
agreed to a twenty-year lease, annual rental starting at
$19,500, and an occupancy date of August 15. Mahoney
advised Baringer of his sixty-day option contract on the
109 building. [*125] On May 11, 1979, Mahoney's attorney sent a letter to Baringer enclosing a copy of the
option contract on the 109 building and an addendum to
McDonald's form lease based on the parties' May 7 negotiations. In early June, Baringer informed Mahoney
on at least two occasions that a lease would be forwarded
as soon as it was typed.
On June 29, Mahoney had not yet received a lease.
He called Baringer and advised him that the option on
the 109 building would end on July 1. Mahoney asked
Baringer if the parties had a deal and Baringer replied,
"WB have a deal. Do you want to blow it?" Baringer
stated that the lease was coming. On July 1, Mahoney
exercised his option to purchase the 109 building and
deposited an additional $9,000 earnest money.
On July 2, Baringer notified Mahoney that the
lease was ready and Mrs. Mahoney picked it up at
McDonald's Regional Office. Upon reviewing the
lease, Mahoney's attorney discovered that the rental
amount differed from the amount agreed upon at the May
7 meeting and that McDonald's had typed the lease on
a different lease form. On July 10, Mahoney contacted
Baringer and objected to the changes. Baringer agreed
to increase the rental to the amount agreed upon and to
retype the lease on the form McDonald's had originally
supplied. Mahoney agreed to one change in the terms
of the addenda: Rather than requiring McDonald's to
pay one-third of the cost for remodeling the facade of
the 109 building, McDonald's contribution would not
exceed $10,000.
Sometime between July 20 and July 25, Baringer forwarded a corrected lease form to Mahoney. This lease
was on the form originally furnished to Mahoney, provided for a rental of $19,500 per year and incorporated the May 11 addenda verbatim. The only difference between this lease and the agreement reflected in
the May 11 letter was a "Work Addendum" added by

Page 34
LEXSEE

McDonald'8 which limited McDonald's contribution for
the facade remodeling to $10,000 and which provided
that McDonald's would install its own entrance doors.
Mahoney signed the revised lease on July 25 and returned it to McDonald's. He changed the date of occupancy from August 15 to September 1 and noted on
McDonald's work addendum that McDonald's would
provide entrance door frames as well as doors. On July
31, Mahoney closed the sale on the 109 building.
In late August 1979, Robert Doran, McDonald's
senior manager for the St. Louis region, inspected
the 109 building site and advised Mahoney that the
site was not acceptable to him. On September 12,
Mahoney visited McDonald's Regional Office and met
Webb Blessley, who identified himself as Baringer's supervisor. Blessley stated he was taking over the matter of leasing the 109 building and informed Mahoney
that McDonald's was having second thoughts about the
location. Mahoney talked to Blessley about enlarging
the 109 building by constructing an addition. In a letter dated October 3, 1979, Mahoney offered to construct an addition and lease McDonald's a total of 5,000
square feet for $34,000 per year. Mahoney indicated
that this letter "would serve to waive the August 1979
lease." This proposal did not satisfy McDonald's and on
October 12, 1979 Blessley wrote to Mahoney formally
terminating negotiations and returning the lease which
Mahoney had signed.
In March 1980, Mahoney leased the ground floor
of the 109 building to Greiner's Submarine Sandwich
Shops, Inc. for five years at $19,200 per year. Greiner's
terminated its lease on December 31, 1981 by leaving in
the middle of the night. Mahoney also made several attempts to sell the 109 building as part of a package with
his buildings at 105 and 107 North Eighth. From March
1981 to July 1981 he negotiated with Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company regarding the purchase of the buildings for $1,300,000. He then entered an option contract
with Donn Lipton, giving Lipton the right to purchase
the three buildings for $1,546,500. Unfortunately for
Mahoney, neither deal was consummated. In September
1983, Mahoney's wife [*126] opened a cafe on the
ground floor of the 109 building.
Mahoney claimed that he incurred $736,171.82 in
expenses related to the purchase of the 109 building;
$300,000 in purchase price debt and $436,171.82 in
interest, taxes, insurance, etc. Offset against these
expenses were the fair market value of the building,
$300,000, plus $107,217.24 in income received. Thus,
according to Mahoney, the expenses relating to the purchase exceeded the credits by $328,954.58. The magistrate adopted these debits and credits in assessing dam-

6

ages.
n. DISCUSSION.
A. Apparent Authority.
Before examining the magistrate's application of
promissory estoppel, we must first decide whether
McDonald's should be bound by Baringer's statements.
Under Missouri law, apparent authority exists when a
principal has created such an appearance of things that it
causes a third person reasonably and prudently to believe
that a second person has the power to act as the principal's agent. Thailv. Industrial Commission, Division of
Employment Security, 540 S.W2d 179, 181 (Mo. App.
1976); Dudley v. Dumont, 526 S.W2d 839, 845 (Mo.
App. 1975); see S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. Seaboard
Surety Co., 417F.U 1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 1969). The
magistrate concluded that Baringer had apparent authority to act as McDonald's agent because McDonald's had
placed him in a position where it was reasonable to
assume that he had authority to negotiate and execute
leases binding on McDonald's. Mahoney v. Delaware
McDonald's Corp., No. 80-665 C(4), slip op. at 15
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 1984).
McDonald's contends that it was not reasonable for
Mahoney to assume that Baringer had authority to act
on behalf of McDonald's. In support of this contention, it points to the magistrate's finding of fact
no. 8: "Baringer advised [Mahoney] that the lease
would be approved by the St. Louis Regional Office
and had to be formally reviewed and executed at
[McDonald's] Oak Brook, Illinois office." McDonald's
argues that Mahoney could not have reasonably believed
that Baringer had authority to bind McDonald's to a lease
once he knew that the lease was subject to review by the
Oak Brook office.
We disagree. In discussing the issue of apparent authority, the magistrate made the following statement: "The undersigned believes that Baringer advised [Mahoney] that the execution of the lease in Oak
Brook was a mere formality and that Baringer assured
[Mahoney] that a lease would be forthcoming." We regard this statement as a finding of fact, even though it
appears under the heading "CONCLUSIONS OF LAW."
See Elmore v. United States, 404 F.2d 56, 57 (6th Cir.
1968); Solway Metal Sales, Ltd. v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co., 120 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 344 E2d 568,
569 (D. C. Cir. 1965). Our review of the record indicates
that this finding is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly,
we accept the magistrate's conclusions that "[Mahoney]
had reason to believe and did believe that Baringer had
authority to enter binding lease agreements on behalf
of [McDonald's]." Thus, the magistrate did not err in
concluding that McDonald's was bound by Baringer's
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representations.
B. Promissory Estoppel.
Missouri's courts have stated that there are three elements to be satisfied before the doctrine of promissory
estoppel can be invoked: (1) a promise, (2) detrimental
reliance on the promise, and (3) injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. Mayer v. King
Cola Mid-America, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Mo.
App. 1983); Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S. W2d 121,
124 (Mo. App. 1980). The courts have also quoted favorably from section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts,
indicating that the "promise" requirement will only be
satisfied by a promise which the promisor "should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial nature." In re Jamison's Estate, 202
S.W.2d 879, 886 (Mo. 1947); Mayer v. King Cola
Mid-America, Inc., supra, 660 S. W2d at 749.
[*127] At trial, Mahoney argued that the elements of
promissory estoppel were present in this case because
he had purchased the building in reliance on Baringer's
promise that the parties had "a deal." The magistrate
found that Baringer had indeed made the promise and
that Mahoney had acted in reliance. Accordingly, he
held McDonald's liable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
McDonald's argues that none of the elements of
promissory estoppel are satisfied in this case. First, it
contends that it never promised to lease the 109 building
from Mahoney. In support of this contention, it states
that Baringer and Mahoney were still engaged in preliminary negotiations when Mahoney purchased the building and that Baringer never promised that McDonald's
would lease the building from Mahoney.
The magistrate properly rejected McDonald's "negotiation" contention. The only "negotiations" occurred
when Baringer attempted to alter the terms outlined in
Mahoney' s attorney' s letter dated May 11,1979 (memorializing the parties' May 7, 1979 agreement), and those
negotiations resulted in restoration of the agreed upon
terms. No other changes of any substance were made
to the parties' original agreement. McDonald's contention that Baringer never made a promise to Mahoney
is in direct conflict with the magistrate's finding of fact.
McDonald's attempts to reargue the evidence, but does
not assert that the finding was clearly erroneous. We
conclude that the finding is plausible in light of the conflicting evidence presented at the trial and, in deference
to the magistrate's superior position to determine the
credibility of the witnesses before him, we accept the
finding. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 105 S. a. 1504, 1512, 84 L Ed. 2d 518
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(1985). Accordingly, we conclude that the first element
of promissory estoppel is present in this case.
McDonald's next argues that Mahoney could not have
reasonably relied on Baringer's statement, "We have a
deal," because he knew that Baringer did not have the
authority to commit McDonald's to a lease. This argument simply repeats McDonald's earlier contention
that Mahoney knew that all leases had to be reviewed at
McDonald's Oak Park, Illinois office. We rejected that
contention in our discussion of apparent authority, and
we reject it here as well.
Finally, McDonald's argues that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel does not apply to this case because
the claim is barred by the statute of frauds and because
Mahoney waived the claim in his letter of October 3,
1979. The magistrate noted that, under Missouri law,
a court may enforce oral promises otherwise barred by
the statute of frauds if enforcement is necessary to prevent a deep-seated fraud or equitable wrong. He concluded that barring Mahoney's action in this case would
result in a deep-seated injustice because Mahoney not
only lost the promised lease, he also purchased a building and incurred substantial expenses. WB think this
is a permissible application of state law and we defer
to the magistrate's interpretation. The magistrate also
concluded that Mahoney's letter of October 3, 1979, in
which he stated, "This letter will also serve to waive
our previous lease," did not constitute a waiver, because
waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right
and there was no evidence that Mahoney used the word
in its legal sense. Ws agree.
We conclude that the magistrate did not err in applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel to the facts in
this case. Mahoney could have allowed his option on
the subject property to lapse. He acted further and purchased the building only when assured by Baringer that
"we have a deal." These events, together with the obvious injustice which would result if Mahoney is left
holding an empty bag, are sufficient to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
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that loan. During this period, he also paid $31,828.99
for taxes, insurance, etc. on the building. The magistrate concluded that Mahoney was entitled to receive
100% of these expenses as part of his reliance damages.
McDonald's contends that the magistrate erred in awarding 100% of the expenses. It argues that Mahoney's
damages should be limited to exclude the amount he
could have avoided by acting prudently when he learned
that McDonald's had repudiated the lease.
Ws think McDonald's contention has merit Under
section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the
remedy in promissory estoppel cases "may be limited
as justice requires." It would be unjust for Mahoney
to hold the 109 building indefinitely while McDonald's
paid interest on the purchase price. Instead, Mahoney
was entitled to a reasonable time to sell the building
or make an alternative disposition of it. His expenses
during this time, plus any loss sustained on the disposition of the building, would constitute his just reliance
damages.
The record does not indicate that Mahoney ever made
any attempt to sell the 109 building after McDonald's
breached the lease. There is no indication that the building was not marketable; in fact, the magistrate found
that it had a fair market value of $300,000. If Mahoney
could have sold the building for $300,000 in 1979, we
must conclude that his failure to do so was baaed on his
decision that he could do better for himself by making
an alternative disposition of the building. n3 Therefore,
once Mahoney decided to keep the building, he was no
longer acting in reliance on McDonald's promise, he
was acting on the basis of his own decision.
n3 For example, he might have concluded that
he could do better by selling the 109 building in
a "package" with the two contiguous buildings that
he already owned. In fact, Mahoney has negotiated
with both Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
and Donn Lipton regarding a package deal on all
three buildings.

C Damages.
Under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, damages
may be measured by the extent of the promisee's reliance. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 comment d (1979). In other words, our objective in this
case is to reimburse Mahoney for the [*128] expenses
he incurred in reliance on McDonald's promise to lease
the 109 building.
Mahoney borrowed the entire $300,000 used to purchase the 109 building. From July 1979 to November
1983, he claims that he paid $404,342.83 in interest on

In March of 1980, Mahoney decided to lease the
ground floor of the building to a sandwich shop. This
occurred five months after McDonald's terminated discussions and returned the lease documents to Mahoney.
On the basis of the above analysis, we conclude that
this lease represented Mahoney's decision to keep the
property in spite of McDonald's refusal to execute a
lease. We think that the five months Mahoney actually
spent in deciding what disposition to make of the building was a reasonable time under the facts of this case.
Accordingly, we conclude that Mahoney is entitled to
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reimbursement for the interest and other expenses incurred prior to March 1980. Subsequent expenses are
Mahoney's responsibility because they represent a calculated risk on his part to hold on to the building instead
of selling it outright.
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HI. CONCLUSION.
We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for a
redetermination of damages consistent with this opinion.
No costs are awarded in this appeal.
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May 6, 1993, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1]
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from
Court of Common Pleas. Case No. 186,890
DISPOSITION: Judgment accordingly.
COUNSEL: Marshall I. Nurenberg, for appellant.
James T. Crowley, Keith L. Carson and Kathleen B.
Df Angelo, for appellees.
JUDGES: Nugent, Judge. Blackmon, J., concurs. John
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OPINIONBY: NUGENT
OPINION: [*615] This is an appeal from the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the motion for summary judgment filed jointly by defendantsappellees [*616] First Union Management, Inc. and
First Union Real Estate Equity and Mortgage Investment
(collectively, "First Union") against plaintiff-appellant
McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Haiman Co., L.P.A.
("McCarthy, Lebit").
Pertinent to this appeal, McCarthy, Lebit's amended
complaint asserts claims for relief of, among other
things, nl breach of contract and promissory estoppel
(first claim for relief), fraud (third claim for relief)
and negligent misrepresentation (fourth claim for relief).
McCarthy, Lebit* s amended complaint generally alleges
that First Union, the owner and manager of real property commonly known as 55 Public Square, Cleveland,
Ohio (the Illuminating Building), breached an oral lease
agreement [**2] entered into with McCarthy, Lebit for
space in the above premises. In separate answers, both
First Union entities denied that an oral lease agreement had been entered into and raised the defense that
McCarthy, Lebit's claims were barred by the statute of
frauds. Additionally, First Union Management asserted

a counterclaim for unpaid operating expenses, which was
subsequently dismissed.
nl McCarthy, Lebit's other claims for relief were
dismissed at various stages throughout the proceedings. Count two, alleging intentional interference
with business relationships, was dismissed without
prejudice by stipulation of the parties. Count five,
alleging conversion for overcharges, was dismissed
with prejudice, and count six, alleging mail and wire
fraud in violation of Sections 1341 and 1962, Title
18, U.S.Code, was withdrawn.
On March 25, 1991, First Union moved for summary judgment on McCarthy, Lebit's remaining claims
for breach of an oral lease agreement and promissory
estoppel, fraud and negligent misrepresentation. [**3]
McCarthy, Lebit duly opposed First Union's motion.
Evidentiary materials submitted in support of and in opposition to First Union's motion indicate that McCarthy,
Lebit occupied space in the Illuminating Building since
1961. In 1989, McCarthy, Lebit occupied a total of
9,565 square feet of space under two separate leases,
both of which were scheduled to expire on November
1, 1989. Sometime in the spring of 1989, the parties
entered into negotiations to renew McCarthy, Lebit's
existing space as well as to occupy space being vacated
by another tenant ("Sweeney space").
McCarthy, Lebit partners Larry Crystal and Irwin
Haiman were appointed by the law firm to negotiate a
new lease with First Union for the space then occupied,
as well as the Sweeney space which the firm intended
to occupy. In preparation for negotiations, Crystal reviewed the existing leases between McCarthy, Lebit and
First Union, as well as a lease between another tenant,
represented by Crystal, and First Union. Crystal was
well aware that each lease contained a legend on its face
and on the signature page stating that:
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"This Lease is being forwarded for your approval and
execution on the understanding that it shall [**4] not become effective until it is accepted by the Landlord and
its counsel and executed by the Landlord."
[*617] Crystal, on deposition, stated that the legend
meant "exactly what it says."
Subsequently, on April 13, 1988, Crystal and Haiman
met with Arthur Roth, then an assistant vice president
of leasing at First Union Management, at the offices of
McCarthy, Lebit. At that time, Roth was responsible for
obtaining new tenants and renewing existing tenants in
the Illuminating Building. At that meeting, Crystal informed Roth that McCarthy, Lebit was interested only in
a "good deal" because it had received solicitations from
other nearby buildings seeking tenants. Roth testified
that First Union wanted McCarthy, Lebit to remain in
the building because it was a very prestigious law firm
and had always paid its rent on time. Roth put forth
two proposals: one was a five-year lease renewal at $
13 per square foot with an option for another five years
at market rates; and the other was a ten-year lease renewal with a base rental rate of $ 12.50 per square foot
for the first five years and $ 13.50 per square foot for
the second five years. Crystal and Haiman both asserted
that the [**5] parties agreed to the second option and that
McCarthy, Lebit would also obtain the adjacent Sweeney
space at the same rate that Sweeney was paying until his
lease expired. The Sweeney space would be added into
the McCarthy, Lebit lease before the date upon which
Sweeney was to vacate his space. Both parties agreed to
leave open for further discussion the base year (1987 or
1988) and denominator (leased space or leasable space)
to be utilized in connection with the escalation clause in
any lease that might be entered into. Other provisions
for the lease would reflect the standard lease employed
in the past by First Union and other tenants in the building. At the conclusion of the meeting, Roth indicated to
both Crystal and Haiman that he would need to discuss
the deal with his superior at First Union, Dan Nixon.
Likewise, Crystal and Haiman indicated that they had to
discuss the proposal with their partners. The three men
then shook hands to seal the deal.
Following the meeting, Crystal prepared a memorandum to his partners discussing the offer submitted by
Roth and discussing the differences between the parties with respect to the base year and leased-vs.-leasable
space. That [**6] same day, the partners of McCarthy,
Lebit met to discuss the proposed lease agreement. They
then prepared a wish list which they hoped to have added
to the lease. The following day, Haiman and Roth met to
discuss the wish list. Roth rejected McCarthy, Lebit's
wish list. Subsequently, Haiman informed Roth that
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McCarthy, Lebit accepted the terms of the agreement
reached at the April 13, 1988 meeting. Additionally,
Irwin Haiman averred that he and Roth agreed that the
base year would be 1988 and that the rent would be determined by calculating on the basis of leasable space as
opposed to leased space.
Following this meeting, Roth discussed the entire
agreement with his supervisor, Dan Nixon, who approved the deal. Roth then told McCarthy, Lebit that
the parties had a deal and that he would begin die paperwork. However, the [*618] paperwork could not be
completed at that time because First Union did not know
the date upon which the Sweeney space would be available for McCarthy, Lebit* s occupancy.
Over the next few months, Haiman repeatedly contacted Roth to determine when a written lease agreement would be prepared. Roth repeatedly indicated that
a written lease agreement would [**7] be forthcoming
and that the only reason for the delay was that First
Union was behind in its paperwork. In reliance upon
Roth's assurances, McCarthy, Lebit did not look for
other space.
As early as July 1989, when George Sirow became
Roth's supervisor, Roth knew that First Union did not
intend to honor the agreement reached with McCarthy,
Lebit and that First Union planned on presenting new
terms to the lease agreement as well as represent to
McCarthy, Lebit that Roth did not possess authority to
bind First Union. However, it was not until August 1989
that Sirow, First Union's vice-president of operations,
and Roth requested a meeting with Crystal and Haiman
to discuss the lease agreement. At this meeting, Sirow,
for the first time, asserted that Roth lacked authority
to bind First Union and that the rental price would be
increased by three dollars per square foot. McCarthy,
Lebit refused to pay this price, did not sign a lease with
First Union, and eventually moved their offices from the
Illuminating Building.
Finally, Crystal's deposition testimony indicates that
he and other attorneys at McCarthy, Lebit represented
other tenants of the Illuminating Building in negotiations [**8] with First Union. On those occasions, the
person with whom the McCarthy, Lebit attorneys dealt
was Arthur Roth. Crystal stated that leases orally negotiated with Roth were honored by First Union. Over
the years, Roth had developed an expertise in these negotiations and a reputation that his word could be relied
upon.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court granted First
Union's motion for summary judgment. McCarthy,
Lebit timely appeals, raising the following assignments
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of error:
"I. The court erred in granting summary judgment to
the defendants by finding that the theory of promissory
estoppel was not applicable to the evidence.
"II. The court erred in granting defendants' motion
for summary judgment by concluding that there was no
evidence to support a jury finding that the defendants
were liable for negligent misrepresentation.
"HI. The court erred in granting defendants' motion
for summary judgment by finding that a contract was
not in existence.
"IV. The court erred in granting defendants' motion
for summary judgment by finding that any oral agreement on the facts of this case was unenforceable under the
statute of frauds (Ohio Revised Code Sections 1335.04,
1335.05)."
[*619][**9]I
McCarthy, Lebit's first, third and fourth assignments
of error are interrelated and will, therefore, be considered jointly. Collectively, McCarthy, Lebit argues the
trial court erred in granting First Union's motion for
summary judgment. In its first assignment of error,
McCarthy, Lebit contends that a material issue of fact
exists on its separate claim for relief based on promissory estoppel. In its third and fourth assignments of
error, McCarthy, Lebit argues that a material issue of
fact exists as to whether an oral lease agreement was
established under the facts of the present case and that
such agreement was not barred by the statute of frauds
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
A court reviewing the granting of a summary judgment must follow the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56(C).
Stegawskiv. Cleveland Anesthesia Group, Inc. (1987),
370hioApp.3d 78,523N.E.2d902. Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment can be granted, it
must be determined that "(1) [n]o genuine issue as to
any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it
appears from [**10] the evidence that reasonable minds
can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom
the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party." Temple v. Vkan United,
Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 0.0.3d 466,
472,364N.E.2d267,274.
In Viock v. Stowe-Vtoodward Co. (1983), 13 Ohio
App.3d 7, 14-15, 13 OBR 8, 16, 467 N.E.2d 1378,
1386, the court held in pertinent part that:
"Wfe recognize that summary judgment, pursuant to
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Civ.R. 56, is a salutary procedure in the administration
of justice. It is also, however, a procedure which should
be used cautiously and with the utmost care so that a litigant's right to a trial, wherein the evidentiary portion
of the litigant's case is presented and developed, is not
usurped in the presence of conflicting facts and inferences. * * * It is settled law that '[t]he inferences to
be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the affidavits and other exhibits must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion * *
[**11] *' which party in the instant case is appellant.
Hounshellv. American States Ins. Co. (1981), 67 Ohio
St.2d427, 433[21 0.0.3d 267, 271, 424 N.E.2d3U,
314]; see Far Eastern Textile, Ltd. v. City National
Bank & Trust Co. (S.D.Ohio 1977), 430 ESupp. 193,
196. It is imperative to remember that the purpose of
summary judgment is not to try issues of fact, but rather
to determine whether triable issues of fact exist"
The first issue presented by McCarthy, Lebit's appeal is whether a material issue of fact exists concerning
McCarthy, Lebit's claim that the parties reached an oral
lease agreement. If this court should find that McCarthy,
Lebit failed to raise a material issue of fact regarding the
existence of an oral lease [*620] agreement, then the issue of the applicability of the statute of frauds barring
enforcement of said oral lease agreement would be rendered moot. Moreover, McCarthy, Lebit's claim based
on promissory estoppel would also be rendered moot
since McCarthy, Lebit's complaint alleges that it detrimentally relied upon the alleged oral lease "to forebear
accepting any [**12] other offers to lease space." Given
the allegations and posture of the present cause of action,
it becomes apparent that McCarthy, Lebit's reliance on
the doctrine of promissory estoppel is stated as a shield
to bar First Union from raising the statute of frauds. n2
n2 In McCarthy, Lebit's first assignment of error, McCarthy, Lebit argues that it asserted a separate claim for relief based on promissory estoppel in count one of its complaint. However, in its
brief in opposition to First Union's motion for summary judgment filed with the trial court, McCarthy,
Lebit states: "Plaintiff has pled two separate and
distinct claims for relief — one in oral contract
supported by promissory estoppel; and one in tort
for the negligent misrepresentations of defendants."
Accordingly, McCarthy, Lebit failed to raise a separate claim for relief for promissory estoppel with
the trial court. It is a well established principle of
law in Ohio that a party cannot raise new issues for
the first time on appeal. Addyston Village School
Dist. Bd. ofEdn. v. Nolte Tillar Bros. Constr.
Co. (1943), 71 Ohio App. 469, 26 OO 379, 49
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N.E.2d99; State Planters Bank <ScThust Co. v. FiftyThird Union Trust Co. (1937), 56 Ohio App. 309,
9 O. O. 29?\ 10 N.E.2d 935; Killer v. Shaw (1932),
45 Ohio App. 303, 187 N.E. 130. In any event,
this court concludes, infra, that a separate claim for
relief based on promissory estoppel is barred by the
statute of frauds.
[**13]
In its legal sense, the word "contract" includes every
description of agreement or obligation, whether verbal
or written, whereby one party becomes bound to another
to pay a sum of money or to perform or omit to do a
certain act. Terex Corp. v. Grim Voiding Co. (1989),
58 Ohio App.3d 80, 568 N.E.2d 739, paragraph one of
the syllabus. An enforceable contract may be created
where there is an offer by one side, acceptance on the
part of the other, and a meeting of the minds as to the
essential terms of the agreement. 17 Ohio Jurisprudence
3d (1980), Contracts, Section 17. An essential element
needed to form a contract is that the parties must have a
distinct and common intention which is communicated
by each party to the other. Noroski v. Fallet (1982), 2
Ohio SUd 77, 2 OBR 632, 442 N.E.2d 1302; Vbbash
Elevator Co. v. First Natl. Bank (1872), 23 Ohio St.
311. If the minds of the parties have not met, no contract is formed. Noroski, supra, 2 Ohio St. 3d at 79,2
OBR at 633, 442 N.E.2d at 1304. [**14]
A contract is binding and enforceable if it encompasses
the essential terms of the agreement. Mr. Mark Corp.
v. Rush, Inc. (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 167, 11 OBR
259, 464 N.E. 2d 586. Minor terms left unresolved do
not vitiate an agreement if essential terms have been incorporated into the agreement. Id.
This court has previously noted, in Mr. Mark Corp.,
supra, at 169, 11 OBR at 261, 464 N.E.2d at 589-590,
that the modern view of contractual certainty is well expressed in Restatement of the Law 2d, Contracts (1981)
92, Section 33:
[*621] "(1) Even though a manifestation of intention
is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be
accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the
contract are reasonably certain.
"(2) The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if
they provide a basis for determining the existence of a
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.
"(3) The fact that one or more terms of a proposed
bargain are left open or uncertain may show that a manifestation of intention is not intended to be understood as
an offer or as [**15] an acceptance." See, also, Corbin
on Contracts (1963), Section 95.
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Comment a to Section 33 of the Restatement adds:
"[T]he actions of the parties may show conclusively
that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement,
even though one or more terms are missing or are left
to be agreed upon. In such cases courts endeavor, if
possible, to attach a sufficiently definite "v^nmg to the
bargain.
"An offer which appears to be indefinite may be given
precision by usage or trade or by course of dealing between the parties. Terms may be supplied by factual
implication, and in recurring situations the law often
supplies a term in the absence of agreement to the contrary. * * * Where the parties have intended to conclude
a bargain, uncertainty as to incidental or collateral matters is seldom fatal to the existence of the contract."
Comment f to Section 33 notes at 95:
"The more important the uncertainty, the stronger the
indication is that the parties do not intend to be bound;
minor items are more likely to be left to the option of one
of the parties or to what is customary or reasonable."
Further, with respect to the authority of an agent to
bind his principal to a lease agreement, [**16] we note
that:
"The issue here is not actual authority, but, rather, apparent authority or agency by estoppel. The terms are
equivalent and based upon the same elements. Logsdon
u ABCO Construction Co. (1956), 103 Ohio App. 233
[3 aa2d289,141
N.E.2d216J. In Logsdon, the court
defined apparent authority as follows:
"'"This authority to act as agent may be conferred if
the principal affirmatively or intentionally, or by lack of
ordinary care, causes or allows third persons to act on an
apparent agency. It is essential that two important facts
be clearly established: (1) That the principal held the
agent out to the public as possessing sufficient authority
to embrace the particular act in question, or knowingly
permitted him to act as having such authority, and (2)
that the person dealing with the agent knew of die facts
and acting in good faith had reason to believe [*622]
and did believe that the agent possessed the necessary
authority. * * *"' Id. at 241-242 [3 0.0.2dat 293-294,
141 N.E.2d at 223]." Ammerman v. Avis Rent A Car
System (1982), 7 Ohio App. 3d 338, 340-341, 7 OBR
436, 438-439, 455 N.E.2d 1041, 1044-1045. [**!7]
In the present case, the record reveals that McCarthy,
Lebit partners Crystal and Haiman met with First
Union's vice-president of leasing, Arthur Roth, to negotiate a lease renewal. Roth put forth two lease proposals. Roth, Crystal and Haiman all agreed that McCarthy,
Lebit accepted the second option for a ten-year lease re-
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newal with a base rent of $ 12.50 per square foot for
the first five years and $ 13.50 per square foot for the
second five years. Crystal and Haiman both also asserted that McCarthy, Lebit would occupy the Sweeney
space at the same rate Sweeney was paying until his
lease expired. The Sweeney space would be added into
the McCarthy, Lebit lease before the date upon which
Sweeney was to vacate his space. Other provisions of
the lease would reflect the standard lease used by First
Union. Although the base year and denominator were
left for further discussion and the parties indicated that
approval of their respective partners and/or supervisors
was necessary, the three men shook hands to seal the
deal. The next day, Haiman presented Roth with a wish
list, which Roth rejected. Haiman then informed Roth
that McCarthy, Lebit accepted the terms of the agreement
[**18] reached on April 13, 1988. Haiman, further,
averred that an agreement was reached that the base year
would be 1988 and that the rent would be determined by
calculating on the basis of leasable space as opposed to
leased space. In addition, Roth testified that he believed
the parties had reached an agreement. Finally, Roth
made numerous assurances to Haiman that he would begin the paperwork on the agreement and that a written
lease agreement would be forthcoming. These continuous assurances by Roth signified Roth's authoritative
position in these negotiations as well as emphasizing that
the agreement was completed.
First Union argues that at least three essential and material terms of the alleged oral lease agreement were left
unresolved. Consequently, First Union argues there was
no meeting of the minds to form an oral lease agreement.
Initially, First Union argues that there was no agreement
as to which portion of the Sweeney space McCarthy,
Lebit was to rent or a date upon which McCarthy, Lebit
could occupy said space. However, an examination of
the record reveals that McCarthy, Lebit raised a material
issue of fact regarding the essential elements of the agreement. The affidavit [**19] of Irwin Haiman indicates
that McCarthy, Lebit was to lease that portion of the
space which included Sweeney's office and a conference
room. Moreover, the deposition testimony of Arthur
Roth reveals that the lease renewal was to take effect in
November 1989 and that the Sweeney space would be
added into the McCarthy, Lebit lease before the [*623]
date when Sweeney was to vacate his space. Finally,
First Union argues that the parties never agreed upon a
lease year or a denominator for calculating leasing obligations. However, Haiman's affidavit asserts that the
parties agreed that the rental rate would be calculated on
a 1988 base year and it would be based on leasable (as
opposed to leased) space. Accordingly, we conclude that
the evidentiary materials presented by McCarthy, Lebit
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are sufficient to raise a material issue of fact regarding
whether an oral lease agreement was entered. Wing v.
Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108,
570 N.E.2d 1095. McCarthy, Lebit's third assignment
of error is therefore sustained.
Having determined that McCarthy, Lebit raised a
material issue of fact regarding the existence of an
[*+20] oral lease agreement, this court must next decide whether, under the present circumstances, Ohio's
statute of fraud bars recovery. Ohio has two relevant
statutes of frauds. R.C 1335.05 provides in pertinent
part:
"No action shall be brought whereby to charge the
defendant, * * * upon a contract of sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or interest in or concerning
them, * * * unless the agreement upon which such action
is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in
writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith
or some other person thereunto by him or her lawfully
authorized."
More specifically, R.C 1335.04 provides:
"No lease, estate, or interest, either of freehold or
term of years, or any uncertain interest of, in, or out of
lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall be assigned or
granted except by deed, or note in writing, signed by
the party assigning or granting it, or his agent thereunto
lawfully authorized, by writing, or by act and operation
of law."
It is well established in Ohio that courts of equity
may bar application of the statute of frauds. For instance, an oral lease will be taken out of the statute of
frauds by partial performance. Egner v. Egner (1985),
24 Ohio App.3d 171, 24 OBR 261, 493 N.E2d 999;
[**21] Cuvier Press Club v. Fourth & Race St. Assoc.
(1981), 1 OhioApp.3d30,1 OBR 150, 439N.EL2d443.
Further, the statute of frauds may not be interposed in
furtherance of fraud. Manifold v. Schuster (1990), 67
Ohio App.3d 251, 254, 586 N.E.2d 1142, 1144. The
above exceptions to application of the statute of frauds
exist in recognition that the historical purpose behind
the statute is to prevent the furtherance of fraud. See,
e.g., Manifold, supra; Ayres v. Cook (1942), 140 Ohio
St. 281, 23 O.O. 491, 43 N.E.2d 287; Wilbur v. Paine
(1824), 1 Ohio St. 251; Ardinger v. Bell (App. 1934),
17 Ohio Law Abs. 438; and TUscarawas S. &L Co. v.
Jarvis (App. 1931), 11 Ohio Law Abs. 357.
To defeat application of the above statutes, McCarthy,
Lebit argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppel,
as a separate and distinct claim for relief, is not [*624]
barred by the statute of frauds (first [**22] assignment
of error). Additionally, McCarthy, Lebit argues that the
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doctrine of promissory estoppel, in appropriate circumstances, may estop the opposing party from using the
statute to vitiate an otherwise enforceable oral contract
(fourth assignment of error).
In Ohio, the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been
adopted as it is stated in the Restatement of the Law 2d,
Contracts (1973), Section 90, which provides:
"A promise which the promisor should reasonably
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of
the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
McCroskeyv.
State(1983),80hioSt.3d29,80BR339,
456 N.E.2d 1204; Talley v. Teamsters Local No. 377
(1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 142, 2 0.0.3d 297, 357N.E.2d
44. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is also recognized as an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
in employment contract disputes providing for a separate claim for relief and recovery. Wing, supra; [**23]
Helmick v. Cincinnati Vbrd Processing, Inc. (1989),
45 Ohio St.3d 131, 543 N.E.2d 1212; Mers v. Dispatch
Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St. 3d 100, 19 OBR 261,
483 N.E.2d 150.
Promissory estoppel may also be used as an equitable
doctrine which may be asserted as a separate cause of action based upon a promise which has induced reliance.
R. Renaissance, Inc. v. Rohm <fe Haas Co. (S.D.Ohio
1987), 674F.Supp. 591 (applying Ohio law); and Allen
v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. (N.D.Ohio 1988),
707ESupp. 309 (applying Ohio law).
First Union relies on Seale v. Citizens S. <fc L. Assn.
(C.A.6, 1986), 806 F.2d 99 (applying Ohio law) for
the proposition that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
cannot be used to take a claim for an oral agreement
to purchase or lease real estate outside the reach of the
statute of frauds. In Seale, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that:
"Real estate transactions are usually formal undertakings involving significant sums of money. Because they
have the potential [**24] to affect the actions and interests of third parties, these transactions need to be made
public. The statute of frauds is thus necessary:
" 'to ensure that transactions involving a transfer of realty interests are commemorated with sufficient solemnity. A signed writing provides greater assurance that
the parties and the public can reliably know when such a
transaction occurs. It supports the public policy favoring
clarity in determining real estate interests and discourages indefinite or fraudulent claims about such interests.1 North Coast Cookies, Inc. v. Sweet Temptations,
Inc., 16 Ohio App.3d 342, 348 [16 OBR 391, 397], 476
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N.E.2d388 [395] (1984)." Seale, supra, ax 104.
[*625] The Seale court, after placing considerable emphasis on the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court had not
given a strong indication of its position on the issue, held
that the oral agreement to repurchase the subject real estate was not enforceable because it violated the statute
of frauds. Id. at 104. Accord Sandusky Hous. Trust
Ltd. Partnership v. Bouman Group (June 30, [**25]
1992), Franklin App. No. 91AP-1249, unreported,
1992 WL 158460; TransOhio Sav. Bank v. Jones (Feb.
12, 1992), Lorain App. No. 91CA005128, unreported,
1992 WL 25705; Nethero v. Poulson (Aug. 7, 1990),
Wkyne App. No. 2634, unreported, 1991 WL 150982;
and Leesburg Fed. S. &L. v. Dunlap (Mac 28,1988),
Highland App. No. 658, unreported, 1988 WL 35791;
N. Canton Ctr., Inc. v. Fleming Cos., Inc. (June 19,
1993), Stark App. No. CA-8995, unreported, 1993 WL
35566.
However, the Seale court recognized that a number
of courts have permitted promissory estoppel in statutes
of frauds cases while an apparently equal number of
courts have rejected it. Seale, supra, 806 E2d at 103,
citing Promissory Estoppel as Basis for Avoidance of
Statute of Frauds (1974 & Supp.1986), 56 AJJL3d
1037. Moreover, at least one Ohio court of appeals
has recognized that a party may rebut or overcome the
statute of frauds (R.C 1335.05) by using the doctrine
of promissory estoppel. Gathagan v. Firestone lire &
Rubber Co. (1985), 23 Ohio App.3d 16, 23 OBR 49,
490 N.E.2d 923; [*+26] see, also, Knowles v. Beverly
Ann, Inc. (Aug. 25, 1975), Geauga App. No. 619, unreported (suggesting that estoppel may take an oral modification of lease agreement out of the statute of frauds).
In Gathagan, the plaintiff brought a cause of action alleging breach of an alleged oral employment contract.
He was awarded $ 46,870 after a jury trial. Both parties
appealed. The Court of Appeals for Summit County reversed the trial court holding that the trial court should
have given jury instructions on the statute of frauds (R.G
1335.05) and on plaintiffs promissory estoppel defease
to the statute of frauds. The Gathagan court carefully
examined Ohio case law and case law from other jurisdictions to hold that the doctrine of promissory estoppel
may bar the statute of frauds as a defense to an oral employment contract that would otherwise fall within the
statute. Id., 23 Ohio App.3d at 18, 23 OBR at 51, 490
N.E.2dat925.
Courts outside Ohio have also recognized that in
appropriate circumstances, the doctrine of promiaaory
estoppel can bar a statute of frauds defense to an action
based on an oral lease agreement. [*+27] In Mauala
* UilfordMgt. Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 1983), 559F.Supp.
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1000, a United States district court held that a genuine issue of fact existed to deny defendants' motion
for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach
of an agreement to enter into a lease on the ground that
there was a disputed issue of fact with respect to whether
defendants should be estopped from asserting the statute
of frauds defense. The court noted that "[amplication of
[the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel] is warranted only [*626] where there is (i) a fraudulent oral
promise by the defendant; (ii) upon which the plaintiff
relies; (iii) by engaging in acts which are 'unequivocally
referable' to the oral promise; (iv) resulting in substantial injury * * *." Id. at 1004. The court concluded
"that there are disputed issues of fact with respect to,
inter alia, whether defendants falsely and fraudulently
represented to plaintiffs that they would deliver a lease
for apartment 12A (or whether defendants fraudulently
concealed from plaintiffs the fact that the lease had not
been approved) and whether plaintiffs suffered substantial [**28] injury by relying on this allegedly fraudulent
representation." Id. Similarly, in the present case, we
believe there is a material issue of fact with respect to
whether First Union falsely represented to McCarthy,
Lebit that they would deliver a written lease (or whether
First Union negligently concealed from McCarthy, Lebit
the fact that the lease had not been approved by George
Sirow) and whether McCarthy, Lebit suffered substantial
injury by relying on the negligent misrepresentations.
In Nicol v. Nelson (Colo.App. 1989), 776 P.2d 1144,
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs
were entitled to injunctive relief, enjoining defendant
from developing real estate, on their claim based on
promissory estoppel and that the defendant was barred
by said doctrine from raising a statute of frauds defense.
In Nicol, the trial court found that plaintiffs purchased
their lots only after receiving assurances from the defendant that the adjoining tract of land would remain
undeveloped space and that if defendant acquired said
land, he would not develop it. After the defendant
took steps to develop the property, plaintiffs brought
suit seeking [**29] injunctive relief. The court in Nicol
noted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as stated
in the Restatement of the Law 2d, Contracts, (1973),
Section 90(i), is designed to assure fairness in business
relationships by protecting one who relies to his detriment on the promise of another. Id. at 1146. See, also,
Dunn v. Dunn (1975), 24 N.C.App. 713, 212 S.E.2d
407 (holding that under the instant circumstances, the
defendants were equitably estopped to plead the statute
of frauds in defense of plaintiffs action to specifically
enforce an oral contract to reconvey land).
Finally, we note that some courts hold that the doctrine
of promissory estoppel may be used to preclude the de-
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fense of statute of frauds, but only when there has been
(1) a misrepresentation that the statute's requirements
have been complied with or (2) a promise to make a
memorandum of the agreement. See Johnson v. Gilbert
(App. 1980), 127 Ariz, 410, 414, 621 P. 2d 916, 920;
Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc. (1972), 16
Ariz.App. 415, 493 P.2d 1220; [**30] 21 TUrtle Creek
Square, Ltd. v. New York State Teachers' Retirement
Sys. (C.A.5,1970), 432 F.2d 64; "Moore" Burger, Inc.
* Phillips Petroleum Co. (Tex. 1972), 492 S.WU934.
Courts which generally adopt this approach recognize
the restrictions placed on [*627] the doctrine of promissory estoppel as stated in the Restatement of Contracts
2d (1932), Section 178, Comment f, which provides in
pertinent part:
"Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute,
an estoppel may preclude objection on that ground * *
*. A misrepresentation that there has been such satisfaction if substantial action is taken in reliance on the representation, precludes proof by the party who made the
representation that it was false; and a promise to make a
memorandum, if similarly relied on, may give rise to an
effective promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise operate to defraud." See "Moore" Burger, supra;
Rockland Industries, Inc. u Frank Kasmir Assoc.
(N.D.Tex.1979), 470F.Supp. 1176; e.g., John K Pelt
Co., Inc. v. Am. Cos. Co. ofReading (Tex. App. 1974),
513 S.W.2d 128,131; [**31] Johnson, supra, 127Ariz,
at 414, 621 P.2dat 920. "This approach has been praised
as providing 'a reasonable balance between the two doctrines — encouraging businessmen to reduce their agreements to writing while mitigating the harsh effects which
unswerving adherence to the Statute of Frauds might
produce.'" Id., 127Ariz, at414, 621 P.2dat920.
Based on the foregoing analysis, this court adopts the
approach taken by those courts which hold that the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be used to preclude
a defense of statute of frauds, but only when there has
been (1) a misrepresentation that the statute's requirements have been complied with or (2) a promise to make
a memorandum of the agreement. This approach adheres to the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel
as adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court and stated in
Restatement 2d of Contracts, Section 90. Additionally,
it promotes a balanced approach to encouraging those
in business to reduce their agreements to writing and
thereby adhering to the policy considerations behind the
statute of frauds while at the same time providing [**32]
a mitigating effect to the harsh application of the statute
of frauds and assures fairness in business relationships
by protecting one who relies to his detriment on the
promise of another.
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Under the unique circumstances in the present case,
we conclude that McCarthy, Lebit raised a material issue of fact regarding whether the doctrine of promissory
estoppel precludes First Union from raising the defense
of the statute of frauds. We have previously concluded
that a material issue of fact exists as to whether an oral
lease agreement exists. We, now, conclude that a material issue of fact exists as to whether First Union,
through its agent, Arthur Roth, promised that a written lease agreement would be forthcoming. The record
reveals that following the April 13, 1988 meeting, Irwin
Haiman repeatedly contacted Arthur Roth to determine
when a written lease agreement would be prepared. Both
Haiman and Crystal averred that Roth repeatedly indicated that a written lease agreement would be forthcoming. Accordingly, a material issue [*628] of fact exists
regarding whether First Union, through its agent Roth,
reasonably should have expected McCarthy, Lebit to forbear action in reliance [**33] on Roth's representation
that a written lease agreement would be forthcoming.
Moreover, the instant misrepresentation goes to the issue
of whether the statute would be complied with and that
a memorandum, i.e., a written lease, would be made.
Finally, the record indicates that through past dealings a
unique relationship had developed between the attorneys
at McCarthy, Lebit and Arthur Roth. Crystal's deposition testimony indicates that the attorneys at McCarthy,
Lebit had dealt with Roth in the past and that leases
negotiated with Roth were honored by First Union and
reduced to writing. The issue of whether McCarthy,
Lebit* s reliance is sufficient to estop First Union from
using the statute of frauds as defense to McCarthy,
Lebit's claim based on an oral lease agreement is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. Gaihagan,
supra, paragraph three of the syllabus.
McCarthy, Lebit's first, third and fourth assignments
of error are accordingly sustained, and this cause is remanded to the trial court for a jury determination as to
whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel bars First
Union from asserting [**34] the defense of the statute
of frauds on McCarthy, Lebit's claim for breach of an
alleged oral lease agreement. McCarthy, Lebit's first assignment of error, is overruled but only to the extent that
it asserts a separate claim for relief based on promissory
estoppel.

n
In McCarthy, Lebit's second assignment of error,
McCarthy, Lebit argues the trial court erred in granting First Union's motion for summary judgment on its
claim for negligent misrepresentation.
The elements of negligent misrepresentation were articulated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Haddon View
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Invest. Co. v. Coopers <&. Lybrand (1982), 70 Ohio
St.2dl54, 156, 24 0.0.3d 268, 269, 436 N.E.2d 212,
214, as follows:
"3 Restatement of Torts 2d, 126-127, Section 552,
provides in relevant part:
"*(1) One who * * * supplies false information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining
or communicating the information.
•'(2) * * * [T]he liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited [**35] to loss suffered
"'(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons
for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the
information or knows that the recipient intends to supply
it; and
[*629] "(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction
that he intends the information to influence or knows
that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.'"
McCarthy, Lebit contends that the evidentiary material submitted in opposition to First Union's motion for
summary judgment raises a material issue of fact on each
element of the tort of negligent misrepresentation. First
Union, however, contends that Section 552 does not apply in the present case since McCarthy, Lebit's claim for
relief is an attempt to obtain the benefit of the bargain
which is expressly precluded by Section 552B, which
states:
"(1) The damages recoverable for a negligent misrepresentation are those necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the pecuniary loss to him of which the misrepresentation is a legal cause, including:
"(a) the difference between the value of what he has
received in the transaction and its purchase price or other
value given for it; and
"(b) pecuniary loss suffered [**36] otherwise as a consequence of the plaintiffs reliance upon the misrepresentation.
"(2) The damages recoverable for a negligent misrepresentation do not include the benefit of the plaintiffs
contract with the defendant."
First Union further contends that the reason for the exclusion of damages based on the benefit of the bargain is
because the claim for negligent misrepresentation is to
provide a remedy to third parties to a contract between a
professional (such as an architectural firm as in Haddon
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View, supra) and a client where the professional fails
to exercise ordinary care in performing his duties to his
client.
First Union's arguments are not persuasive in this regard. First, a reading of the allegations in McCarthy,
Lebit's complaint does not support the argument that
McCarthy, Lebit seeks the benefit of the bargain.
Specifically, McCarthy, Lebit alleged that due to the
negligent misrepresentations of First Union through its
agent Roth, McCarthy, Lebit was induced to "forebear the opportunity to lease other space in other buildings," thereby incurring "substantial damages." Indeed,
McCarthy, Lebit presented the [**37] affidavit of Steven
W. Joseph, which indicated that comparable commercial
space was available in the Public Square and surrounding regions at a rate of $ 1.50 to $ 2 less per square
foot than what they are presently paying. It is not the
benefit of the bargain with First Union which is the measure of damages sought in the instant complaint. Rather,
damages are to be measured by comparing their current
monthly rental obligations with those which they might
have been obligated to pay under a lease in another comparable building which they could have leased but for
their reliance on Roth's representations that a written
lease agreement was forthcoming to [*630] confirm this
oral agreement. This distinction between its rental obligations currently incurred and those which it could have
entered into, while similar to damages representing the
benefit of the bargain pursuant to the anticipated lease
with First Union, are distinct from the benefit of the
bargain allegedly entered into with First Union and represent a pecuniary loss which McCarthy, Lebit allegedly
incurred.
The distinction between what damages constitute
recoverable "pecuniary damages" and nonrecoverable
"benefit-of-the-bargain" [**38] damages is not an easy
one. The issue of damages in a negligent misrepresentation claim was discussed by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community
Gen. Hosp. Assn. (1990), 54 Ohio St.3dl, 560N.E.2d
206, wherein the court precluded "economic damages"
in an action brought by a contractor against an architecturalfirmwhich was allegedly negligent in drafting plans
and specifications in a construction project absent privity
of contract between the plaintiff/contractor and defendant/architectural firm. In holding that 3 Restatement
of the Law 2d, Torts (1977) 126-127, Section 552 did
not provide recovery for economic damages suffered by
third parties not in privity with design professionals, the
court explained:
"'The law of torts is well equipped to offer redress
for losses suffered by reason of a "breach of some duty
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imposed by law to protect the broad interests of social
policy." [Citations omitted]. Tort law is not designed,
however, to compensate parties for losses suffered as a
result of a breach of duties assumed only by agreement.
That type of compensation necessitates an analysis of the
damages [**39] which were within the contemplation of
the parties when framing their agreement. It remains the
particular province of the law of contracts. * * *
" 'The controlling policy consideration underlying tort
law is the safety of persons and property — the protection of persons and property from losses resulting from
injury. The controlling policy consideration underlying the law of contracts is the protection of expectations
bargained for. If that distinction is kept in mind, the
damages claimed in a particular case may more readily
be classified between claims for injuries to persons or
property on the one hand and economic losses on the
other.'
"Therefore, applying the Restatement in this context
will encompass liability that is otherwise best suited for
contract negotiation and assignment." Floor Craft Floor
Covering, supra, 54 Ohio St. 3d at 7, 560 N.K2d at
211.
In Floor Craft, plaintiffs specifically contracted with
the hospital to hold the architects harmless for economic
damages arising from the architects' plans and specifications. Moreover, the architects' contract with the hospital contained several provisions to shield the [**40]
architects from liability from the contractors. [*631]
Accordingly, application of the economic loss rule in
Floor Craft was required to hold the parties to their contract. At at 7, 560N.E.2dat211.
Adoption of the "economic loss" rule in Floor Craft
does not necessarily preclude recovery in the instant case
since Section 552 specifically provides that damages for
"pecuniary loss" are recoverable for negligent misrepresentations made by those who have a pecuniary interest
in a transaction. Aside from Floor Craft, no further
Ohio cases discuss the applicable damages recoverable
in a negligent misrepresentation claim. However; cases
outside Ohio appear to adopt two separate theories of
recovery. Courts which apply the economic loss rule
to preclude recovery in a misrepresentation claim do so
in a very narrow context. These courts hold thM the
economic loss rule does not apply (1) where one intentionally makes false representations, and (2) where one
in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others makes negligent representations. See
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. NatL Tank Co. (1982), 91
IH2d 69, 61 IHDec. 746, 435 N.E.2d 443. [**41]
With respect to the second exception, such persons usually include attorneys, abstractors of title, surveyors, in-
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spectors of good, operators of ticker services, and banks
dealing with non-depositors' checks. Falco Linings,
Inc. v. Pavex, Inc. (M.D.Pa.1990), 755 F.Supp.
1269. See, also, Delman v. Cleveland Hts. (1989), 41
Ohio StJd 1,534 N.E.2d835 (negligent misrepresentation claim rejected as to municipality and its employees
in conducting point of sale inspections of real estate);
Floor Craft, supra (discussing architect's liability for
negligent misrepresentation); Haddon View, supra (discussing accountant's liability for negligent misrepresentation); Harrell v. Crystal (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d515,
611 N.E.2d 908 (attorneys); Perpetual Fed. S. & L.
Assn. v. Porter & Peck, Inc. (1992), 80 Ohio App. 3d
569, 609 N.E.2d 1324 (real estate appraisers); see, e.g.,
Doe v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ohio (1992), 71 Ohio
App.3d369, 607N.E.2d492; [**42] ZissBros. Constr.
Co. v. TransOhio Sav. Bank (June 20, 1991), Cuyahoga
App. No. 58787, unreported, 1991WL 118058 (rejecting claim against bank for allegedly failing to properly
qualify purchasers of a home); Goens v. Torco Cos.
(Jan. 22, 1990), Butler App. No. CA89-06-092, unreported, 1990 WL 4259 (termite inspectors); Kilburn
ML Becker (1990), 60 Ohio App.3d 144, 573 N.E.2d
1226 (insurance agent); and see, e.g., Dayton-V&dther
Corp. v. Kelly (1987), 42 OhioApp.3d 184,537N.E.2d
682. The second exception was even rnore narrowly construed in Hi-Grade Cleaners, Inc. v. Am. Permac, Inc.
(N.D.RU982), 561 F.Supp. 643, where the court held
that "tort claims based upon negligent misrepresentation
are limited to those in the business of selling information
which their customers might rely upon in taking some
additional action.m Id. at 644. See, also, Palco Linings,
Inc., supra, 755 F.Supp. 1269, for a discussion of the
economic loss rule.
[*632] However, those courts which apply the economic [**43] loss rule to bar recovery in tort claims
for negligent misrepresentation fail to take into account
the express wording of Section 552, which provides that
"one who, * * * in any other transaction in which he
has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for
the guidance of others in their business transactions, is
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information * * *." The
above strict and narrow interpretation of the tort of negligent misrepresentation fails to take into account those
circumstances where the supplier of false information
has a pecuniary interest in the transaction at hand and
also fails to realize that "pecuniary loss" is by its very
definition "economic loss." See Black's Law Dictionary
(6 Ed. 1990) 1131; see, also, Harrell, supra, 81 Ohio
App. 3d at 523, 611N.E.2dat 913, recognizing recovery
for pecuniary damages.
Other jurisdictions dealing with cases more on point
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to the present case adopt a rule allowing for "out-ofpocket" losses, but precluding recovery for damages representing the benefit-of-the-bargain pursuant to Section
552B. See Frame v. Boatmen's Bank of Concord Village
(Mo.App. 1989), 782 S. W.2d 117; [**44] First Interstate
Bank of Gallup v. Foutz (1988), 107 N.M. 749, 764
P.2d 1307; Anzalone v. Strand (1982), 14 Mass.App.
45, 436 N.E.2d 960; Onita Pacific v. Trustees of
Bronson (1990), 104 Ore.App. 696, 803 P. 2d 756;
Coastal (Bermuda) Ltd. v. E.W Saybolt <fc Co., Inc.
(C.A.5, 1987), 826 F.2d 424; Mammas v. Oro Mdley
Townhouses, Inc. (App.1981), 131 Ariz. 121, 638Rid
1367.
In Frame, supra, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants upon plaintiffs claim for negligent misrepresentation based on facts very similar to those in the
present case. In Frame, the plaintiff entered into a
sales contract for the purchase of a bowling alley. The
contract was contingent upon plaintiffs obtaining financing* Plaintiff met with the vice-president of the
Boatmen's Bank, Mark Murray, who informed plamtiff
that Boatmen's was willing to lend eighty percent of the
appraised value or the sales price, whichever was lower.
Because [**45] the appraisal was not to be completed
until after the financing contingency date set forth in the
purchase agreement, plaintiff contacted Murray and informed Murray that he was risking $ 20,000 in earnest
money and requested assurances that Boatmen's would
loan him the money. According to plaintiff, Murray
responded affirmatively. However, Boatmen's later rejected plaintiffs loan application, and plaintiff lost $
5,000 earnest money. The trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, and the court of
appeals reversed, finding that plaintiff raised a material
issue of fact on his negligent misrepresentation claim.
The court applied Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts,
Section 552(1) as a prima facie case of negligent misrepresentation. The courtrecognizedthat the Boatmen's
Bank is in the business of [*633] making loans, and
its vice-president supplied plaintiff with loan information. Boatmen's pecuniary interest was self-evident.
Moreover, the court wrote "in making the statement
that the loan would be forthcoming, Murray intentionally provided that information to appellant [plaintiff]
for guidance, knowing that appellant would rely upon
Murray's statement [**46] in deciding whether to remove the financing contingency. The financing contingency was removed and appellant suffered a pecuniary loss by having his earnest money forfeited." Id.,
782 S.W2d at 122. The court also rejected defendant's
claim that plaintiff could not have justifiably relied upon
Murray' s oral representation that the loan was fortbcom-
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ing because the oral loan agreement was unenforceable
pursuant to the statute of frauds. The court rejected this
argument, noting that the reasonableness of plaintiffs
reliance is normally a question of fact for the jury. Id.
as 123-124.
In the present case, it is undisputed that First Union is
in the business of renting commercial real estate and that
its agent, Arthur Roth, supplied McCarthy, Lebit with
false information. Moreover, First Union's pecuniary
interest in the above transaction is self-evident. Further,
it is our opinion that a material issue of fact exists with
respect to whether Roth's representations that the paperwork was being completed and a written lease agreement
was forthcoming was made knowing that McCarthy,
Lebit would rely upon it in deciding to [**47] forgo
the opportunity to pursue other leasing options. Finally,
whether McCarthy, Lebit justifiably relied upon Roth's
representations should also be left for the jury's determination. Gathagan, supra, at paragraph three of the
syllabus.
The issue of damages was further explored by the appellate court in Frame v. Boatmen's Bank of Concord
Village (Mo.App.1992), 824 S.W.2d 491 ("Frame IT).
On remand, the trial court awarded plaintiff $ 4,300,
representing plaintiffs lost earnest money deposit paid
to the prospective seller of the bowling alley. Frame
appealed, urging he was entitled to recover lost profits.
The court of appeals rejected Frame's argument, citing
to the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 5S2B,
as prohibiting "benefit-of-the-bargain" damages. The
court in Frame II limited Frame to consequential damages asrepresentedby his lost earnest deposit money.
Id. at 495-497.
In the present case, McCarthy, Lebit's damages, as
alleged in its complaint, are limited to its forbearance
of pursuing other leasing opportunities in other office
[**48] buildings. While the difference between these
damages and damages based upon the benefit of the bargain allegedly entered into with First Union may be
slight, there still exists a distinction as previously explained, and these differences should not prevent recovery in the present case if a jury determines that
McCarthy, Lebit has proven its claim for negligent misrepresentation.
[*634] Accordingly, this court rejects First Union's
argument that McCarthy, Lebit is precluded from recovery under Section 552B based on the contention that its
claim is really a claim for benefit-of-the-bargain damages.
First Union's second argument that Section 552 allows recovery only for third parties is also without merit.
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While the Ohio Supreme Court has addressed the issue
of a defendant's liability to a third party for negligent
misrepresentations, see Haddon View, Floor Craft and
Delman, supra, it has never limited a negligent misrepresentation claim to third parties only. In fact, Section
552, itself, does not limit its application to third parties.
Rather, it states "one who * * * supplies false information
for the guidance of others in [**49] their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information + * *." Thus, while Section 552 can be applied to
third parties, it is clearly not limited to third parties.
Finally, the cases previously cited apply Section 552 to
parties directlyrelatedto each other pursuant to contract
negotiations.
Accordingly, this court finds that a material issue of
fact exists as to McCarthy, Lebit's claim for negligent
misrepresentation. McCarthy, Lebit's second assignment of error is well taken.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this
cause is remanded to the trial court on McCarthy, Lebit's
second, third and fourth assignments of error. On remand, McCarthy, Lebit must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that an oral lease agreement was entered
into. In addition, McCarthy, Lebit must demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel bars application of the statute of
frauds. McCarthy, Lebit's claim for negligent misrepresentation is limited to "out-of-pocket" losses. Finally,
to the extent that McCarthy, Lebit may recover damages under its claim for breach [**50] of an oral lease
agreement, such damages cannot be duplicative of those
damages recoverable under its negligent misrepresentation claim.
Judgment accordingly.
Blackmon, J., concurs.
John F. Corrigan, P.J., dissents.
DISSENT-BY: CORRIGAN
DISSENT: John F. Corrigan, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the judgmentrenderedby
the majority.
With respect to the firm's breach of contract claim,
it must be noted that the parties' oral agreement may
constitute an express agreement. Lucas v. Costantini
(1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 367, 368, 13 OBR 449, 450,
469 N.E.2d 927, 928. An express contract, unlike an
implied contract, connotes a formal exchange of [*635]
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promises when the parties have communicated in some
manner the terms to which they agree to be bound. Id,
at 369, 13 OBR at 451, 469 N.E.2d at 929. However,
the court will give effect to the manifest intent of the
parties where there is clear evidence demonstrating that
the parties did not intend to be bound by the terms of an
agreement until formalized on a written document and
signed by both. Richard A. Berjian, D. O., Inc. v. Ohio
Bell Tel. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2dl47,151, 8 0.0.3d
149, 151, 375N.E.2d410, 413. [**51]

absent approval from their principals. Accordingly, I
would find that the firm's claim that it had an oral contract is unsupportable as the firm and First Union clearly
did not intend to [**53] be bound until a written lease
was prepared and executed. Moreover, Roth lacked actual and apparent [*636] authority to bind First Union
as he told Crystal and Haiman that he needed his superiors' approval and they therefore could not reasonably
believe that Roth could bind First Union on the basis of
his word alone.

Further, with respect to the authority of an agent to
bind his principal to a lease agreement, it is essential
that two facts be clearly established:

Moreover, where the evidence is uncontroverted that
no written lease, or memorandum thereof was ever executed, any oral agreement by the parties is properly held
unenforceable. Manifold v. Schuster (1990), 67 Ohio
App.3d 251, 254, 586N.E.2d 1142, 1144.

"(1) that the principal held the agent out to the public
as possessing sufficient authority to embrace the particular act in question, or knowingly permitted him to act
as having such authority, and (2) that the person dealing with the agent knew of the facts and acting in good
faith had reason to believe and did believe that the agent
possessed the necessary authority. * * *" Ammerman
v. Aids Rent A Car System (1982), 7 Ohio App. 3d 338,
340-341, 70BR436,438-439, 455N.E.2d 1041,1045.
In this case, the majority asserts that Crystal's deposition demonstrates that Roth orally negotiated leases
which were honored by First Union and that Roth developed "expertise" and "a reputation that his word would
be relied upon." Crystal's actual statements, however
indicate that Crystal was familiar with the legend on
First Union's proposed leases which indicated that the
lease was not effective until accepted and executed by
the landlord, and he continued to negotiate changes on
behalf [**52] of the tenant even after a written, proposed
lease was submitted to him. In addition, when Crystal
and Haiman left the meeting at issue here, they stated
that they needed to review the plan with their partners,
and that it was subject to the partners' approval. Crystal
likewise admitted that Roth indicated that he had to discuss some of the points with his superiors and that First
Union's attorneys were to prepare a written lease for the
parties.
Haiman* s affidavit similarly acknowledges that he presented the substance of the terms announced by Roth to
his partners for their agreement and that the parties intended that a written lease was to be prepared.
Finally, Roth stated that as a "disclaimer," he told
Crystal and Haiman that the deal had to be approved by
his superiors, and that there were in fact three separate
entities which had to approve the deal in writing on a
lease deal sheet.
Thus, oral leases were clearly not negotiated and neither Roth nor Crystal and Haiman could bind the parties

A lease will be taken out of the statute of frauds by
partial performance. See, e.g., Delfino v. Paul Davies
Chevrolet, Inc. (1965), 2 Ohio St. 2d 282, 286, 31
O0.2d557, 559, 209 N.E.2d 194,197, and the statute
of frauds may not be interposed in furtherance of fraud.
Marion Credit Assn. v. Cochran (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d
265, 533 N.E.2d 325, paragraph two of the syllabus.
The firm also cites authority for the proposition that,
in an employment context, promissory [**54] estoppel
may be assorted in opposition to the defense that a contract is unenforceable pursuant to the statute of frauds.
See, e.g., Gathagan v, Firestone Tire A Rubber Co.
(1985), 23 Ohio App.3d 16, 18, 23 OBR 49, 51, 490
N.E.2d 923, 925. Estoppel was rejected as a bar to the
statute offraudsin cases involving real estate, however,
in Leesburg Fed. S. & L. v. Dunlap (Mar. 28, 1988),
Highland App. No. 658, unreported, 1988 WL 35791.
The court stated:
"In Seale v. Citizens Savings and Loan Assn. (C.A.
6,1986), 806E2d99,102-104, the court held the doctrine of promissory estoppel should not apply to statute
of frauds cases involving real estate. The court, noting the Gathagan case involved an alleged employment
contract, conjectured that our state courts would not allow promissory estoppel to defeat the statute of frauds
in cases involving real estate:
"'WB do not find this Court of Appeals decision to be
persuasive authority for the proposition that the Supreme
Court of Ohio would allow promissory estoppel to defeat the statute of frauds in a real estate context, however.
[*+55] Gathagan involved a breach of an oral contract
for employment for two years. Ws are not convinced
that the Ohio courts would treat employment contracts
and real estate transactions as co-extensive, since the
latter implicate interests that are generally regarded as
more deserving of protection.
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'Real estate transactions are usually formal undertakings involving significant sums of money.'
"The Seale court further wrote:
"'If a court allows parol evidence of an unwritten contract, it can never be certain that it is not perpetuating
rather than preventing a fraud. Had the agreement been
reduced to writing, however, there would be little opportunity for fraud or mistake to arise.1
[*637] "We agree with the reasoning of the Seale court
and we decline to apply the Gathagan case to cases involving real estate. Accordingly, we find no issue of
fact concerning whether appellee should be equitably
estopped from asserting the statute of frauds in the case
at bar."
I would apply the rationale set forth in Seale v.
Citizens S. & L. Assn., supra, expressly adopted by
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the Highland County Court of Appeals, and would not
allow the promissory [**56] estoppel claim to defeat
application of the statute of frauds.
Finally, as to the claim for negligent misrepresentation, I would conclude that, assuming such a claim may
defeat application of the defense of the statute of frauds
in a case such as this where a written lease is contemplated, the firm presented no evidence that anyone at
First Union ever represented that Roth could bind First
Union by an oral statement. Moreover, even assuming
such a representation had been made, since the parties
contemplated execution of a written lease and further negotiations, the firm could not justifiably rely upon such
representation.
I would therefore overrule each of the assigned errors
and affirm the judgment rendered below.

Page 53

851 R2d 763 printed in FULL format.
SOUTHMARK CORPORATION, Plaintiff-AppeUant, v. LIFE INVESTORS, INC, and USUCO
Corporation, Defendants-Appellees
No. 87-1353
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
851 F.2d 763; 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 11067; 7 U.CCR. Serv. 2d(Callaghan) 529

August 11, 1988
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As amended August 11,
1988.
PRIOR HISTORY:
[**1] Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas.
DISPOSITION: Modified and Affirmed.
COUNSEL: Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell &
Miller, Dallas, Texas, Jack Pew, Jr., Charles L.
Babcock, Attorneys, for Appellant.
David Klingsberg, Kaye, Scholer, New York, New
"fork, Mark R. Weiss, Hughes & Luce, Dallas, Texas,
Eric R. Cromartie, Attorneys, for Appellees, (Life).
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New \brk,
New York, Robert E. Gerber, Rain, Harrell, Emery,
Young & Doke, Dallas, Texas, Morris Harrell, Timothy
W. Mountz, Attorney, for Appellees, (USUCO).
JUDGES: Garwood and Jones, Circuit Judges, and
Black, * District Judge.
* District Judge of the Southern District of Texas,
sitting by designation.
OPINIONBY: GARWOOD
OPINION: [*764] GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
In this Texas diversity case, plaintiff-appellant
Southmark Corporation (Southmark) appeals the district
court's summary judgment that Southmark take nothing
against defendant-appellee Life Investors, Inc. (Life)
and its dismissal of Southmark's suit against USUCO
Corporation (USUCO). WB affirm in all respects, except that the wording of the judgment of dismissal of
the action against USUCO is modified to reflect that it
is a dismissal for lack of in personam jurisdiction. [**2]

Facts and Proceedings Below
Prior to the transactions that gaveriseto this suit, Life
nl and General George Olmsted (Olmsted) of Arizona
owned a controlling share of stock in International
Bank (IB), an Arizona corporation. Olmsted owned
approximately forty-one percent of the outstanding IB
stock and Ufe owned approximately twenty-two percent. In November 1984, Ufe and Olmsted signed a
Memorandum of Understanding in which Life agreed
that if it wished to sell its IB stock, it would first offer
the stock to Olmsted. n2 Olmsted would then have thirty
[•765] days in which to accept the offer. If Olmsted did
not accept, Ufe would then have ninety days in which
to sell the stock to any third party at a price equal to or
higher than the price offered to Olmsted.
nl Ufe is an insurance holding company organized
and existing under the laws of Iowa. Approximately
eighty-one percent of Ufe's stock is owned indirectly by AEGON, a holding company organized
and existing under the laws of The Netherlands.
AEGON holds the Ufe stock through two wholly
owned subsidiaries, AGO International B.V. of The
Netherlands, and Fiago, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of New York, Until
October 10, 1985, Ufe and AEGON together owned
797,774 shares of common stock and 4,187,676
shares of Class A common stock of IB. In this appeal, Ufe need not be differentiated from AEGON,
and for the sake of simplicity we will refer to both
Ufe and AEGON as "Ufe."
[**3]
n2 The Memorandum of Understanding agreement
states in relevant part:
"1. George Olmsted ("General Olmsted") hereby
giants Aegon, N.V. and Ufe Investors, Inc.
('Aegon') a right of first offer on his shares of
International Bank, and Aegon hereby grants a aim-
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newal with a base rent of $ 12.50 per square foot for
the first five years and $ 13.50 per square foot for the
second five years. Crystal and Haiman both also asserted that McCarthy, Lebit would occupy the Sweeney
space at the same rate Sweeney was paying until his
lease expired. The Sweeney space would be added into
the McCarthy, Lebit lease before the date upon which
Sweeney was to vacate his space. Other provisions of
the lease would reflect the standard lease used by First
Union. Although the base year and denominator were
left for further discussion and the parties indicated that
approval of their respective partners and/or supervisors
was necessary, the three men shook hands to seal the
deal. The next day, Haiman presented Roth with a wish
list, which Roth rejected. Haiman then informed Roth
that McCarthy, Lebit accepted the terms of the agreement
[**18] reached on April 13, 1988. Haiman, further,
averred that an agreement was reached that the base year
would be 1988 and that the rent would be determined by
calculating on the basis of leasable space as opposed to
leased space. In addition, Roth testified that he believed
the parties had reached an agreement. Finally, Roth
made numerous assurances to Haiman that he would begin the paperwork on the agreement and that a written
lease agreement would be forthcoming. These continuous assurances by Roth signified Roth's authoritative
position in these negotiations as well as emphasizing that
the agreement was completed.
First Union argues that at least three essential and material terms of the alleged oral lease agreement were left
unresolved. Consequently, First Union argues there was
no meeting of the minds to form an oral lease agreement.
Initially, First Union argues that there was no agreement
as to which portion of the Sweeney space McCarthy,
Lebit was to rent or a date upon which McCarthy, Lebit
could occupy said space. However, an examination of
the record reveals that McCarthy, Lebit raised a material
issue of fact regarding the essential elements of the agreement. The affidavit [**19] of Irwin Haiman indicates
that McCarthy, Lebit was to lease that portion of the
space which included Sweeney's office and a conference
room. Moreover, the deposition testimony of Arthur
Roth reveals that the lease renewal was to take effect in
November 1989 and that the Sweeney space would be
added into the McCarthy, Lebit lease before the [*623]
date when Sweeney was to vacate his space. Finally,
First Union argues that the parties never agreed upon a
lease year or a denominator for calculating leasing obligations. However, Haiman's affidavit asserts that the
parties agreed that the rental rate would be calculated on
a 1988 base year and it would be based on leasable (as
opposed to leased) space. Accordingly, we conclude that
the evidentiary materials presented by McCarthy, Lebit
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are sufficient to raise a material issue of fact regarding
whether an oral lease agreement was entered. Wing v.
Anchor Media, Ua\ of Texas (1991), 59 Ohio St.3dl08,
570 N.E.2d 1095. McCarthy, Lebifs third assignment
of error is therefore sustained.
Having determined that McCarthy, Lebit raised a
material issue of fact regarding the existence of an
[**20] oral lease agreement, this court must next decide whether, under the present circumstances, Ohio's
statute of fraud bars recovery. Ohio has two relevant
statutes of frauds. R.C 1335.05 provides in pertinent
part:
"No action shall be brought whereby to charge the
defendant, * * * upon a contract of sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or interest in or concerning
them, * * * unless the agreement upon which such action
is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in
writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith
or some other person thereunto by him or her lawfully
authorized."
More specifically, R.C 1335.04 provides:
"No lease, estate, or interest, either of freehold or
term of years, or any uncertain interest of, in, or out of
lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall be assigned or
granted except by deed, or note in writing, signed by
the party assigning or granting it, or his agent thereunto
lawfully authorized, by writing, or by act and operation
of law."
It is well established in Ohio that courts of equity
may bar application of the statute of frauds. For instance, an oral lease will be taken out of the statute of
frauds by partial performance. Egner v. Egner (1985),
24 Ohio App.3d 171, 24 OBR 261, 493 N.K2J 999;
[ • ^ l ] Cuvier Press Club v. Fourth & Race St. Assoc.
(1981), 1 OhioApp.3d30,1 OBR 150, 439N.E.24443.
Further, the statute of frauds may not be interposed in
furtherance of fraud. Manifold v. Schuster (1990), 67
Ohio App.3d 251, 254, 586 N.E.2d 1142, 1144. The
above exceptions to application of the statute of frauds
exist in recognition that the historical purpose behind
the statute is to prevent the furtherance of fraud. See,
e.g., Manifold, supra; Ayres v. Cook (1942), 140 Ohio
St. 281, 23 0.0. 491, 43 N.E.2d 287; Wilbur v. Paine
(1824), 1 Ohio St. 251; Ardinger v. Bell (App. 1934),
17 Ohio Law Abs. 438; and Tuscarawas S. &L.Co. v.
Jarvis (App. 1931), 11 Ohio Law Abs. 357.
To defeat application of the above statutes, McCarthy,
Lebit argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppel,
as a separate and distinct claim for relief, is not [*624]
barred by the statute of frauds (first [**22] assignment
of error). Additionally, McCarthy, Lebit argues that the
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produced two documents [*766] signed by Life's representatives. One document was the 1984 Memorandum
of Understanding in which Life agreed to give Olmsted
a right of first offer on Life's shares of IB stock. The
other document was the May 1985 letter in which Life informed Olmsted that it had received an unsolicited offer
for the IB shares and that it wished to sell those shares at
a specified price. According to Southmark, these documents, taken together, satisfy the statute of frauds by indicating that Life and Southmark had in fact entered into
a contract for the sale of the IB securities. Southmark argued alternatively that Life should be estopped from asserting a statute of frauds defense because Life promised
to execute final documents setting forth the terms of its
alleged oral agreement with Southmark. With regard to
USLICO's motion to dismiss, Southmark argued that its
proof established that Texas courts had both specific and
general jurisdiction over USLICQ
The district court rejected Southmark's contentions
and granted Life's motion for summary judgment as well
as USLICO's motion to dismiss. The district court found
that the [**7] two documents produced by Southmark
failed to satisfy the statute of frauds because neither document specifically referred to Southmark. Citing Cohen
v. McCutchin, 565 S.W2d 230 (Tex. 1978), the court
stated that a writing sufficient to meet the standards of
a statute of frauds must be signed by the person to be
charged and it must identify the other party to the transaction. Although Life's representatives signed the documents in question, neither document specifically mentions Southmark.
The court also found that Southmark's promissory
estoppel claim was meritless because the evidence produced by Southmark did not raise a factual issue as
to whether Life promised to sign a written contract.
Relying on Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S. W2d 796 (Tex. 1982),
the district court explained that a promise to prepare a
written contract is not sufficient to overcome the statute
of frauds under the doctrine of promissory estoppel;
instead, there must be a showing that the defendant
promised to sign a particular written agreement.
Finally, the district court found that USLICO's contacts with Texas were not sufficient to establish in personam jurisdiction and granted USLICO's motion to dismiss [**8] on this basis. However, the district court's
final judgment ordered that Southmark take nothing
against either defendant, thus in form being on the merits in favor of USLICO as well as Life. This appeal
followed.
Discussion
The issues raised on appeal are whether the district
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court properly granted Life's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of frauds defense, and whether
the district court properly granted USLICO's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Wfe shall address these issues in turn.
L The Statute of Frauds Defense
The parties in this case agree that the alleged contract
between Life and Southmark falls within the provisions
ofTex.Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §8.319. The question
is whether the two documents produced by Southmark
together satisfy the requirements of section 8.319. After
reviewing the documents, we agree with the district
court's conclusion that they do not.
Section 8.319 specifically provides that a contract for
the sale of securities is unenforceable unless there is some
writing signed by the party against whom enforcement
is sought "sufficient to indicate that a contract has been
made" for the sale of a stated quantity of described [**9]
securities at a stated price. Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann.
§ 8.319(1) (emphasis added). The documents produced
by Southmark, taken alone or read together, do not sufficiently indicate that a contract for the sale of the IB securities had in fact been made. Indeed, the Memorandum
of Understanding merely provides that if Life wishes to
sell the IB stock, it will notify Olmsted and give him an
opportunity to purchase the same. The Memorandum of
Understanding then states that if Olmsted chooses not
to buy the shares, Life will be free [*767] to seO the
shares to any third party. Nothing in the Memorandum
of Understanding indicates that life must enter into a
firm agreement with a prospective buyer before notifying Olmsted, nor does anything in it indicate that an offer
for the shares must exist before Life can notify Olmsted
of its desire to sell. n5 Furthermore, assuming a third
party has made an offer, nothing in the Memorandum of
Understanding indicates that Life must sell the shares to
that third party in the event Olmsted chooses not to buy
the shares within the prescribed time.
n5 Southmark argues that the undisputed testimony
of its president and chairman reflects that he was
told by Life's executive vice president that under the
Memorandum of Understanding, Life was to notify
Olmsted of its desire to sell only if Life had a "bona
fide agreement" for the sale of the shares and not just
an offer. Thus, according to Southmark, the fact that
Life notified Olmsted of its desire to sell is itself an
indication that life had a firm agreement for the sale
of the IB securities. However, to satisfy the statute
of frauds, a writing must be complete in itself so
that the contract can be ascertained from the writ-
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1000, a United States district court held that a genuine issue of fact existed to deny defendants' motion
for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim for breach
of an agreement to enter into a lease on the ground that
there was a disputed issue of fact with respect to whether
defendants should be estopped from asserting the statute
of frauds defense. The court noted that "[amplication of
[the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel] is warranted only [*626] where there is (i) a fraudulent oral
promise by the defendant; (ii) upon which the plaintiff
relies; (iii) by engaging in acts which are 'unequivocally
referable' to the oral promise; (iv) resulting in substantial injury * * *." Id. at 1004. The court concluded
"that there are disputed issues of fact with respect to,
inter alia, whether defendants falsely and fraudulently
represented to plaintiffs that they would deliver a lease
for apartment 12A (or whether defendants fraudulently
concealed from plaintiffs the fact that the lease had not
been approved) and whether plaintiffs suffered substantial [**28] injury by relying on this allegedly fraudulent
representation." Id. Similarly, in the present case, we
believe there is a material issue of fact with respect to
whether First Union falsely represented to McCarthy,
Lebit that they would deliver a written lease (or whether
First Union negligently concealed from McCarthy, Lebit
the fact that the lease had not been approved by George
Sirow) and whether McCarthy, Lebit suffered substantial
injury by relying on the negligent misrepresentations.
In Nicol v. Nelson (Coh.App.1989), 776 P.2d 1144,
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs
were entitled to injunctive relief, enjoining defendant
from developing real estate, on their claim based on
promissory estoppel and that the defendant was barred
by said doctrine from raising a statute of frauds defense.
In Nicol, the trial court found that plaintiffs purchased
their lots only after receiving assurances from the defendant that the adjoining tract of land would remain
undeveloped space and that if defendant acquired said
land, he would not develop it. After the defendant
took steps to develop the property, plaintiffs brought
suit seeking [**29] injunctive relief. The court in Nicol
noted that the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as stated
in the Restatement of the Law 2d, Contracts, (1973),
Section 90(i), is designed to assure fairness in business
relationships by protecting one who relies to his detriment on the promise of another. Id. at 1146. See, also,
Dunn v. Dunn (1975), 24 N.C.App. 713, 212 S.E.2d
407 (holding that under the instant circumstances, the
defendants were equitably estopped to plead the statute
of frauds in defense of plaintiffs action to specifically
enforce an oral contract to reconvey land).
Finally, we note that some courts hold that the doctrine
of promissory estoppel may be used to preclude the de-
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fense of statute of frauds, but only when there has been
(1) a misrepresentation that the statute's requirements
have been complied with or (2) a promise to make a
memorandum of the agreement. See Johnson v. Gilbert
(App.1980), 127 Ariz. 410, 414, 621 P.2d 916, 920;
Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc. (1972), 16
Ariz.App. 415, 493 P.2d 1220; [**30] 21 JUrtle Creek
Square, Ltd. XL New York State Teachers' Retirement
Sys. (C.A.5,1970), 432F.2d 64; "Moore" Burger, Inc.
\t Phillips Petroleum Co. (Tex. 1972), 492 S.W2d934.
Courts which generally adopt this approach recognize
the restrictions placed on [*627] the doctrine of promissory estoppel as stated in the Restatement of Contracts
2d (1932), Section 178, Comment f, which provides in
pertinent part:
"Though there has been no satisfaction of the Statute,
an estoppel may preclude objection on that ground * *
*. A misrepresentation that there has been such satisfaction if substantial action is taken in reliance on the representation, precludes proof by the party who made the
representation that it was false; and a promise to make a
memorandum, if similarly relied on, may giverisetoan
effective promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise operate to defraud." See "Moore" Burger, supra;
Rockland Industries, Inc. u Frank Kasmir Assoc.
(N.D.Tex.1979), 470 F.Supp. 1176; e.g., John H. Pelt
Co., Inc. v, Am. Cos. Co. of Reading (Tex. App. 1974),
513 S.W.2d 128,131; [**31] Johnson, supra, 127Ariz,
at 414, 621 P. 2d at 920. "This approach has been praised
as providing 'a reasonable balance between the two doctrines — encouraging businessmen to reduce their agreements to writing while mitigating the harsh effects which
unswerving adherence to the Statute of Frauds might
produce." Id., 127Ariz, at 414, 621 P.2dat 920.
Based on the foregoing analysis, this court adopts the
approach taken by those courts which hold that the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be used to preclude
a defense of statute of frauds, but only when there has
been (1) a misrepresentation that the statute's requirements have been complied with or (2) a promise to make
a memorandum of the agreement. This approach adheres to the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel
as adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court and staled in
Restatement 2d of Contracts, Section 90. Additionally,
it promotes a balanced approach to encouraging those
in business to reduce their agreements to writing and
thereby adhering to the policy considerations behind the
statute of frauds while at the same time providing [**32]
a mitigating effect to the harsh application of the statute
of frauds and assures fairness in business relationships
by protecting one who relies to his detriment on the
promise of another.
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Since we have determined that the two documents fail to
indicate that a contract has been made, as specifically required by section 8.319, we need not determine whether
the documents must also identify the party seeking enforcement.
II. Promissory Estoppel
Southmark alternatively argues that if the documents
it produced do not satisfy the requirements of section
8.319, nevertheless Life should be estopped from asserting a statute of frauds defense. Citing "Moore"
Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W2d
934, 938 (Tex. 1972), Southmark argues that the doctrine of promissory estoppel removes a contract from
the statute of frauds if the plaintiff establishes that: (1)
the defendant promised to sign an instrument complying
with the statute of frauds; (2) the defendant should have
realized his promise would cause injury to the plaintiff;
(3) such injury occurred; and (4) injustice will result if
the promise is not enforced. In the present case, [**14]
Southmark contends that the last three elements are selfevident. With regard to the first element, Southmark
points to the affidavit of Thomas Walker (Walker), a
Southmark vice president, who stated that Life's representatives promised in an April 1985 Atlanta, Georgia
meeting "that an agreement had been reached and that
they (Life's representatives) would execute final documents consummating that agreement." Southmark also
points to the affidavit of Jerome Levy (Levy), another
Southmark vice president, who stated that on July 19,
1985 he was told by a representative of Life "that the
purpose of the meeting" scheduled for July 24, 1985 in
New York "was to resolve the final points of discussion
and put the contract in a form to be executed that week"
and that
"during the April-July, 1985 period, there were several conversations between Art Christoffersen [of Life]
and myself pertaining to the fact that there was a firm
agreement between the parties and that the only items
necessary to close the transaction were execution of the
documents and the requisite regulatory approvals."

These affidavits, according to Southmark at least raise
a fact issueregardingLife's promise to sign [**15] an
instrument complying with section 8.319. n8 We disagree.
n8 As mentioned, the district court rejected this
argument stating that under Texas law the party to
be charged must have promised to sign the written
agreement. According to the district court, "the af-
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fidavits submitted by Plaintiff do not clearly state
that Life ever promised to sign any particular agreement."
In further support of its promissory argument,
Southmark cites Cobb v. Vkst Texas Microwave Co.,
700 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App. - Austin 1985, writrefd
n.r.e.). In that case, the trial court entered a summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that
the oral lease that the plaintiff sought to enforce was
barred under the statute of frauds. The appellate court
reversed, stating that on the promissory estoppel issue
the plaintiff had adduced some proof raising a fact issue
that the defendants had promised to sign an instrument
complying with the statute of frauds. In particular, the
plaintiff had adduced: (1) his own affidavit in which
he stated that the defendants had promised toreducethe
oral agreement to a written lease; and (2) a letter from
one of the [*769] defendants to the plaintiff in which the
[**16] defendant stated that "we will enter into a mutually agreeable lease arrangement, which you, in your
most expedient manner, will execute as soon as possible." Id. at 616-17.
Given the facts here, however, we think the district
court correctly rejected Southmaik's promissory estoppel theory. In "Moore" Burger, the court held that an
oral promise to sign a written agreement that complies
with the statute of frauds is enforceable and sufficient to
overcome a statute of frauds defense if: (1) the promisor
should havereasonablyexpected that the promise would
induce the promisee to take action that would lead to
definite and substantial injury; (2) the promise did induce the promisee to take such action leading to injury;
and (3) enforcement of the promise is the only means
of avoiding injustice to the promisee. "Moore" Burger,
492 S. W.2d at 938. In "Moore" Burger, the determinative promise was a promise to sign a written agreement
that had already been prepared and that did in fact comply with the statute of frauds. See id. at 938, 940.
n9 Thus, in Consolidated Petroleum Indus, v. Jacobs,
648 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.App. - Eastland 1983, writrefd
n.r.e.), which involved [**17] an oral agreement that
was subject to the provisions of section 8.319, the court
held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not
apply where there is no proof of a promise to sign a
written contract that had been prepared and that would
satisfy the requirement of the statute of frauds. Id. at
367.
ti9lnNaglev. Nagle,633S.W2d796fTex. 1982),
the Texas Supreme Court made it clear that "Moore"
Burger had thus limited the promissory estoppel ex-
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View, supra) and a client where the professional fails
to exercise ordinary care in performing his duties to his
client.
First Union's arguments are not persuasive in this regard. First, a reading of the allegations in McCarthy,
Lebit's complaint does not support the argument that
McCarthy, Lebit seeks the benefit of the bargain.
Specifically, McCarthy, Lebit alleged that due to the
negligent misrepresentations of First Union through its
agent Roth, McCarthy, Lebit was induced to "forebear the opportunity to lease other space in other buildings," thereby incurring "substantial damages." Indeed,
McCarthy, Lebit presented the [**37] affidavit of Steven
W. Joseph, which indicated that comparable commercial
space was available in the Public Square and surrounding regions at a rate of $ 1.50 to $ 2 less per square
foot than what they are presently paying. It is not the
benefit of the bargain with First Union which is the measure of damages sought in the instant complaint. Rather,
damages are to be measured by comparing their current
monthly rental obligations with those which they might
have been obligated to pay under a lease in another comparable building which they could have leased but for
their reliance on Roth's representations that a written
lease agreement was forthcoming to [*630] confirm this
oral agreement. This distinction between its rental obligations currently incurred and those which it could have
entered into, while similar to damages representing the
benefit of the bargain pursuant to the anticipated lease
with First Union, are distinct from the benefit of the
bargain allegedly entered into with First Union and represent a pecuniary loss which McCarthy, Lebit allegedly
incurred.
The distinction between what damages constitute
recoverable "pecuniary damages" and nonrecoverable
"benefit-of-the-bargain" [**38] damages is not an easy
one. The issue of damages in a negligent misrepresentation claim was discussed by the Ohio Supreme Court in
Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Forma Community
Gen. Hosp. Assn. (1990), 54 Ohio SUd 1,560N.E.2d
206, wherein the court precluded "economic damages"
in an action brought by a contractor against an architectural firm which was allegedly negligent in drafting plans
and specifications in a construction project absent privity
of contract between the plaintiff/contractor and defendant/architectural firm. In holding that 3 Restatement
of the Law 2d, Torts (1977) 126-127, Section 552 did
not provide recovery for economic damages suffered by
third parties not in privity with design professionals, the
court explained:
"'The law of torts is well equipped to offer redress
for losses suffered by reason of a "breach of some duty
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imposed by law to protect the broad interests of social
policy." [Citations omitted]. Tort law is not designed,
however, to compensate parties for losses suffered as a
result of a breach of duties assumed only by agreement.
That type of compensation necessitates an analysis of the
damages [**39] which were within the contemplation of
the parties when framing their agreement. Itremainsthe
particular province of the law of contracts. * * *
"'The controlling policy consideration underlying tort
law is the safety of persons and property — the protection of persons and property from losses resulting from
injury. The controlling policy consideration underlying the law of contracts is the protection of expectations
bargained for. If that distinction is kept in mind, the
damages claimed in a particular case may more readily
be classified between claims for injuries to persons or
property on the one hand and economic losses on the
other.'
"Therefore, applying the Restatement in this context
will encompass liability that is otherwise best suited for
contract negotiation and assignment." Floor Craft Floor
Covering, supra, 54 Ohio St. 3d at 7, 560 N.E.2d at
211.
In Floor Craft, plaintiffs specifically contracted with
the hospital to hold the architects harmless for economic
damages arising from the architects' plans and specifications. Moreover, the architects' contract with die hospital contained several provisions to shield the [**40]
architects from liability from the contractors. [*631]
Accordingly, application of the economic loss rale in
Floor Craft was required to hold the parties to their contract. Id. at 7, 560N.E.2dat2U.
Adoption of the "economic loss" rule in Floor Craft
does not necessarily preclude recover in the instant case
since Section 552 specifically provides that damages for
"pecuniary loss" are recoverable for negligent misrepresentations made by those who have a pecuniary interest
in a transaction. Aside from Floor Craft, no further
Ohio cases discuss the applicable damages recoverable
in a negligent misrepresentation claim. However cases
outside Ohio appear to adopt two separate theories of
recovery. Courts which apply the economic lots rule
to preclude recovery in a misrepresentation claim do so
in a very narrow context. These courts hold that the
economic loss rule does not apply (1) where one intentionally makes false representations, and (2) where one
in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others makes negligent representations. See
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. NatL Tank Co. (1982), 91
IH2d 69, 61 IlLDec. 746, 435 N.E.2d 443. [**41]
With respect to the second exception, such persons usually include attorneys, abstractors of title, surveyofa, in-
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of any oral promise by Life to subsequently reduce the
agreement to a writing to be agreed on and executed,
Life cannot have reasonably expected that the promise
so shown would induce Southmark to action leading to
its definite and substantial injury.
nil Both Levy and Walker stated in their affidavits that in June 1985 Southmark understood that
Olmsted would not be able to consummate an agreement with Life. This information apparently came
from Charles Roth, the securities broker who initially advised Southmark of the possibility of acquiring Life's IB shares. However, Levy indicated that
at the end of June Olmsted was given an extension of
time to locate the requisite funding for the proposed
stock purchase.
Arthur Christoffersen, the executive vice president
of Life, stated in his affidavit that on July 22, 1985
counsel for IB told Life's counsel that the problems
with Olmsted were resolved and that Olmsted was
assigning his contract to purchase the IB stock to
USUCQ Christoffersen notified Southmark of this
development the same day. Nothing in the affidavits
of Southmark's officers indicates that Southmark was
notified of Olmsted's status prior to that date. In
fact, Southmark suggests in its brief on appeal that it
was not officially informed of Olmsted's status until
August 9, 1985, when the president of IB notified
Southmark that Olmsted was not going to purchase
the IB securities. In any event, nothing in the record
indicates that either party knew prior to July 22,1985
that Olmsted would definitely be unable to purchase
the securities.
[**2H
Neither Cobb nor any other case cited by Southmark
compels the conclusion that Southmark's estoppel theory precluded summary judgment for Life. In Cobb, the
defendant at least provided a written acknowledgement
of the oral lease agreement as well as of the agreement
to execute a document embodying it. Pursuant to the
agreement and in reliance on the defendant's promises,
the plaintiff spent $ 312,237 renovating the lease space.
Because the renovations were part of the agreement,
the defendant certainly should have expected that its
promises would induce the plaintiff to undertake his contractual obligations by making the renovations. Under
these circumstances, it seems clear [*771] that an injustice would occur unless the defendant were estopped
from asserting a statute of frauds defense.
In the present case, however, there was neither a written acknowledgement of the alleged oral sales agree-

Page 59
LEXSEE

ment nor of any agreement to execute final documents
embodying the agreement already made. Moreover,
Southmark had not performed under the alleged agreement, nl2 nor had it made actual expenditures or binding commitments with third parties in reliance on Life's
promises. Instead, Southmark claims [**22] only that
it lost potential profits from business opportunities it
passed up, largely if not wholly while it was uncertain whether Olmsted would purchase the shares. These
circumstances are thus markedly different from those
presented in Cobb. Indeed, the factors creating the potential for injustice in Cobb and similar cases, nl3 viz.,
the promisee's partial performance and actual expenditures or binding commitments made in reliance upon a
promise that could be expected to induce the promisee
to take such action, are simply not present in the case at
hand. Texas courts have made it clear that promissory
estoppel should be invoked only when the circumstances
are so egregious as to render it inequitable for the court
to apply the statute of frauds, see Reynolds v. Stevens,
659 K2d 44, 45 (5th Cir.1981), but in this case we cannot say that such circumstances exist.
nl2 Although Texas courts have held that full or
partial performance of an oral agreement by one
party may preclude invocation of the statute of frauds
by the other, there are cases in which the court refused to enforce the oral agreement even where the
plaintiff had performed. See, e.g., Mercer v. C.A.
Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232,1237 (5th Cir. 1978).
[**23J
nl3 Other cases in which the court found that
the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be properly asserted are similarly distinguishable from the
present case. In Computer Sys. of Am., Inc. v.
International Business Mach. Corp., 795 E2d 1086
(1st Cir. 1986) (applying Texas law), for example,
there was evidence of an existing document that confinned the parties' lease agreement and the general
terms thereof, and there was evidence of a written
promise to sign a more comprehensive and formal
agreement at a later time. See id, as 1087,1093-94.
Moreover, in reliance on the defendant's promises,
the plaintiff had already modified the leased equipment to meet the defendant's particular needs and
had undertaken steps to facilitate the installation of
the equipment at the defendant's facilities. Id. at
1088.
Likewise, inMagcobarN. Am. v. Grasso Oilfield
Sent, Inc., 736 S.W2d 787 (Tex.App. - Corpus
Christi 1987, dismissed as moot), another case involving an alleged lease agreement, there was evi-
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ing because the oral loan agreement was unenforceable
pursuant to the statute of frauds. The court rejected this
argument, noting that the reasonableness of plaintiffs
reliance is normally a question of fact for the jury. Id.
at 123-124.
In the present case, it is undisputed that First Union is
in the business of renting commercial real estate and that
its agent, Arthur Roth, supplied McCarthy, Lebit with
false information. Moreover, First Union's pecuniary
interest in the above transaction is self-evident. Further,
it is our opinion that a material issue of fact exists with
respect to whether Roth's representations that the paperwork was being completed and a written lease agreement
was forthcoming was made knowing that McCarthy,
Lebit would rely upon it in deciding to [**47] forgo
the opportunity to pursue other leasing options. Finally,
whether McCarthy, Lebit justifiably relied upon Roth's
representations should also be left for the jury's determination. Gathagan, supra, at paragraph three of the
syllabus.
The issue of damages was further explored by the appellate court in Frame v. Boatmen's Bank of Concord
Village (Mo.App. 1992), 824 S.W.2d 491 ("Frame IT).
On remand, the trial court awarded plaintiff $ 4,300,
representing plaintiffs lost earnest money deposit paid
to the prospective seller of the bowling alley. Frame
appealed, urging he was entitled to recover lost profits.
The court of appeals rejected Frame's argument, citing
to the Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts, Section 552B,
as prohibiting "benefit-of-the-bargain" damages. The
court in Frame II limited Frame to consequential damages as represented by his lost earnest deposit money.
Id. at 495-497.
In the present case, McCarthy, Lebit's damages, as
alleged in its complaint, are limited to its forbearance
of pursuing other leasing opportunities in other office
[**48] buildings. While the difference between these
damages and damages based upon the benefit of the bargain allegedly entered into with First Union may be
slight, there still exists a distinction as previously explained, and these differences should not prevent recovery in the present case if a jury determines that
McCarthy, Lebit has proven its claim for negligent misrepresentation.
[*634] Accordingly, this court rejects First Union's
argument that McCarthy, Lebit is precluded from recovery under Section 552B based on the contention that its
claim is really a claim for benefit-of-the-bargain damages.
First Union's second argument that Section 552 allows recovery only for third parties is also without merit.

Page 49
LEXSEE

While the Ohio Supreme Court has addressed the issue
of a defendant's liability to a third party for negligent
misrepresentations, see Haddon View, Floor Craft and
Delman, supra, it has never limited a negligent misrepresentation claim to third parties only. In fact, Section
552, itself, does not limit its application to third parties.
Rather, it states "one who * * * supplies false information
for the guidance of others in [**49] their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information * * *." Thus, while Section 552 can be applied to
third parties, it is clearly not limited to third parties.
Finally, the cases previously cited apply Section 552 to
parties directly related to each other pursuant to contract
negotiations.
Accordingly, this court finds that a material issue of
fact exists as to McCarthy, Lebit's claim for negligent
misrepresentation. McCarthy, Lebit's second assignment of error is well taken.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this
cause is remanded to the trial court on McCarthy; Lebit's
second, third and fourth assignments of error. On remand, McCarthy, Lebit must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that an oral lease agreement waa entered
into. In addition, McCarthy, Lebit must demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that the doctrine of
promissory estoppel bars application of the statute of
frauds. McCarthy, Lebit's claim for negligent misrepresentation is limited to "out-of-pocket" losses. Finally,
to the extent that McCarthy, Lebit may recover damages under its claim for breach [**50] of an oral lease
agreement, such damages cannot be duplicative of those
damages recoverable under its negligent misrepresentation claim.
Judgment accordingly.
Blackmon, J., concurs.
John F. Corrigan, P.J., dissents.
DISSENTBY: CORRIGAN
DISSENT: John F. Corrigan, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the judgment rendered by
the majority.
With respect to the firm's breach of contract claim,
it must be noted that the parties' oral agreement may
constitute an express agreement. Lucas v. Costantini
(1983), 13 Ohio App. 3d 367, 368, 13 OBR 449, 450,
469 N.E.2d 927, 928. An express contract, unlike an
implied contract, connotes a formal exchange of [*635]
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Nacionales de Colombia, 638 S.W.2d 870, 872
(Tex.1982), rev'd on other grounds, 466 U.S. 408,
104 S. Ct. 1868,80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984) (interpreting Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2031b, which has
since been recodified at Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code
Ann. §§ 17.04l-.045), the principal question here is
whether the assertion of jurisdiction over USLICO
by the district court is constitutionally permissible.
[**27]
In Odder, the Supreme Court held that when an alleged
tort-feasor's intentional actions are expressly aimed at
the forum state, and the tort-feasor knows that the brunt
of the injury will be felt by a particular resident in the
forum, the tort-feasor must reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there to answer for its tortious actions.
Id. 104 S. Ct. as 1487. This holds true even if the
tort-feasor's conduct occurs in a state other than the forum state. Id. at 1488. But in the present case, there is
no evidence that USLICO expressly aimed its allegedly
tortious activities at Texas, nor is there evidence that
USLICO knew the brunt of Southmark's injury would
be felt there.
Indeed, the oral agreement with which USLICO allegedly interfered was apparently negotiated and made
in Atlanta and/or New York, and there is no evidence
that the agreement was made or to be performed in
Texas or governed by Texas law. nl6 Life, the other
party to the purported [+773] agreement, is not a resident of Texas, nor is Olmsted. The company whose
stock Southmark wished to purchase and that USLICO
did purchase was not a Texas corporation and it did not,
so far as the record shows, do any business [**28] in
Texas. Nor is there evidence that the stock was located
or purchased in Texas. Southmark itself is incorporated
in Georgia, and USLICO is a Virginia company domiciled in Washington, D.C

nl6 Southmark also relies on Union Carbide Corp.
v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1984), in
support of its specific jurisdiction argument. In that
case, however, the contract with which the defendant
tortiously interfered was a contract that was being
performed in the forum. Moreover, the defendant
interfered with that contract by entering into another
contract, also to be performed in the forum, with one
of the parties to the original agreement. Under these
circumstances, which are not present in the case at
hand, it is far more likely that the defendant will anticipate being haled into court in the forum to answer
for its tortious activities.
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In short, nothing in the record indicates that USLICO
expressly aimed its allegedly tortious activities at Texas,
or that Texas is even the focal point of USLICO's tortious conduct. nl7 Moreover, it is not even clear that
Southmark would feel the brunt of its injury in Texas.
While it may be true that USLICO agreed to buy the
stock knowing that [**29] Southmark has its principal
place of business in Texas, and that Southmark is therefore a Texas resident for jurisdictional purposes, we do
not think this fact standing alone would cause USLICO
to anticipate being haled into a Texas court to answer for
its conduct. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 471
US. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528
(1985) (noting that the mere foreseeability of causing
injury in another state is not a "sufficient benchmark"
for exercising personal jurisdiction). Indeed, under the
circumstances, the fact that Southmark has its principal
place of business in Texas is, as the district court put it,
a mere fortuity. Cf. Patterson v. Dietze, Inc., 764E2d
1145, 1147 (5th Cir. 1985) (where defendant's contact
with the forum rests solely on "the mere fortuity that the
plaintiff happens to be a resident of the forum," doe process requirements are not satisfied). We therefore reject
Southmark's specific jurisdiction argument
nl7 Southmark has argued that personal jurisdiction over USLICO exists because USLICO availed
itself of the protection of Texas laws by selling securities in Texas to finance the purchase of the IB
shares. However, the securities in question were actually offered by an underwriter after Southmark had
already filed this suit.
[**30]
Having concluded that specific jurisdiction is lacking,
we now consider whether Southmark has established that
general jurisdiction exists. To do so we must examine
the nature of USLICO's contacts with Texas to determine whether they constitute the kind of continuous and
systematic contacts required to satisfy due process.
USLICO asserts, and Southmark does not dispute, that
USLICO has no offices or real property in Texas; it has
no address, bank account, or telephone listing in Texas;
it does not recruit or maintain employees in Texas; it
has never performed services or paid taxes in Texas;
and it does not regularly advertise or send personnel to
Texas on USLICO business. Nonetheless, Southmark
contends that USLICO's subsidiaries that do business in
Texas are alter egos or agents of USLICO and that the
general jurisdiction that Texas courts have over the subsidiaries may be imputed to USLICO We do not agree.

87 Ohio App. 3d 613, *636; 622 N.E.2d 1093;
1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2382, **55
"'Real estate transactions are usually formal undertakings involving significant sums of money.'
"The Seale court further wrote:
" 'If a court allows parol evidence of an unwritten contract, it can never be certain that it is not perpetuating
rather than preventing a fraud. Had the agreement been
reduced to writing, however, there would be little opportunity for fraud or mistake to arise.'
[*637] "We agree with the reasoning of the Seale court
and we decline to apply the Gathagan case to cases involving real estate. Accordingly, we find no issue of
fact concerning whether appellee should be equitably
estopped from asserting the statute of frauds in the case
at bar."
I would apply the rationale set forth in Seale v.
Citizens S. & L. Assn., supra, expressly adopted by
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the Highland County Court of Appeals, and would not
allow the promissory [**56] estoppel claim to defeat
application of the statute of frauds.
Finally, as to the claim for negligent misrepresentation, I would conclude that, assuming such a claim may
defeat application of the defense of the statute of frauds
in a case such as this where a written lease is contemplated, the firm presented no evidence that anyone at
First Union ever represented that Roth could bind First
Union by an oral statement. Moreover, even assuming
such a representation had been made, since die parties
contemplated execution of a written lease and further negotiations, the firm could not justifiably rely upon such
representation.
I would therefore overrule each of the assigned errors
and affirm the judgment rendered below.
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DISPOSITION: [*1] Judgment vacated. Case remanded
with direction to enter judgment for the defendant.
Because of the novel question presented, no costs are
awarded to either party.
COUNSEL: Attorney for the Plaintiff: Lawrence
Winger, Esq. (orally), Herbert H.Bennett & Associates,
P.A., 121 Middle St., Suite 300, Portland, Maine 04101
Attorneys for the Defendant: Robert J. Piampiano, Esq.
(orally), William McKinley, Esq., RICHARDSON &
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JUDGES: Before ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN,
CLIFFORD, COLLINS and BRODY*, JJ.
* Brody J. sat at oral argument and participated in
the initial conference but resigned before this opinion
was adopted.
OPINIONBY: ROBERTS
OPINION: ROBERTS, J.
Emery-Waterhouse Co. appeals from a judgment
of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Lipez, J.)
awarding damages to Timothy B. Stearns for breach
of an oral contract to employ Stearns for a definite
term greater than one year. The court held EmeryWaterhouse estopped to assert its defense under the
statute of frauds, 33 M.R.S.A. §51(5)(1988), by the extent of Steam's detrimental reliance on the oral contract.
Because Stearns did not produce clear and convincing evidence of fraud on the [*2] part of his employer, we hold
that enforcement of the oral contract was barred by the
statute of frauds. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment.
Emery-Waterhouse is a Portland hardware whole-

saler that also franchises "Trustworthy" hardware stores
throughout the Northeast and owns several such stores.
In December, 1984 the Employer's president, Charles
Hildreth, met with Timothy Stearns in Massachusetts to
discuss hiring him to run the Employer's retail stores.
Stearns was managing a Sears-Roebuck & Company
store in Massachusetts, had done retail marketing for
Sears for twenty seven years, and was then fifty years
old. He was earning approximately $ 99,000 per year,
owned his home in Massachusetts, and also owned property in Maine. Stearns had some dissatisfactions with
Sears but was concerned about retaining his Sean job
security and was aware that his age would make it hard
to find another marketing job. After the initial meeting
Stearns came to Maine, inspected some stores, and met
with Hildreth in Portland. The substance of this second
meeting was disputed, but the jury found that Hildreth
gave Stearns an oral contract of employment to age fifty
five at a guaranteed salary [*3] of $ 85,000 per year.
This contract was never reduced to writing.
Stearnsresignedfrom Sears, moved to Maine, and became Emery-Witerhouse's director of retail sales. His
employer retained Stearns in this position at $ 85,000
for nearly two years. In December, 1986 Hildreth advised Stearns that he was being removed, but Stearns
was given a different job as the national accounts manager the next day. Stearnsremainedin this new position
at an annual salary of $ 68,000 for six months. Hildreth
then succeeded in his efforts to acquire a national marketing firm, eliminated Stearns's position as a result,
and terminated his employment before he reached age
fifty five. Stearns eventually filed a complaint in the
Superior Court for breach of contract. The court denied summary judgment based on the possibility that
the employer might be estopped to assert its defense
under the statute of frauds by Stearns's detrimental reliance. At trial the court held that such an estoppel ap-
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plied. The jury established the oral contract and breach
by special findings and the court assigned damages in
equity pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
139. Following the denial of its post [*4] trial motions
Emery-Waterhouse brought this appeal.
The appeal presents a question of first impression in
Maine: whether an employee may avoid the statute of
frauds based solely upon his detrimental reliance on an
employer's oral promise of continued employment, nl
Other jurisdictions have divided on this question. n2
Some have permitted avoidance based on theories of
promissory estoppel, Mcintosh v. Murphy, 469 R2d
177, 181 (Haw. 1970), equitable estoppel, Pursell v.
Vhlverine-Pentronix, Inc., 205N. W.2d504, 506 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1973), or part performance, Stevens v. Good
Samaritan Hosp. and Medical Center, 504 R2d 749,
752 (Or. 1972). Others have rejected such an avoidance
as contrary to the policy of the statute, Tannenbaum v.
Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., 173 So. 2d 492, 495 (Flo.
1965), or as unsupported by sufficient evidence to verify the oral promise, Hudson v. \knture Industries, Inc.,
252 S.E.2d 606,608 (Go. 1979). Steams contends that
our case law permits him to avoid the statute of frauds
under the promissory estoppel theory of section 139 of
the Restatement (Second) [*5] of Contracts. n3 We disagree.
nl It is undisputed that the oral contract with
Stearns, if any, was for a period longer than one
year and therefore was within the statute of frauds.
n2 See Annotation, "Action By Employee
In Reliance On Employment Contract Which
Violates Statute Of Frauds As Rendering Contract
Enforceable," 54A.L.R.3d 715 at §§ 11-13 (1974);
3 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts
§ 533A (3d ed. 1960); 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 459 (1950 & Supp. 1990).
n3 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1)
provides as follows:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the
part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce the action or forbearance is enforceable
notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The
remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice
requires.
In Chapman v. Bomann, 381 A. 2d 1123, [*6] (Me.
1978), we adopted promissory estoppel as a substitute
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for consideration, Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
90, but did not decide whether it would permit a direct avoidance of the statute of frauds. Id. § 139. n4
Chapman involved an oral promise to make a writing
satisfying the statute of frauds that was ancillary to a
contract for the sale of land. Wfe considered whether this
ancillary promise could be enforced under the equitable
principle that the statute of frauds may not itself become
an instrument of fraud. Focusing on the conduct of the
defendant, we concluded that an actual, subjective intention to deceive can estop the operation of the statute.
In addition, an oral, ancillary promise may be enforced
if the circumstances show objectively that "a fraud, or a
substantial injustice tantamount to a fraud" would result
from strict application of the statute. Chapman, 381
A.2dat 1123. Thus, although we invoked the rubric of
promissory estoppel, our decision in Chapman actually
applied an equitable estoppel and extended it only to an
ancillary promise to make a writing. See 381 A.2d at
1130 n. 6.
n4 At the time of our decision in Chapman the
language to be incorporated in section 139 was contained in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 217A
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 1968). See Chapman, 381
A.2datU30n.6.
[*7]
Wfe affirm that equitable estoppel, based upon a
promisor's fraudulent conduct, can avoid application of
the statute of frauds and that this principle applies to
a fraudulent promise of employment. But we decline
Stearns's invitation to accept promissory estoppel as permitting avoidance of the statute in employment contracts
that require longer than one year to perform. Although
section 139 of the Restatement may promote justice in
other situations, in the employment context it contravenes the policy of the Statute to prevent fraud. It is
too easy for a disgruntled former employee to allege reliance on a promise, but difficult factually to distinguish
such reliance from the ordinary preparations that attend
any new employment. Thus, such pre-employment actions of reliance do not properly serve the evidentiary
function of the writing required by the statute. An employee who establishes an employer's fraudulent conduct
by clear and convincing evidence may recover damages
for deceit, Boivin v. Jones & Vining, Inc., 578 A.2d
187,189 (Me. 1990), or may avoid the statute of frauds
and recover under an oral contract. The policy of the
statute commands, however, [*8] that the focus remain
upon the employer's conduct rather than upon the employee's reliance.
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For similar reasons we reject the part performance
doctrine as an avenue for avoidance of the statute of
frauds in the employment context. We have recognized
in other circumstances that a promisor's acceptance of
partial performance may estop a defense under the statute
on the ground of equitable fraud. Northeast Inv. Co. v.
Leisure Living Communities, Inc., 351 A. 2d 845, 855
(Me. 1976); McGuire v. Murray, 107 Me. 108,115
(1910). Under this doctrine, too, our focus has been
upon the conduct of the promisor. Moreover, an employee's preparations to begin a new assignment generally convey no direct benefit to an employer so it is particularly inappropriate to remove from an employer the
protections of the statute. An employee can recover for
services actually performed in quantum meruit. But to
enforce a multi-year employment contract an employee
must produce a writing that satisfies the statute of frauds
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or must prove fraud on the part of the employer.
Stearns has neither alleged nor proved fraud on the
part of Emery-Waterhouse. Stearns does not [*9J dispute that he was adequately compensated for the time
that he actually worked. We conclude that his action for
breach of contract is barred by the statute of frauds. Our
holding renders it unnecessary to address the employer's
other contentions on appeal.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated.
Case remanded with direction to enter judgment for
the defendant. Because of the novel question presented,
no costs are awarded to either party.
All concurring.
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Manion, Kanne, Circuit [**2] Judges, and Eschbach,
Senior Circuit Judge. Flaum, Circuit Judge, joined
by Bauer, Chief Judge, Wfood, Jr., Cudahy, Ripple and
Kanne, Circuit Judges, concurring.
OPINIONBY: PER CURIAM
OPINION: [*1560] John Varhol appealsfroma jury verdict that awarded him what he considers to be grossly
inadequate damages. Not surprisingly, Varhol's mam
contention on appeal is that the damage award was too
low. Preserving that issue for appeal, however, required
Varhol to file a timely new trial motion m the district
court. Hahn v. Becker, 588 E2d 768, 772 (7th Cir.
1979). Unfortunately Varhol served his new trial motion well after the ten-day limit Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 allows.
Whether Varhors motion was timely, and thus whether
\fcrhol has preserved his damages issue for appeal, depends on the status of Eady v. Foerder, 381 R2d 980
(7th Cir. 1967), which held that m certain "unique circumstances" a district court may dispose of an otherwise
untimely new trial motion on the merits.
The case was originally argued before a three-judge
panel. The full court plus Senior Judge Eschbach [**3]
reheard the case en banc to consider whether to overrule
Eady. The court as constituted is evenly divided. Six
judges (Judges Cummings, Posner, Coffey, Easterbrook,
Manion, and Eschbach) voted to overrule Eady. Six
judges (Chief Judge Bauer and Judges Wbod, Cudahy,
Flaum, Ripple, and Kanne) voted not to overrule Eady.
Since a majority of the court as constituted did not vote
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to overrule Eady, it remains as the law of this circuit.
Despite not overruling Eady, the court unanimously
voted to affirm the district court on all issues, including
damages. Those judges who voted to overrule Eady
would affirm the amount of damages on procedural
grounds, not reaching the issue on the merits because of
Varhol's failure to file a timely new trial motion. Those
judges who voted not to overrule Eady would hold on the
merits that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by not awarding Varhol a new trial on damages.
The court's opinion discusses those issues on which
all judges have agreed. The question of whether to overrule Eady is discussed in separate concurring opinions.

* The Illinois State Bar Association and Appellate
Lawyers Association, the Federal Bar Association,
the Wisconsin Porcelain Retirement Participants,
the Chicago Council of Lawyers, and the Seventh
Circuit Bar Association filed briefs as amici curiae
on the question of whether to overrule Eady. Wfe
thank these groups for their participation in this case.
[**4]
I.
John Varhol worked as a chief of on-board services
for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (more
commonly known as Amtrak, the name by which we
will refer to it). Varhol's job required him to ride
on Amtrak's trains during their scheduled runs. On
November 12, 1983, the train on which Varhol was
working derailed near Jefferson, Texas. The car in
which Varhol had been riding remained upright, but
Varhol was thrown to his hands and knees. He picked
himself up, checked various cars, and went outside to
help remove passengers from the train. A short time
after the accident, while still helping to remove passengers, Varhol slipped on some rocks near the track,
again falling on his hands and knees. Varhol rode a
train home to Chicago the next day, working along the
way; he never worked again (for Amtrak and as far as
we know for anyone else).
According to Varhol, the derailment caused him severe
injuries that prevented him from returning to work, and
caused him great pain and suffering. Varhol sued Amtrak
under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45
U.S.C. §§ 51 -60. Amtrak admitted that its negligence
caused the derailment, so the only issue at trial was damages. [**5] The problem for Varhol in proving damages
was that he had had Multiple Sclerosis (MS) for ten to
twenty years before the derailment. Varhol claimed that
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the derailment had made his MS worse; Amtrak contended that Varhol's condition after the derailment resulted [*1561] from the natural progression of his MS,
and that the derailment had nothing to do with exacerbating his MS. Varhol alleged that he suffered injuries apart
from the exacerbation of his MS, but the evidence was
such that a reasonable jury could have believed that other
than a few scrapes and bruises he received in his falls,
the bulk of Varhol's damages (for example, his physical
ills and inability to return to work) were caused by his
MS. Thus, the central issue at trial was whether, and to
what extent, the derailment exacerbated Varhol's MS.
After both sides presented conflicting testimony on the
medical issues, the trial judge submitted the case to the
jury. Among the instructions the judge gave was a series of interrogatories concerning the extent to which the
derailment aggravated Varhol's MS. Those interrogatories required the jury to determine, if it could, 'what
percentage of [Varhol's] present condition was caused
by [**6] the injuries he suffered as a result of the train
derailment. . .," and then asked the jury if it took that
"percentage into consideration in reducing the amount
of damages that you have awarded" to Varhol. The jury
found that the derailment caused one percent of Varhol's
condition, and awarded him $ 237.00 in damages.
After the jury announced its verdict, the district judge
told Varhol's lawyers that they could take twenty-one
days to file any post-trial motions, including a motion
for a new trial. Twenty-one days later, Varhol filed his
motion for new trial. Not surprisingly, Varhol's motion contended that a new trial was necessary because
the jury's verdict was grossly inadequate. Varhol also
challenged the trial judge's decision to submit the special interrogatories on aggravation to the jury, and the
judge's decision not to admit his medical bills into evidence. The trial judge denied Varhol's motion, \farhol
appeals both the denial of his motion and the underlying
judgment.

n.
The sequence of events in the district court raises a
question as to our appellate jurisdiction. Varhol did not
file his notice of appeal until after the district court denied his new trial motion - [**7] fifty-nine days after
the clerk entered judgment on the jury's verdict See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. Amtrak is not an agency of the United
States, so Fed.R. App.P. 4(a) required Varhol to file his
notice of appeal "within 30 days after the date of the
entry of judgment." The Supreme Court and this court
have repeatedly emphasized that a timely notice of appeal is "mandatory and jurisdictional." E.g., Griggs v.
Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61, 74
L. Ed. 2d 225, 103 S. O. 400 (1982) (per curiam);
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Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections, 434
US. 257, 264, 54L. Ed. 2d521, 98S. Ct. 556(1978);
Parke-Chapley Constr. Co. v. Cherrington, 865 E2d
907, 908-09 (7th Cir. 1989); cf., Sonicraft, Inc. v.
NLRB, 814 E2d 385 (7th Cir. 1987). This means what
it says: if an appellant does not file his notice of appeal
on time, we cannot hear his appeal.
If a party files a timely motion for a new trial under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), the time for filing a notice of
appeal from the underlying judgment does not begin to
run until the district court enters judgment denying the
motion. Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4). But Varhol's new trial
motion was not timely, even though he filed his motion
within the twenty-one days the district court gave him.
Rule [**8] 59(b) provides that "[a] motion for a new
trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry
of the judgment." Rule 6(b) provides that a district court
may not extend the time for filing any Rule 59 motion.
Since the trial judge could not extend the time to file
the new trial motion, Varhol's new trial motion was untimely and, according to Rule 4(a)(4), should not have
tolled the time for filing his notice of appeal.
There is, however, a narrow exception to the general
rule prohibiting an untimely appeal. This exception,
known as the "unique circumstances" doctrine, originated in Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat
Packers, Inc., 371 US. 215, 9 L. Ed. 2d 261, 83
S. Ct. 283 (1962) (per curiam). In Harris, the district court, acting before the 30-day appeal period had
ended, granted [*1562] the losing party's motion under then-Fed.R.Civ.P. 73(a) to extend the time to file
its notice of appeal. (Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(a)(5) now provides for motions to extend the time to file a notice of
appeal; we will discuss Rule 4(a)(5) in more detail below.) This court dismissed the appeal, finding that the
circumstances the district court relied upon to grant the
extension did not constitute "excusable neglect," as the
rule [**9] required. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that if a party relies on a district court's extension of
time to file a notice of appeal, and delays an appeal, the
court of appeals should not dismiss the appeal because
it disagrees with the district court's finding of excusable
neglect. Id. at 217. If the decision to grant an extension is open to second-guessing by the appellate court,
the only way a party could protect itself would be to
file an appeal within thirty days of the judgment; but
the extension of time was supposed to allow the party
to defer the decision to appeal. The Supreme Court reasoned that this obvious dilemma presented such "unique
circumstances" that this court should not have disturbed
the district court's decision to grant the extension. Id.
The Court extended the "unique circumstances" doc-
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trine in Thompson v. INS, 375 US. 384, 11 L. Ed.
2d 404, 84 S. Ct. 397 (1964). In Thompson, a party
served a motion for a new trial twelve days after entry
of judgment. The district court assured the party that
his motion was timely, and went on to decide the motion
on the merits. By the time the district court decided the
motion, the time to appeal the underlying judgment had
run. The party [**10] filed a late appeal, which this
court dismissed. The Supreme Court relied on Harris
to again reverse, holding that when a party performs
"an act which, if properly done, postponed the deadline
for filing an appeal," and the party relied on the district
court's conclusion that the act had been properly done,
the appeal is timely if filed within the mistaken new
deadline. Id. at 387. Later in the same term, the Court
relied on Thompson to summarily reverse another court
of appeals' dismissal of an untimely appeal. Wblfeohn
v. Hankin, 376 US. 203, 11 L. Ed. 2d 636, 84 S. Ct.
699 (1964).
This court has applied the unique circumstance* doctrine a number of times; indeed, we have remarked that
the doctrine is "particularly well established" in this circuit. Bernstein v. Lind-Wildock & Co., 738E2dl79,
182 (7th Cir. 1984). For cases invoking the doctrine
to save otherwise untimely appeals, see, e.g., idL at
182-83, Textor v. Board of Regents, 711 F.2d 1387,
1390-91 (7th Cir. 1983), and the cases Textor citea. The
unique circumstances doctrine as applied in Thompson
has been criticized and its continuing vitality questioned.
See Parkc-Chapley, 865 E2d at 913 n. 6; Sonicrafi v.
/**;;;NLRB, 814F.2d 385, 387(7th Cir. 1987); Smith
u Evans, 853F.2dl55,160-61 (3d Cir. 1988); set MIBO
Houston v. Lack, 487U.S. 266,282,101L. Ed. 2d245,
108 S. Ct. 2379 (1988) (Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
dissenting). But we are bound to follow Thompson unless we are "almost certain that the [Supreme Court]
would repudiate" it if given the chance. See Olson
u Paine, Wsbber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d
731, 734 (7th Cir. 1986). Despite the questions as
to Thompson's continuing vitality, we will not speculate as to Thompson's demise. Such speculation would
be especially inappropriate given that the very term after Lack, a unanimous Court rejected a unique circumstances argument by distinguishing rather than overruling Thompson. See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489
US. 169, 109 S. Ct. 987, 992-93, 103 L. Ed. 2d 146
(1989). While this is not conclusive proof that a Court
majority would not overrule Thompson if necessary to
decide a case, the fact that the Court in Osterneck chose
not to overrule Thompson makes it overly bold for us
to repudiate Thompson. Therefore, until the Supreme
Court says otherwise, Thompson and the unique [**12]
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circumstances doctrine it pronounced remain good law,
and we will continue to follow it, as we must. Cf. Kraus
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 899 K2d 1360,1362-65 (3d
Cir. 1990).
[*1563] That Thompson is still good law does not necessarily mean that it applies in this case. In Osterneck,
the Supreme Court held that the unique circumstances
doctrine will excuse an untimely notice of appeal when
"a party has performed an act which, if properly done,
would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and
has received specific assurance by a judicial officer that
this act has been properly done." 109 S. Ct. at 993.
In Green v. Bisby, 869 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1989), we
held, based on Osterneck, that the unique circumstances
doctrine did not save an untimely notice of appeal where
the court entered a minute order extending the time to
file a Rule 59 motion and the appellant, apparently relying on that order, filed an untimely Rule 59 motion.
Id. at 1072. We reasoned in Green that the unique circumstances doctrine did not apply because the entry of
the minute order was "not an act of affirmative representation by a judicial officer [that the act was properly
done] as contemplated [**13] by Osterneck." Id,
It is difficult to distinguish this case from Green. It
is true that in this case, the district court told Varhol in
open court he could have 21 days to file any Rule 59
motions. But it hardly seems that reliance on a judge's
spoken order in open court is any more reasonable than
reliance on the court's written orders. It is also true that
in Green a magistrate rather than the district court judge
who ultimately decided the case entered the order extending the time to file the Rule 59 motion. See id. But
a magistrate is a judicial officer, and there is nothing
in Green to suggest that the magistrate was not properly empowered under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) to consider
matters relating to post-trial motions.
Wfe do not have to decide whether Green controls
this case, however, because there is an alternative basis for appellate jurisdiction. After the thirty days
for appeal had run, Varhol recognized his jurisdictional
problem and filed a timely motion under Fed.R.App.P.
4(a)(5) to extend the time to appeal. Rule 4(a)(5) allows such extensions after the original thirty-day period has ended if the court finds that the failure to file
a timely notice [**14] of appeal resulted from "excusable neglect." See Lorenzen v. Employees Retirement
Plan of Sperry <ft Hutchinson, 896 F.2d 228, 231-32
(7th Cir. 1990); Parke-Chapley, 865 E2d at 909-11;
Redfield v. Continental Cos. Co., 818 F.2d 596, 601
(7th Cir. 1987). The trial judge found that Varhol's
failure to file a timely notice of appeal resulted from his
reliance on the extension of time to file the new trial
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motion and the consideration of that motion on the merits. The judge found this to be excusable neglect, and
granted Varhol more time to file his notice of appeal.
One might reasonably wonder how Varhol's reliance
could be "excusable." After all, Rules 59 and 6(b), and
Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4) lead clearly to the conclusion that
an untimely Rule 59 motion will not toll the time to
appeal no matter what the district court may say or
do. Surely a lawyer practicing in federal court ought
to know the federal rules. Cf. United States v. Beacon
Bay Enterprises Inc., 840 F.2d 921 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1988). Attorney unfamiliarity with or misunderstanding of the federal rules, except in rare instances, is
generally not excusable neglect under Rule 4(aX5). See
Parke-Chapley, [++15] 865 F2d at 912-13.
Still, the trial judge did find excusable neglect in this
case, and we generally give deference to that finding.
See Redfield, 818 F.2d at 602; see also Lorenzen, 896
Kid at 232-33. Amtrak has not challenged that finding.
Moreover, this court relied on the fact that the district
court had granted Varhol's Rule 4(a)(5) motion in denying Amtrak's motion to dismiss this appeal, \fahol v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp., No. 88-2207 (7th
Cir. Aug. 8, 1988) (unpublished order). And despite
the rules' clarity, it is at least arguable that reliance on
a trial judge's extension of time to file a Rule 59 motion and subsequent consideration of that motion on the
merits could constitute excusable neglect: it is understandable that litigants would put great stock in what
federal judges say about procedural matters (even if what
the federal judges say may turn out to be wrong). The
circumstances in this case are [*1564] similar to those
in Feeder Line Towing Serv., Inc. v. Toledo, Peoria
& Vkstern RR Co., 539 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1976). In
Feeder Line, an appellant in an admiralty case did not file
its notice of appeal within Rule 4(a) 's thirty-day limit.
The [**16] appellant's counsel thought that 28 ULS.C. §
2107, which provided a sixty-day appeal period in admiralty cases, controlled; counsel failed to recognize that
under 28 U.S.C. § 2072, Rule 4(a)'s thirty-day limit,
which was inconsistent with § 2107's sixty-day limit,
controlled. Id. at 1108 The district court found that
this was excusable neglect, and granted an extension of
time to file a notice of appeal. We upheld this determination because counsel's error was not the result of
irresponsibility but a good faith, though erroneous, interpretation of two provisions of law. Id. at 1109. This
was so even though § 2072 states, on its face, that "all
laws in conflict with [the federal] rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect."
The real question here is not whether we would have
found Varhol' s reliance to be excusable neglect but rather
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whether we should second-guess the trial judge's decision that it was. In this case, we think not. We are not
saying that we will not overturn a district court's finding
of excusable neglect where the party's excuse is so far
afield (for example, counsel simply forgetting on day
thirty to file the notice) that [**17] granting the extension would be a patent abuse of discretion. (Compare
the discussion inLorenzen, 896 E 2d at 232-33, concerning the types of mistakes that may warrant lenity under
Rule 4(a)(5).) Allowing extension on frivolous grounds
would turn Rule 4(a)(5) into a device to convert automatically the thirty-day appeal period into a sixty-day
period, something the rule was not meant to be. See
In re O.P.M. Leasing Sendees, 769 E2d 911, 917 (2d
Cir. 1985) (Friendly, J.). Nor are we saying that the
district court would have abused its discretion if it had
found that Varhors reliance was not excusable neglect.
See Lorenzen, 896 E2d at 233. But because it is at
least arguable that Varhol's actions could constitute excusable neglect, Amtrak has not challenged the district
court's finding that it was, and an earlier ruling of this
court has implicitly improved that finding, we will not
second-guess the district court's finding of excusable neglect in this case. Since the district court did not abuse
its discretion in granting Varhol an extension of time to
file his appeal, and Varhol filed his appeal within the
extended time granted, we have jurisdiction over this
appeal [**18] even if Thompson's unique circumstances
doctrine does not apply here.

m.
On the merits, Varhol raises several issues besides the
amount of damages. Varhol first complains that it was
error for the district court to submit to the jury the special interrogatories concerning aggravation of his preexisting MS. As we have noted, those interrogatories
essentially told the jury to determine what portion of
Varhol's condition, as it existed at the time of trial, resultedfromthe derailment, and, if it could determine that
portion, to take it into account in determining damages.
Varhol complains that the interrogatory was inconsistent
with the aggravation instruction the court gave the jury
(which was, with slight modifications, a Fifth Circuit
pattern instruction); according to Varhol, that instruction did not allow the jury to apportion damages for the
aggravation of his MS between aggravation caused and
not caused by the derailment. Varhol also complains
that the interrogatory failed to instruct the jury that it
could award damages resulting from the derailment (for
example, pain and suffering from his injuries suffered in
the derailment, emotional distress from the derailment,
and [**19] the effects of a head injury he allegedly suffered in the derailment) separately from the aggravation
of his MS. As a result of this omission, Varhol claims
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that the interrogatory unduly focused the jury's attention
CHI aggravation, and confused the jury by essentially instructing the jurors that damagesfromaggravation of the
MS were the only damages they could award.
District courts have broad discretion under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b) to submit special interrogatories
[*1565] to juries. SeeElston v. Morgan, 440E2d47,
49 (7th Cir. 1971). We find no abuse of discretion
here.
Vkrhol's contention that the aggravation
instruction did not allow apportionment is hollow.
That instruction read, in part: "If you find thai mere
was such an aggravation, you should determine what
portion of plaintiffs present condition resulted from
the aggravation and make allowance in your verdict
only for the aggravation." This clearly told the jury that
it was to award damages to Varhol for his MS condition
only to the extent his condition was aggravated by
the derailment; in short, it told the jury to apportion.
The special interrogatories led the jury, in an orderly
way, through this apportionment process, [*+20] and
allowed die court and parties to decipher the jury's
thinking on that issue.
Vbrhoi's arguments about juror confusion and overemphasis on aggravation damages are equally unconvincing. Nothing in the special interrogatory told the jurors
that aggravation was the only damage component they
could award and the trial judge fully instructed the jury
on every element of damages Varhol claimed. The district court also instructed the jury to follow all his instructions, and not to single any out as more important
than the others. Moreover, at the instruction conference
the judge directed Varhol's lawyers to draft the interrogatories. If his lawyers were concerned about the interrogatories possibly disregarding other damages, they
should have drafted the interrogatories to get around
that problem. But the interrogatories, as Varhol's counsel submitted them, did not include any warning to the
jurors not to disregard other damages, and \fahol's
lawyers did not mention this possible problem to the
judge. At all events, we think the instructions as a whole
fully and fairly informed the jury about Varhol's damage
theories. If any problem did exist with jury confusion or
overemphasis on [**21] aggravation, however, Varhol's
lawyers took no steps to avoid these problems at trial,
so he cannot complain about them on appeal.
Varhol next raises a series of alleged errors by the
trial judge in admitting and refusing to admit certain
evidence. Varhol first contends that the judge erred by
refusing to admit Varhol's bills for medical expenses incurred before trial. All these bills had been paid by
Travelers Insurance Group Policy GA-23000, a policy
for which Amtrak, not Varhol, paid the premiums. The
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trial judge found that because the bills had been paid
by this policy, Varhol could not recover those expenses;
therefore, the judge ruled that evidence of the amounts
was inadmissible because the amounts were irrelevant
and because of the possibility that the jury might misuse
the amounts in calculating damages (for example, by deciding that trebling the bills would be a good way to fix
damages).
Varhol does not contend that he was entitled to collect
the medical expenses paid by the Travelers' policy, so we
assume, without deciding, that he was not. nl Varhol
insists only that even if he could not recover the paid
medical expenses, the district court should have admitted the bills, [**22] amounts and all, because they were
necessary to assess the full extent of his injuries.
nl Section 5 of FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 55, provides
that an employer "may set off . . . any sum it has
contributed or paid to any insurance, . . . that may
have been paid to the injured employee . . . on
account of the injury. . . . " Despite the language
"any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance" (emphasis added), most courts have followed
the lead of Judge Friendly's concurrence in Blake v.
Delaware &. Hudson Ry Co., 484 Eld 204, 207
(2d Cir. 1973) and have held that an employer is
entitled to set off the entire amount of benefits paid
by a policy it pays for if the collective bargaining
agreement between the employer and the employee's
union expressly provides that the purpose of the policy is to indemnify the employer against FELA liability rather than serve as a wage equivalent for
the employees. See, e.g., Folkestad v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 813 F.2d 1377, 1382-83 (9th Cir.
1987); Mead v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,
676F.Supp. 92,94-95 (D.Md. 1987). The relevant
collective bargaining agreement in this case provides
that the policy is not a wage equivalent. Thus, under
Judge Friendly( s reasoning, setoff would have been
proper. Compare Mead, supra, which found setoff
proper for Amtrak under the same policy.
[**23]
[*1566] The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the bills. We agree that since
Varhol could not recover the expenses reflected in those
bills, the amounts of those expenses bore little, if any,
relevance to this case. See Francis v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 661F Supp. 244, 245 (D.Md. 1987).
Even if the amounts were somehow relevant, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding the possibility of jury confusion, misuse, and double-recovery out-
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weighed the bills* probative value. Fed.R.Evid. 403.
This is especially so since several witnesses, lay and expert, testified concerning the extent of Varhol's injuries.
Varhol next contends that the district court erred by
refusing to admit his tendered Exhibit 23. Exhibit 23
was a 1971 letter from a doctor at the Mayo Clinic to
Varhol. During discovery, Varhol had given Amtrak a
number of documents from the Mayo Clinic; by mistake,
he did not include Exhibit 23 among them. When Varhol
tried to introduce the letter, Amtrak objected, claiming
surprise because it had never seen the letter. The district
court excluded the letter for this reason. Varhol offers no
authority for his argument that the court [*+24] should
have admitted the letter, so we could hold that he has
waived this issue. See Fed.R.App.R 28(aX4); Beard
v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 408 (7th Cir.
1988). But in any event, we see no abuse of discretion
in refusing to admit a document that a party never submitted to his opponent before trial (even if by mistake),
despite a discovery request by the opponent.
Varhors third alleged evidentiary error was the district court's decision to allow Robert Fitzgerald, an
Amtrak employee, to testify in Amtrak's case about matters beyond authenticating documents. Varhol claims he
was surprised by Fitzgerald's testimony because Amtrak
did not list Fitzgerald in the pretrial order; instead,
Amtrak stated only that it would call a "Representative
of National Railroad Passenger Corp." Again, \fcrhol
has cited no authority to support his argument But,
in any event, Varhol's claim of surprise rings false.
While Fitzgerald did not merely authenticate records,
all his testimony concerned records that Amtrak had
given Varhol in discovery. Moreover, Varhol himself
had called Fitzgerald as a witness for the same reason
Amtrak did — to authenticate and explain Varhors employment records. [**25] We find no abuse of discretion
in allowing Fitzgerald to do the same thing for Amtrak.
Varhol's final evidentiary challenge is his most substantial. Over Varhol's objection, the trial judge allowed
Amtrak- to cross-examine Varhol about a suspension from
work he had received for purchasing stolen train tickets
from his boss. The district court allowed the crossexamination under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b), which allows a
questioner cross-examining a witness to attack the witness's credibility by inquiring into specific instances of
misconduct by the witness that are "probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness."
Amtrak's counsel asked Varhol the following questions during cross-examination:
Q. Mr. Varhol, were you not suspended for 45 days
on March 13, 1981?
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A. Yes, I was.
Q. For the purchase and use of stolen Burlington
Northern commuter tickets . . .?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you not admit to your guilt, agree to the
suspension, and make restitution for the stolen tickets
you had purchased and used?
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(Burger, J.). In addition, such acts
"do disclose a disregard for the rights of others which
might reasonably be expected to express itself in giving
false testimony whenever it would be to the advantage of
the witness. If the witness had no compunctions against
stealing another's property . . . it is hard to see why he
would hesitate to obtain an advantage [**28] for himself
or [a] friend in trial by giving false testimony."

A. Yes.

Although Varhol testified on redirect that he did not
know the tickets were stolen when he bought them, we
think the questions and answers about the incident fairly
raise the inference that [**26] Varhol knowingly bought
and used stolen tickets. The fact that Varhol admitted
"guilt" and paid restitution so indicates: why admit guilt
or pay restitution if you are not guilty of anything? The
jury did not have to draw this inference (and for all we
know, it may not have), but it could have. The question,
therefore, is whether Varhol's alleged conduct — buying and using stolen tickets — [*1567] was probative of
Varhol's "character for truthfulness or untruthfulness."
Varhol insists that Rule 608(b) only allows questioning about acts that involve fraud or deceit — for example, perjury, subornation of perjury, false statement,
embezzlement, and false pretenses. See United States v.
Amahia, 825 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1987). Our own
cases, however, do not use language that cabins crossexamination under Rule 608(b) in this way. See, e.g.,
United States v. Holt, 817F.2d 1264,1272-73 (7th Cir.
1987); Simmons, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 762 E2d
591, 605 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. CovelU, 738
F.2d 847, 856 (7th Cir. 1984). But the fact that none of
these cases has specifically limited Rule 608(b) questioning to acts that involve fraud or deceit is not very helpful
[**27] to us here because these cases all involved questioning about acts that involved some element of deceit
or false statement.
The reason for allowing cross-examination under Rule
608(b) is to allow a party to attempt to cast doubt on a
witness's reliability for telling the truth. Acts involving fraud or deceit clearly raise such doubt, while certain
acts, such as murder, assault, or battery normally do not.
But stealing and receiving stolen goods fall into a gray
area. Stealing does not necessarily involve false statements or deceit, so it does not necessarily go directly to
a witness's propensity to lie. But people generally regard acts such as stealing (and receiving and using stolen
property) as acts that "reflectQ adversely on a man's honesty and integrity." Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.
App. D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967)

David W. Louisell and Christopner B. Mueller, 3
Federal Evidence § 305, at 226 (1979) (quoting Ladd,
Credibility Tests - Current Trends, 89 U. Fa. L. Rev.
166,180 (1940)). As a practical matter, it is difficult to
distinguish between untruthfulness and dishonesty. See
id.
The question whether to allow questioning about acts
such as receiving and using stolen property under Rule
608(b) is a close one. But we think that the connection
between such acts and honesty and integrity, and between honesty and integrity and credibility, is sufficient
to allow admission, subject to the district court judge's
sound exercise of discretion. In this case, Varhol's credibility was a key issue. The stolen ticket evidence did
arguably reflect upon his honesty, and Varhol's counsel
had the opportunity to minimize any adverse inference
on redirect examination. Therefore, we do not think
it was an abuse of discretion to allow Amtrak to attack
Vunol's credibility by cross-examining Varhol about the
stolen tickets.
There is one further complication here, though: the
trial judge never told the jury that it was to consider
the evidence [*+29] about the stolen tickets only in determining Varhol's credibility. Varhol insists that we
must reverse because of the district court's failure to
give a limiting instruction. Varhol, however, has not
preserved this issue. At the time Amtrak asked the
questions, Varhol's lawyers stood silent and mentioned
nothing about a limiting instruction. In fact, at a sidebar immediately before Amtrak asked the questions (a
particularly appropriate time to remind the judge about
a limiting instruction), Varhol's counsel did not mention
a limiting instruction.
It is true, as Varhol notes, that his counsel did ask
the district judge several times during trial for a limiting
instruction, and that the judge stated that he would give
one. But all these requests came during arguments on
\ferhol's motion in limine, long before Amtrak actually
asked the questions. We do not know the reason for
\ferhol's counsel's failure to speak up at the moment of
truth: it could have been a tactical decision not to draw
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any more attention to the issue; it also could have been
an oversight. Whatever the reason, counsel's [*1568]
failure to speak up when the judge let the questioning in
without giving a limiting instruction has [**30] waived
the issue. If Varhol wanted a limiting instruction, he
should have reminded the judge at the proper time to
give one.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district
court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
CONCURBY: FLAUM; MANION
CONCUR: Flaum, Circuit Judge, joined by Bauer,
Chief Judge, Wood, Jr., Cudahy, Ripple and Kanne,
Circuit Judges, concurring.
John Varhol won a jury verdict against Amtrak for $
237. Immediately after the court discharged the jury,
counsel for Varhol informed the district judge that he
wished to file a post-trial motion for a new trial. With
no objection from Amtrak, the court gave him 21 days.
The next day, the court entered the jury verdict. On the
twenty-first day, Varhol filed a motion for a new trial in
accordance with the court's order.
In its reply, Amtrak responded with Rules 59(b) and
6(b). Rule 59(b) provides 10 days for motions for new
trials and Rule 6(b) prohibits the district court from extending that time. Under these rules, the motion was not
timely despite the court's purported extension of time.
At the hearing on the motion, the court stated to Varhol's
counsel that "to the extent you find yourself in a problem, it certainly is my fault, not yours. [**31] . . . I
certainly did not intend to have you lose any appellate
right by giving you twenty-one days within which to file
post-trial motions."
Varhol's counsel was an experienced state trial lawyer.
In Illinois state court, the trial judge can extend the time
for a motion for a new trial. 110 III.Stat. para. 21202(b). Varhol's counsel should have refamiliarized
himself with the Federal Rules before the trial, but when
the court granted 21 days to file the motion without
objection from opposing counsel, Varhol relied on the
judge's knowledge of the Rules. Varhol's counsel made
an error, but it was a human error and not a procedurally
fatal error. An experienced district court also made the
error.
Our decision in Eady v. Foerder, 381 E2d 980 (7th
Cir. 1967), was designed to deal with this precise situation. "Eady holds that when a judge extends the time
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within which to file an application for a new trial, and
counsel relies to his detriment on that extension, the
'unique circumstances' of this reliance allow the court
to dispose of the motion before it." Bailey v. Sharp, 782
E2d 1366, 1368 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). If Eady
is good law, then the trial court could [**32] hear the
motion for a new trial and we can consider the merits of
Varhol's damages arguments.
Eady has survived twenty-three years virtually without
criticism except from those who would overrule it today.
It has been favorably commented upon by scholars and
was approved by this Court only four years ago. Bailey,
782 E2dat 1368. It is consistent with the Federal Rules,
Supreme Court precedent, and the principles of justice.
Logic and the principles of stare decisis demand that we
not overrule it and we do not. Eady remains the law of
this Circuit and, therefore, we can reach the merits of
Varhol's damages claim.
At first glance, Eady seems to conflict with the plain
language of the Rules. Rule 6 flatly prohibits extensions of the 10-day time period to file a motion for a
new trial. Textile Banking Co. v. Rentschler, 657 E2d
844, 849 (7th Cir. 1981). This rule is, in some sense,
jurisdictional, in that it places a limit on the district
court's power to entertain a motion for a new trial. See,
e.g., Branion v. Gramty, 855 E2d 1256, 1259 (7th
Cir. 1988). On this basis, Judge Manion and die judges
who join him would overrule Eady. He reasons that the
[*+33] district court has no power to hear the motion;
Eady, he concludes, impermissibly allows the court to
do so.
But Judge Manion's syllogism does not lead to his
conclusion. He claims that: (1) the district court was
without power to extend the time; thus (2) the motion
for the new trial was untimely and outside the [*1569]
court's jurisdiction; and, therefore, (3) the court did
not have the authority to consider the motion. Step
(3), however, is not compelled by steps (1) and (2).
Consider the same syllogism applied to personal jurisdiction: the court has no power under the Constitution
over certain individuals; proceedings over those individuals are outside the court's jurisdiction; so the court can
never hold proceedings where those individuals are subject to the power of the court. That conclusion is simply
not correct: Under the Constitution, courts may lack
jurisdiction over certain individuals, and they may lack
die power to extend their jurisdiction affirmatively to
those people, but, under certain circumstances, they are
permitted to hear cases involving those individuals. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). Judge Manion's logic leads
to a similarly erroneous conclusion when applied [**34]
to statutes of limitation. Like Rule 59(b), courts are
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not free to extend statutes of limitation, but, in certain
circumstances, they can hear cases where the complaint
was filed after the statutory deadline. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(c); see also Roe v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 132
F.2d 829, 832 (7th Cir. 1943); American Nat'I Bank v.
FDIC, 710 E2d 1528,1537 (1 lth Cir. 1983).
With subject matter jurisdiction, of course, the limits on power are absolute. If there is no subject matter
jurisdiction, nothing the parties do can give the court
power to hear the case. Subject matter jurisdiction is
not, however, necessarily the appropriate approach to
the 10-day time deadline of Rule 59(b). Subject matter
jurisdiction is controlled by a statute explicitly labeled
as such. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 et seq. Neither Rule 59 nor
Rule 6 are styled as jurisdictional. Moreover, subject
matter jurisdiction is informed by concerns for federalism. No such concern is present here. And Judge
Manion offers no good reason for treating the time limit
of Rule 59(b) like subject matter jurisdiction, nl The
Rules say nothing on their face about the nature of the
jurisdictional restriction of the Rule 59(b) [**35] time
limit other than that the district court may not extend
it. Had Congress intended the 10-day time period to be
interpreted like subject matter jurisdiction, it could have
said so; yet it was silent. Rule 59(b) can be followed to
its letter, read as jurisdictional, and yet be treated like
personal jurisdiction.
nl Judge Manion urges that his reading of Rules
6 and 59 does not depend on treating them as subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Manion infra at p.
1573. He advances the notion that his suggested result "flows naturally" from a reading of the Rules. I
must take exception with this conclusion. As a logical matter, there is no reason that the time deadlines
of Rule 6 and 59 should not be read like statutes of
limitations, personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or anywhere in between. None of these
approaches and their resultant consequences "flow
naturally" from a reading of the Rules; they are all
policy choices that must be informed by the structure, purposes, and history of the Rules.
Given [**36] that the nature of the jurisdictional deadline of Rule 59(b) can logically fall anywhere on this
continuum, I believe there are good reasons for affirming Eady *s interpretation. Rule 1 requires that the Rules
"be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. R. Civ. P.
1. As Professors Wright and Miller have noted, Eady
is consistent with this mandate because it serves these
interests. See 4A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and
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Procedure $ 1168, at 504-05 (2d ed. 1987).
Justice is served by applying Eady to the present case.
Varhol was informed by the judge that the time deadline
could be extended and he relied on the deadline in good
faith. Amtrak did not raise any objection at the time. If
Amtrak was as uninformed as Varhol, then the incentive
for knowing the Rules to which Judge Manion alludes
is not created by giving Amtrak the benefit of both parties1 mistake. Alternatively, Amtrak knew the rules all
along, and attempted to gain an advantage by keeping
silent while 'Varhol erroneously relied on the judge and
then springing the deadline on him once it was past.
"The Federal Rules [however,] reject the approach that
[**37] pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep
by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept
the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits." [*1570] Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78S. Ct.99,2L.Ed.
2d80
(1957). Justice is served by allowing Varhol to proceed
with his motion; he relied in good faith on a statement
of the district judge.
Moreover, Eady is consistent with the history of the
Federal Rules. As one noted scholar and jurist has noted,
"the advent of the Federal Rules swung the courthouse
door open. They permitted the full development of public law cases and the prompt consideration of the merits.
Parties could no longer rely on clever maneuvers, but
were required to make their best cases on the merits
andfacea dispositive ruling or a trial." Wrinstem, After
Fifty Yean of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are
the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U RL L
REV. 1901, 1920 (1989); see also Conley, 355 US. as
48. When enacting the Rules, " the rulemakers wanted to
escape therigiditiesand technicalities that had attended
the development of procedural codes. . . ."Shapiro,
Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and [**38]
Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV, 1969,1975
(1989); see also Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 U PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U.PA.L.
REV 909 (1987). Eady fulfills this promise: it avoids an
overly rigid interpretation of the Rules and encourages
courts to reach the merits of the dispute.
Eady takes a middle course between treating the time
deadlines like personal jurisdictional limits and subject
matter jurisdictional limits on power. n2 Unlike personal jurisdiction or statutes of limitation, Eady does
not allow parties or the district judge to waive the time
deadlines voluntarily. This middle course provides an
appropriate balance between the institutional concerns
of finality and uniformity and the concern for individual
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justice in a given case. The courts as a whoie have an interest infinalityof judgments beyond that of the individual parties and the parties should not be able to subvert
this. Moreover, justice is achieved through the evenhanded application of the Rules. See Pavelic & LeFlore
v. Marvel Entertainment Corp., [**39] 493 U.S. 120,
110 S. Ct. 456, 107 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1989); Hallstrom
v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 110 S. Ct. 304,
311, 107 L. Ed. 2d 237 (1989); Browder v. Director,
Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 54L.Ea\ 2d 521,
98 S. a. 556 (1978). By refusing to permit parties to
waive the 10-day time limit voluntarily, Eady comports
with these principles. Yet, neither uniformity nor the
institutional interest in finality compel a subject matter
jurisdiction-like approach to the Rules. Cf. Zipes v.
Trans VbrldAirlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 71 L. Ed. 2d
234, 102 S. Ct. 1127(1982).
By not treating the time deadline like subject matter
jurisdiction, Eady is able to provide justice in a limited set of cases to individuals whose potentially valid
substantive claims would be barred by an unyielding interpretation of the procedural rules. Eady, therefore,
provides an equitable balance between possible applications of Rule 6.
n2 It is argued that the approach of this concurrence might require the overruling of Bailey because
Bailey takes a subject matter jurisdictional approach.
Judge Manion infra at p. 1573, n. 1. (Needless
to say, with an evenly divided Court, Bailey, like
Eady, cannot be overruled.) This suggestion is hard
to fathom as what is advocated herein is the reaffirmance of Bailey. Moreover, while advancing new
and hopefully compelling reasons for upholding both
Bailey and Eady, nothing in the proffered logic contradicts those cases. Bailey contains dicta to the effect that once the 10-day time period of Rule 59(b)
expires, recourse lies in appeal, but it then goes on
to reaffirm the Eady exception to this broad statement. By taking this middle ground, Bailey does
not approach the Rules as if they stated limits on
subject matter jurisdiction. Even if it were the case
that the quoted sentences are inconsistent with the
approach of this concurrence (which they are not),
the sections of Bailey quoted by Judge Manion are
dicta and are not contained in the section of Bailey
discussing Eady. It appears a stretch, at the least, to
suggest that a decision is overruled because the underlying logic of a subsequent case conflicts (which
it does not) with a possible interpretation of two sentences of dicta in the prior decision.
[**40]
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Moreover, Eady is consistent with the manner in which
the Supreme Court has interpreted time deadlines under
the Rides. [*1571] Primarily, Eady is in accord with the
mandate that we read the rules for their plain meaning.
Pavelic, 110 S. Ct. at 460. Rule 59(b) on its face is
nothing more than a limitation period. It "sets a definite point in time when litigation shall be at an end."
Browder, 434 U.S. at 264. Neither Rule 59(b) nor Rule
6(b) say anything about waiver on their face. Eady,
therefore, does not conflict with the plain wv^nmg of
the Rules.
Eady is also consistent with Thompson v. INS, 375
US. 384, 11 L. Ed. 2d404,84S. a. 397(1964) mi
Harris Lines v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S.
215, 9L.Ed. 2d 261, 83 S. a. 283 (1962). Vft recognized in Amax Coal v. Director, OWCP, US. Dept.
of Labor, 892 E2d 578 (7th Cir. 1989), that Eady "derive[d] from the analogous decisions in Harris Lines and
Thompson where the Supreme Court recognized an equitable exception to the requirement that notices of appeal
befiledon rime — when counsel relies on the trial court's
assurance that the time to file the notice of appeal has
been extended, either by its discretionary power to do so
under FRCP 59(a) [**41] or by erroneously attempting
to extend the time for filing post-trial motions which toll
the time for filing notice of appeal." Id. at 581 n. 5 (citations omitted). I agree with Judge Manion that Eady
is not compelled by Thompson, but I believe that it is
consistent with it. Bom cases recognize room for equity
in the Rules where a party relies on a representation by
the district judge. Thompson excuses precisely the same
mistake as Eady: a mutual mistake by the district court
and the parties about the power of the court to extend
the time for a Rule 59 motion. Moreover, Thompson
confirms that the time periods in the Rules should not
be interpreted like the rules governing subject matter
jurisdiction.
Judge Manion attempts to distinguish Thompson by
noting that in Thompson a mechanism exists for achieving the outcome that the district court was trying to
reach, so where the district judge could have reached
the same end by a proper procedure, we should not penalize the parties where it did so through an improper
procedure. This argument proves too much, however,
as Judge Manion himself points out that the trial judge
could have created a de facto [**42] 21-day filing deadline in our case by simply withholding the formal entry of judgement for 11 days. There is, therefore, a
nvyfrnnism for achieving the same end. Judge Manion
also attempts to distinguish Thompson by stating that
Thompson merely covers cases of mutual mistake by
the district court and the parties, but that in our situation, there should be no mutual mistakes because the
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district court has no power to hear an untimely motion.
Yet Thompson involves the same mistake as Eady. The
mistake in Thompson cannot be excusable and the mistake in Eady inexcusable. The only difference between
the cases is that they deal with the effects of the same
mistake on different courts. Yet I discern no principled
reason for guarding the jurisdiction of trial courts more
jealously than that of appellate courts.
Eady has also stood the test of time. It has survived
over twenty years of trouble-free life. Judge Manion's
rationales for rejecting Eady existed in 1967 when the
case was decided and no new or compelling reasons have
been advanced for discarding it at this date. n3 Judicial
restraint counsels [*1572] that absent new reasons, we
not reach out to overrule old [**43] precedent.
n3 Judge Manion is correct that I am offering new
reasons for upholding Eady. Judge Manion infra
at p. 1576. The fact that a decision has become
stronger over time once we have had an opportunity
to evaluate it is, however, an argument for upholding the decision, not reversing it. My point about
stare decisis is that Judge Manion offers no new reasons for overruling Eady and, as the judge wishing to change the law, he should shoulder that burden. Respectfully, I can find nothing in his concurring opinion advancing a reason that was not present
when Eady was decided (such as an amendment to the
Rules or the Supreme Court overruling Thompson)
and, therefore, I believe that the burden is not carried.
Moreover, Eady is not inconsistent with Hulson v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa FeRy Co., 289F.2d 726
(1961) and Nugent v. Yellow Cab Co., 295 F.2d 794
(1961). Both those cases hold that district courts
cannot extend time under Rule 59(b). Eady holds
that when the district court inadvertently does so and
counsel relies on the court to its detriment, equity
demands that we allow the court to hear the Rule
59 motion. I believe that these decisions are consistent in the same way that Eady is consistent with
a strict reading of Rules 6 and 59, as outlined in
my opinion. At most, Eady creates an exception to
the rule in those cases, not a wholesale overruling,
which is the course Judge Manion would take today.
Moreover, even if Eady overruled those cases, the
fact that this Court once overruled a decision is not
grounds for displacing the principle of stare decisis,
the mandate that we leave decisions in place absent
new and compelling reasons for overruling them.
Finally, Eady does not stand alone. See Bailey,
782 F.2d at 1368, Amax Coal, 892 E2d at 581 n.
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5, Mayer v. Angelica, 790 E2d 1315, 1338 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1037, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 843, 107 S. Ct. 891 (1987), and Farisie v.
Greer, 705 E2d 882, 898 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
(Swygert, J., concurring), for cases citing Eady with
approval. The Third Circuit has adopted a similar rule in the context of motions for a reduction
of sentence. See Government of the Virgin Islands
v. Gereau, 603 E2d 438, 442 (3d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (motion for reduction of sentence filed beyond the 120-day deadline can be considered if the
parties relied on the district court). Noted scholars
have commented favorably on Eady. See, e.g., 4A
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
1168, at 504-05 (2d ed. 1987). That we have not
had to invoke Eady between 1967 and today stands
t&Rtaynp*\t only to the apparent competence of the district courts in complying with Rule 6, and is not an
implied criticism of Eady.
[**44]
In sum, Eady is consistent with a plain reading of the
Rules, including Rule 1, which, like Rule 6(b), is an act
of Congress which we cannot ignore. It is supported by
Supreme Court precedent, the history of the Rules, and
the principles of stare decisis. Eady, therefore, remains
the law of this Circuit.
Under Eady, we can reach the merits of VarhoTs appeal on the denial of the motion for a new trial. An
order denying a motion for a new trial is committed to
the sound discretion of the district court and, on review,
the district court will not be overturned "except where
exceptional circumstances show a clear abuse of discretion. " Forrester v. White, 846 E2d 29 (7th Or. 1988).
In determining whether to grant a new trial, the district
court must decide if the verdict is against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Id.
The district court denied the motion because it found
that the evidence established that Varhors injuries were
due to the normal symptoms and progression of multiple sclerosis. The same injuries Varhoi claims were
the result of the accident — leg problems, dizziness,
and headaches — could have been symptoms of multiple sclerosis which Varhoi [**45] contracted in 1960.
The jury was entitled to consider the probability that
Varhoi's injuries resulted from a pre-existing disease.
See Abemathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 E2d
963, 973 (7th Cir. 1983). Given the mitigating evidence, I cannot say that the jury's verdict was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. I conclude, therefore, that the district court's decision not to grant a new
trial should be affirmed.
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MANION, Circuit Judge, joined by CUMMINGS,
POSNER, COFFEY, and EASTERBROOK, Circuit
Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring.
The main question we face in this case is whether the
district court properly considered the merits of Varhol's
new trial motion. The answer, based strictly on the
Federal Rules, would appear to be a simple, and resounding, "No!". Rule 59 allows only ten days to serve
a new trial motion. Rule 6(b) forbids district courts from
extending that time, so any extension does not make an
otherwise untimely motion timely. Textile Banking Co.
v. Rentschler, 657 E2d 844, 849 (7th Cir. 1981). Wfe
have repeatedly held that district courts have no power
to grant untimely Rule 59 motions. E.g., Branion v.
Gramfy, 855 F.2d 1256, 1259 (7th Cir. 1988); Bailey
v. Sharp, 782 E2d 1366, 1369 (7th Cir. 1986); Car
Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101,1112
[**46] (7th Cir. 1984); Hulson v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry Co., 289 F.2d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 1961).
Accord Beliz v. W.H. McLeod & Sons Packing Co.,
765 F.2d 1317, 1325 (5th Cir. 1985). Since Varhol's
new trial motion was untimely (despite the trial judge's
purported extension of time to file it), it would appear
the district court had no power to, and should not have,
considered the motion on its merits. If the trial judge
did not have the [*1573] power to consider the merits of
Varhol's new trial motion, we must affirm that decision
without reaching the merits; if the district court could
not properly grant the motion, it could not have been
error to deny it. As a practical consequence, this means
Varhol will have forfeited his opportunity for review of
the amount of damages because a timely motion for new
trial is necessary to preserve that issue for appeal. Hahn
v. Becker, 588 F.2d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 1979).
This reasoning, however, runs head-on into this
court's decision in Eady v. Foerder, 381 F.2d 980 (7th
Cir. 1967). In Eady, the district court told counsel for
the losing party that he could have thirty days to file
any post-trial motions. Counsel, relying on this [**47]
statement, filed a Rule 59 motion 28 days after entry
of judgment. The district court granted the motion. On
appeal, the appellant argued that the district court had no
power to grant the motion because it was untimely. Id.
at 980-81. We rejected this argument, relying on Harris
and Wolfsohn (and thus, impliedly, on Thompson, the
case on which Wolfsohn relied) to hold that where a district court extends the ten-day period to file a new trial
motion, and a party relies on that extension in filing an
untimely motion, the unique circumstances of that reliance allow the district court to consider the motion's
merits. Id. at 981. We have since interpreted Eady to
apply only where a party actually relies on the exten-
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sion; that is, where the party is not aware that the court
cannot extend the time to file the motion. See Bailey,
782 F.2d at 1368-69. Amtrak does not contend that
Varhol's attorneys were aware that the trial judge could
not extend the time for filing his new trial motion, and
thus we assume that they did actually rely on the district court's extension. Therefore, the circumstances in
this case fall squarely into Eady's judge-made exception
[**48] to Rule 59*s time limit.
Whether or not we consider Varhol's damages argument on the merits depends on whether Eady should
remain the law in this circuit. It should not. There are
powerful reasons to overrule Eady, the most important
being that Eady is inconsistent with the federal rules. In
Favelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Corp., 493
U.S. 120, 110 S. Ct. 456, 107 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1989),
the Supreme Court recently reiterated that courts are to
give the federal rules their "plain meaning." Id. 110
S. Ct. at 458. As we have seen, Rules 59 and 6 are
as plain as can be: Rule 59 gives a litigant ten days to
serve post-trial motions, and Rule 6 denies the district
court the authority to extend that time limit.
It follows from this that the district court may not rule
on an untimely Rule 59 motion. The assertion that Rules
59 and 6 do not explicidy spell out the consequences of
a late motion, and that we should thus treat Rule 59's
deadline not as a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction but rather as akin to a requirement of personal jurisdiction or a statute of limitations (both of which can be
waived) does not change this result. The problem is that
Eady allows - in fact, depends on — the district [**49]
court extending the time to file a Rule 59 motion, which
is exactly what Rule 6 expressly prohibits. The rules'
drafters did not have to spell out the consequences of a
late-filed Rule 59 motion; those consequences flow naturally from Rule 6's prohibition of extension of time to
file Rule 59 motions. Even Professors Wright and Miller
admit that "an intelligent reading of the rules [makes] it
quite clear that the district court has no authority. . . to
entertain a new trial motion [served] more than ten days
following entry of judgment. . . ." 4A Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1168, at 506 (2d ed. 1987). nl
nl My position that we should overrule Eady does
not depend on calling Rules 6 and 59 rules of subject matter jurisdiction (in the strict sense). In any
event, it is too late in the day to question the "jurisdictional" nature of the time limits in Rules 6 and
59. In Bailey, this court issued a writ of mandamus
ordering a district court to vacate an order granting
a new trial because the movant in district court had
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served his new trial motion after the ten-day limit
set by Rules 59 and 6 had expired. See 782 E2d at
1369. The premise on which we granted the writ was
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant a
new trial because the new trial motion was untimely.
See id at 1367, 1369. Bailey made the jurisdictional nature of Rules 6 and 59, and the nature of the
"jurisdiction" of which it spoke, abundantly clear:
Rules 6 and 59 allocate decision-making authority
between the district court and the court of appeals.
Once the time prescribed for a motion lapses, the
parties' recourse lies in appeal rather than continued
importuning of the district judge.

Id. at 1368. Language speaking about the allocation of decision-making authority between trial and
appellate courts is the language of subject matter jurisdiction. The approach Judge Flaum' s concurrence
takes would at least require us to question if not overrule Bailey, a decision on which his concurrence relies.
[**50]
[*1574] Whether Rules 59 and 6 limit a court's subject
matter jurisdiction, strictly speaking, is not important.
What is important is that the rules set limits, and that
those limits lead to the conclusion that district courts
may not decide untimely Rule 59 motions. The real issue here is whether the federal rules, as written, bind
the federal courts. On this issue, the Supreme Court has
recently and emphatically spoken: in applying the federal rules, our task is to apply the rules' text as we find
it, not to change it or attempt to improve it. See Pavelic
& LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 460. Appeals to Rule 1 and
"the interest of justice" do not excuse us from heeding
this command. The problem with relying on Rule 1 is
that Rule 1 is a rule of construction. Eady, however,
did not construe the rules; it ignored them. The panel
in Eady did not mention Rule 1, or even attempt to relate its holding to the text of any federal rules. Rules
of construction such as Rule 1 are necessary to interpret
unclear statutes. Rules 59 and 6, however, do not require a rule of construction to aid in their interpretation.
Rule 1 just does not apply to this case, and we ought
not use that rule as a warrant [**51] to bend the other
rules any time an arguably harsh result may offend our
sense of "justice." Cf. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S.
21, 27-32, 91 L. Ed. 2d 18, 106 S. Ct. 2379 (1986)
(rejecting arguments based on Rule 1 and the truisms
that pleading is not a "game of skill" and that courts are
not to avoid decisions on the merits because of "mere
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technicalities," because in interpreting a clear rule "the
choice . . . is between recognizing or ignoring what
the Rule provides in plain language.").
If district courts really need a mechanism to extend
the time for filing post-trial motions after entering a
judgment, it is up to the Supreme Court and Congress,
through the procedure established by the Rules Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, to provide that mechanism. n2
The judiciary and Congress "have established a long tradition of shared responsibility" in regulating practice and
procedure in the federal courts, a tradition "embodied
principally . . . in the Rules Enabling Act" The Act
"was designed to foster a uniform system of procedure
throughout the federal system. . . . " See G. Heileman
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 Eld 648, 665
(7th Cir. 1989) (Ripple, J., dissenting). Though local
courts may supplement [**52] the federal rules, that supplementation may not conflict with the rules. See id.;
Fed.R.Civ.R 83. Courts of appeals and district courts
have no power to change the federal rules on their own
and upset the uniform procedural system Congress and
the Supreme Court have established. By ignoring the
clear text of Rules 59 and 6 — in effect, amending those
rules — Eady subverts the relationship between the judiciary and Congress in regulating practice and procedure
in the federal courts embodied in the Rules Enabling
Act.
n2 In any event, such a change is probably not necessary. A judge who wants to give the parties more
than ten days to file post-trial motions can easily do
that by postponing the formal entry of judgment by
any amount of time necessary. See Fed.R.Civ.R 58.
So, Eady not only created an unauthorized exception
to the rules' time limits; it also created an unnecessary one.
Eady's inconsistency with the federal rules, and the
damage Eady does to the rulemaking process established
by Congress [**53] and the judiciary are themselves
compelling reasons to overrule Eady. But there are other
reasons as well. Eady, as we interpreted it in Bailey v.
Sharp, 782 E2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1986), applies only to
lawyers who have never heard of the case and are ignorant of the rules prohibiting extensions of time to file
post-trial motions. [*1575] See id. at 1368-69. Eady
requires actual reliance on the district judge's misstatement; a lawyer who discovers Eady or reads the federal
rules cannot actually rely on the misstatement because he
knows (or should know) the judge is wrong. Eady thus
rewards the uninformed (or those who pretend to be).
Not knowing the rules, however, is something to be de-
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terred, not promoted. Certainly, uninformed attorneys
do not benefit litigants or the court system. n3
n3 While Eady supposedly states an "equitable"
exception to the rules, it is puzzling why this equitable exception should apply here but not in Bailey.
Bailey was a much more compelling case. In
Bailey, the lawyer relying on Eady did what a good
lawyer should do: he researched the law regarding
time limits on post-trial motions and found Eady.
Unfortunately, he misread Eady as saying that a
district court can generally hear untimely motions,
rather than as stating an equitable exception to the
rules. (This is the inevitable result of Eady's muddying the waters; the rules themselves are clear, and
had the lawyer in Bailey had only the rules before
him he could only have concluded the district court's
extension of time was improper.) See Bailey, 782
E2d at 1368. In this case, Varhol's lawyer took
the judge's word without doing his homework. It
seems odd (and far from "equitable") to penalize
the litigant whose lawyer actually did his homework
(but made an honest mistake in misreading what he
found) while not penalizing the litigant whose lawyer
failed to do what he should have done — research the
problem. For an "equitable" exception, Eady hardly
seems to apply equitably.
Moreover, the fact that Amtrak's counsel may have
been uninformed, or may even have kept silent to
spring a procedural trap does not, as Judge Flaum's
concurrence implies, excuse Varhol's lawyer's failure to know the rules. Even in procedural matters,
two wrongs do not make a right.
[**54]
Moreover, since application of Eady turns on a
lawyer's knowledge of the law, the district court's jurisdiction over a post-trial motion could turn on a detailed
factual inquiry into counsel's knowledge, thought processes, and even honesty (is the lawyer really unaware,
or is he just pretending?). Rules 59 and 6 are clear and
simple, as they should be. Courts and litigants can know
what is properly before a court without bogging down in
procedural minutiae. Detailed factual inquiries into an
attorney's state of mind such as Eady may require, besides being unseemly, disrupt that clarity and simplicity.
See Bailey, 782 E2d ax 1373 (concurring opinion).
If the Supreme Court's unique circumstances cases
compelled the result in Eady, we would be bound to
uphold Eady despite the reasons for overruling it. But
Harris and Thompson do not compel Eady, and probably do not even support it. Harris and Thompson both
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depended on the fact that certain things that occur in the
district court may extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal. The question in those cases was how a mutual
mistake between the judge and the parties about the existence of that time [**55] extending act — in Harris,
a possibly erroneous finding of excusable neglect and
extension of time to appeal before the original appeal
period had run, and in Thompson an erroneous extension of time to file a Rule 59 motion — would affect
the appeal. See Bailey, 782 E2d at 1369-70 (concurring
opinion). The Court in Harris and Thompson merely
held, in effect, that courts of appeals should not penalize litigants when such mutual mistakes occur.
There is no rule allowing district court judges to extend the time to file post-trial motions, and Rule 6
flatly prohibits extensions. There can be no mutual
mistake about how an erroneous extension would affect the court's ability to hear a post-trial motion: the
district court has no power to hear an untimely motion. Thompson stands for the proposition that a district court'8 mistake, where a mechanism exists for extending the time to appeal, should not deprive the court
of appeals of jurisdiction. Eady, however, allows the
district court to expand its own power to hear a posttrial motion beyond the limits the federal rules set and
in the face of a rule that expressly disallows such extensions. Nothing in [**56] Thompson or Harris (or
any other Supreme Court case we know of) suggests
that courts should be able to expand their own power
simply by asserting that power. Indeed, far from being compelled by any Supreme Court precedent, Eady
is contrary to a number of recent Court cases holding
that courts are to apply the federal rules as [*1576] written, and emphasizing the importance of strictly enforcing Congressionally-mandated procedural requirements,
even if the result seems somewhat arbitrary or even unfair. See, e.g., Pavelic, 493 U.S. 120, 110 S. O. 456,
107 L. Ed. 2d 438; Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,
493 US. 20, 110 S. Ct. 304, 311, 107L. Ed. 2d 237
(1989) ("In the long run, experience teaches that strict
adherence to the procedural requirements specified by
the legislature is the best guarantee of even-handed administration of the law."); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger
Co.,487U.S.312,101LEd
2d285,108S. Ct. 2405
(1988) (Fed.R.App.P. 3(c) requires each party appealing a judgment be named in notice of appeal; appellate
court has no jurisdiction over appeal against parties not
named); Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 27-32; Baldwin County
Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147,152, 80L. Ed.
2d 196,104 S. Ct. 1723 (1984) (judges may not disregard procedural requirements "out of a vague sympathy
[**57] for particular litigants").
The Second Circuit has recognized that Thompson
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does not support Eady's holding. In Long Island Radio
Co. v. NLRB, 841 E2d 474, 478-79 (2d Cir. 1988),
the court rejected an argument, based on Thompson's
unique circumstances doctrine, that the National Labor
Relations Board had jurisdiction to consider an untimely
attorney's fee application because the Board had mistakenly granted an extension of time to file the application. The Second Circuit declined to extend Thompson,
reasoning that "there was no suggestion in Thompson
that the district court, in misstating the timeliness of the
new-trial motion, had succeeded in enlarging its own
jurisdiction to entertain that motion." Id. at 478-79.
The Second Circuit cited not Eady, but the concurrence
in Bailey (which criticized and urged overruling Eady),
and the Second Circuit analysis effectively repudiated
Eady. Thus, Eady puts us in conflict with another circuit.
Since Eady is inconsistent with the federal rules and
not compelled by any Supreme Court precedent, the only
reason left for not overruling it is stare decisis, or as our
colleagues put it, "the [**58] test of time." But stare
decisis does not compel us to uphold Eady merely because it has been around a long time. Judge Flaum's
concurrence in this case is the first attempt by any judge
in this (or any other) circuit to attempt to supply a principled basis for Eady's holding. Eady itself offered no
rationale for its holding other than citations to Harris
and Wolfsohn. The panel in Eady completely ignored
the federal rules (around which any discussion of the
problem faced in Eady and here must turn), and railed
to present or analyze any arguments for or against its
holding. Eady also ignored two earlier decisions from
this court, Hulson v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry
Co., 289 F.2d 726 (1961), and Nugent v. Yellow Cab
Co., 295 F.2d 794 (1961), both of which held that district courts had no power to rule on untimely Rule 59
motions despite the fact that the district courts in those
cases had expressly extended the time for filing those
motions. Given that no basis for Eady's holding has
ever been advanced in this circuit until today, it is at
best creative to suggest that stare decisis compels us to
uphold Eady because "the rationales [**59] for rejecting Eady existed in 1967 when the case was decided."
It is also ironic to rely on stare decisis, given Eady's
treatment (or, more accurately, nontreatment) of Hulson
and Nugent, which only six years earlier had rejected
the very approach Eady took. What happened to stare
decisis then?
As for the "test of time": Despite having more than
twenty years to pick up support, no other case, in this
circuit or other circuits, has followed Eady. (There is
a passing reference to Eady in Mayer v. Angelica, 790
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F.2d 1315, 1338 (7th Cir. 1988), that could be read
as approving Eady, but Mayer specifically bypassed the
procedural problem so its reference to Eady is dictum.)
See Bailey, 782 F.2d at 1370 (concurring opinion); 4A
Wright & Miller, supra, § 1168, at 505 (stating that "no
other circuit has followed the result in Eady," a statement that the 1990 pocket part does not retract, and
that our colleagues' concurrence [*1577] does not challenge). n4 In fact, as we have seen, the Second Circuit
has (at least implicitly) rejected Eady and adopted the
approach of the Bailey concurrence (which was also the
approach of Hulson [**60] and Nugent, the two cases
from this circuit Eady ignored). It is just incorrect to
say that Eady has "stood the test of time"; if anything,
Eady's failure to attract support from other courts indicates that it has flunked that test and is ripe to be
overruled. Preserving Eady places us on the wrong side
of an intercircuit conflict, a conflict the Supreme Court
would certainly resolve against us given Eady's inconsistency with the federal rules and the Court's insistence
that we apply those rules as written. This court should
overrule Eady and affirm the district court's decision not
to order a new trial on damages based on Varhoi's failure
to file a timely new trial motion to properly preserve the
damages issue.
n4 It is true that the Third Circuit has adopted a
rule similar to the rule created in Eady in the context of motions for sentence reduction under the pre1987 amendment version of Fed.R.Crim.P. 35. See
Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 603 F.2d 438, 442 (3d Cir.
1979). But Gereau, like Eady, offered no rationale
for its holding other than citation to the Supreme
Court's unique circumstances cases, which were no
more applicable to the situation in Gereau than they
were to the situation in Eady. More importantly,
the Third Circuit has recently questioned the viability of the unique circumstances doctrine, and in that
discussion also questioned Gereau's viability. See
Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 899 F.2d 1360,
1364-65 (3d Cir. 1990). In Kraus, the Third Circuit
"assumed arguendo" that it could apply the unique
circumstances doctrine, but stated that it would "narrowly construed and sparingly apply the 'unique circumstances' exception to time requirements." Id.
at 1365 (citation omitted). Given Kraus, one may
seriously question whether the Third Circuit would
continue following its holding in Gereau, a holding
that Judge Flaum's concurrence implicitly acknowledges, concurring opinion at 1568, is not compelled
by the Supreme Court's unique circumstances cases.
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